

Politics for Diversity: Hospitality versus Foreignness

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Abstract: In this article, we start by looking at the ‘reasons’ we might have for not showing solidarity with those from ‘outside’, from different cultures, by analyzing the arguments of Huntington and Sartori. Secondly, we will analyze the tensions between cultures as a human characteristic and the diversity of cultures, the notion of strange and stranger, the fear of difference, and in any case, the solid relationship that is manifested between human beings even when we consider one another strangers. We defend the notion that the relationship between human beings will be violent when the solid bonds that constitute the original solidarity of our relationships break down. Finally, we will review all these factors to create indicators of solidarity based on the right to hospitality that constitutes the human capacity of moral beings. Our thesis is that we are immoral if we are not hospitable, and therefore we need to create a politics for diversity.

Key words: stranger, immigration, hospitality, solidarity, cultural diversity, dialogue among civilizations.

Resumen: En este trabajo tomaremos como punto de partida las “razones” que podríamos tener para no ser solidarios con los “de fuera”, con los que tienen culturas “diferentes” analizando argumento de autores como Huntington y Sartori. En segundo lugar, analizaremos las tensiones entre cultura como característica de los seres humanos y la diversidad de culturas, la aparición de la noción de extraño y extranjero, el miedo a la diferencia y, en cualquier caso, la sólida relación que se manifiesta entre los seres humanos incluso cuando nos consideramos extraños. Defenderemos que la relación entre los seres humanos será violenta, cuando rompa esos vínculos sólidos que constituyen la solidaridad originaria de nuestras relaciones. Finalmente recapitularemos para dar indicadores de solidaridad basados en el derecho a la hospitalidad como constitutivo de la capacidad humana de ser morales. La tesis será que somos inmorales si no somos hospitalarios, de ahí que necesitemos políticas para la diversidad.

Palabras clave: extranjero, inmigración, hospitalidad, solidaridad, diversidad cultural, diálogo de civilizaciones.

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Introduction

In these reflections¹ I set out to propose a new politics based on the recognition of the “different diversities” that constitute us as human beings: diversities of gender and cultures, of religions and ideologies, and of all the differences that make up the richness of our humanity. We will see how the discovery of others as different can lead to fear by revealing our frailty and interdependence. We have witnessed how one response to fear is domination, at times violent, of some human beings over others. This underpins the definition of politics in the western tradition in terms of who holds the monopoly on violence. In as far as our commitment is to research different ways of making peace(s), we are also committed to finding alternative politics to confront the fear of difference, human frailty and the unforeseeable violent consequences of our actions. These ways of understanding politics are bound up with the discovery of difference and diversity as enriching, not a reason for domination.

First, we examine the ‘reasons’ we might have for not showing solidarity to ‘outsiders’, those from ‘different’ cultures, by analyzing the work of Huntington and Sartori. In their line of thinking, solidarity must first be shown towards ‘our own’, those from our culture which we must defend. Second, we analyze the tensions between cultures as a human characteristic, and the diversity of cultures, the appearance of the notion of strange and stranger, the fear of difference and, in any case, the solid relationship that is manifested between human beings even when we consider one another strangers. We defend the notion that the relationship between human beings will be violent when the solid bonds constituting the original solidarity of our relationships break down. Finally, we will review all these factors to create indicators of solidarity based on the right to hospitality that constitutes the human capacity of moral beings. Our thesis is that we are immoral if we are not hospitable, and therefore we need to create a politics for diversity.

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Why should we show solidarity to those who “threaten us”?

Huntington and Sartori

We might start from some of the questions posed in my book, *Filosofía para hacer las paces* (Philosophy for making peace(s), Martínez Guzmán, 2001):

Why should we share the resources of our territories with ‘strangers’? Why should people who come from ‘outside’ have ‘rights’, as though they were citizens of our political systems—autonomous regions, nationalities, Nation States—that we have built through ‘our own efforts’? What responsibility do we have for their ‘fate’? Why do we feel threatened by their arrival? Are some of us more citizens than others? What relationship is there between citizenship and cultures? (277).

And:

Why should we show solidarity to immigrants? Why should we have any kind of commitment to other human beings, especially the excluded, marginalized, battered women, homeless children, or those dying of hunger in Ethiopia and Eritrea? Isn’t it enough that I treat my own family and my own people in the right way? (307).

These questions are reactions to feelings we often have, although we also sense that they are ‘politically incorrect’. I believe there is an ethnocentric reaction from ‘intellectuals’ in the rich global north in which it seems they ‘courageously’ argue that they ‘have had enough of being politically correct’, that ‘it’s time to call a spade a spade’, highlighting the ultimate triumph of western civilization and even proclaiming the end of history (Daniel, 1997; Fukuyama, 1992). Some go as far as to state, in true pamphleteering style backed by little scholarship, that the time has come to say outright that the events of September 11 in 2001 are part of the struggle for world domination between western and Islamic civilizations, and that migration to the north is part of the Islamic strategy for dominance (Fallaci, 2001).

Unfortunately, these extreme positions can also erode the ‘political correctness’ of other claims that say, equally frankly and in the same pamphleteering style, that our culture, the culture of human rights, has established a global economy grounded on the exploitation and exclusion of part of the world that dies of hunger every day because of the way human resources are organized. Without political correctness, these murders sustain our well-being at the expense of their misery; in the same way that the domestic violence of the patriarchal system is murder, or the air bombings of defenseless civilians in the name of democracy and the removal of dictators: to the extent that they are indiscriminate civilian deaths, they are terrorist killings.

The 'trap' is evidently to go along with those who promote the 'clash of civilizations' argument; while others, from the position of responsibility we have in the universities or in social movements, seek dialogue and interpellation between civilizations, cultures and beliefs, precisely in order to transform the economic conditions that cause the misery, marginalization and exclusion of some by others. *We demand academic rigor in our research, courses and publications like the one in which these articles appear, not only because of an aesthetic attitude, but because we have a responsibility to attend to those who seek our interpellation from their position as marginalized or excluded.*

In the aforementioned book (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 142, 253, 261 s., 270, 288, 320 s.), I explored how the arguments of renowned authors like Huntington (1997a; 1997b) stoke ethnocentric feelings. In what follows I summarize his reasoning, before turning to the arguments of another influential author, Giovanni Sartori.

Huntington

Huntington's proposals can be summarized in the following points, according to my interpretation:

1. The characteristics of what we call western civilization are: the classical Greek and Roman legacy; western Christianity; the plurality of European languages; the separation of spiritual and temporal authority; the rule or governance of law; pluralism and civil society; representative bodies; and individual liberty.
2. Clearly, these characteristics do not mean ours is the only civilization; other civilizations exist. However, they are what give our civilization the singularity and uniqueness that we must defend.
3. It is also true that modernization and economic development do not actually require or produce cultural westernization, according to Huntington. Rather, they should promote commitment to indigenous cultures.
4. Nevertheless, in both the individual and the social sphere, modernization and development cause crises of identity which may find an answer in religion. Either the Christian or the secular nature of western civilization therefore leads to a cultural reaction, especially in Muslim or Asian societies.

5. The consequence of this cultural reaction is a 'clash of civilizations', according to which the universality of western values, led by the United States, is regarded as imperialism.
6. We should leave those involved to sort out regional conflicts among themselves.
7. Accordingly, western values should not be universalized, but rather, the west should be supported to defend them, led by the US. To do this Huntington proposes at least two measures: *a)* control immigration in non-western societies and ensure that those granted entry assimilate; *b)* consider NATO as the security organization of western civilization, its main objective being the defense and preservation of that civilization. These are strong arguments that, like those proposed by Sartori we will see below, seep into western opinion, even —or especially— among ordinary people, making them 'afraid' that their well-being will be lost.

My point-by-point reflections on Huntington's thesis are:

1. Among the characteristics of western civilization that Huntington does not explain, and that I believe are also present, are: male domination; north-south domination; the nullification and subjugation of other cultures and knowledges; the imposition of a global economic model that, as we have seen, causes the exclusion, marginalization and poverty in the world; the manufacture of weapons to wage war in the peripheries and to enable wars between the same peripheries that, hypocritically, we classify as 'savage'. If they really were 'savages', they would fight with slings and stones, spears and daggers, not 'our' missiles and aircraft.
2. We must self-critically accept that these characteristics are also part of the singularity of western civilization or, what would be more dangerous but has been claimed by radical critics of modern western rationality, that these characteristics are 'inherent' to the very singularity of the apparently positive characteristics.
3. Could an alternative line, suggested by Huntington himself, be that modernization and economic development should not produce cultural westernization, but rather a commitment to indigenous cultures that, in my interpretation (Martínez Guzmán, 2002b) can and must have their own forms of domination and economic development? Or, on the contrary, is the relationship

- between positive and negative characteristics so close that even these positive indicators necessarily continue to be 'cultural westernization'? Is the very domination of 'indigenous people' not a 'cultural westernization' for the 'other' cultures?
4. In fact, Huntington himself recognizes that modernization and development (understood as western) lead to a 'crisis of identity', especially in Muslim and Asian societies that look for answers in religion. This is their 'reaction' against western Christian and secular civilization. Is it not true, therefore, that the commitment to indigenous cultures Huntington seems to propose does not exist? Can the abstract idea that 'modernization and development lead to crises of identity' not only be interpreted in terms of 'crises of identity', but also as having economic roots, since the west, in the name of the only civilization, has appropriated the resources for survival of those now in crisis—a crisis not only of 'identity' but of denied access to their own resources, famines, and the unmet expectations caused by western modernization and development? Is turning to religion not a search in their own roots for an alternative to the misery, marginalization and exclusion brought about by the west?
 5. In this sense, it is true that the cultural relationship can be said to cause the clash of civilizations, but *the cultivation of human relationships that generate exclusion and marginalization, where some cultures are victims and others, victimizers, must also be included in the meaning of culture* in this relationship, even though it is not recognized just how much these cultures lose by promoting certain values and not others.
 6. Thus, culture would also include economic bases and the satisfaction of basic needs, one of which is obviously identity. People not only have the right to survive, but to do so in accordance with their own beliefs, cultures and values (Sen, 2000), just as, in the end, we do in the west. Therefore, the clash of civilizations 1) is not only the 'reaction' to, but also the 'consequence' of domination, and 2) is not only 'cultural' or civilizing in the abstract sense, but it also takes into account domination and dominated civilizations, and specific integrated, marginalized or excluded people.
 7. Regarding Huntington's proposal to leave those involved to sort out their cultural conflicts, I could agree if it meant no longer wiping out their resources, controlling their economies, fostering corruption

among their elites, and continuing to sell them weapons. I would not agree if it meant, having carried out all the above, that they are left 'to kill each other'. As we will see below, we need new forms of governance to tackle questions such as these.

Huntington claims, seemingly 'for good', that we should not universalize western values, but rather defend ourselves to protect them. Given all the above analysis, the questions would be: should we defend ourselves from others, or from ourselves? Why must the US lead this defense? Where is pluralism and individual liberty in this? Should we control immigration? How many immigrants do we need to maintain public health services, pensions and general social services in Europe? How do we tackle the causes that force immigrants to leave their own countries? Would simple 'assimilation' be a failure to assume our responsibilities as 'creators' of the world order that causes immigration? If the response is NATO as a military defense against movements north from the south, we are obviously not assuming our responsibility.

Sartori

A book by another significant author (Sartori, 2001), a democratic theorist, also spells out the feelings we might have as westerners. I summarize his proposals in the following points:

1. A good society is a pluralist society. Pluralism is different from *multiculturalism*, the doctrine that promotes ethnic and cultural differences (7).
2. A pluralist society is an *open* society; indeed, the *genetic code* of an open society is pluralism (15). The specific problem is: how open can it be? Can it take in every 'stranger or foreigner' without disintegrating as a pluralist society? (8).
3. Pluralism has a historical precedent and premise: the idea of religious tolerance. The difference is that tolerance *respects* others' values. Pluralism *affirms* diversity and dissent *as its own values*: *concordia discors*, discordant harmony as the source of liberal democracy. This is how 'parties' cease to be 'factions' to move into political life. Unanimity becomes suspicious (19, 21, 24).
4. Religious tolerance has also taught us the distinction between the sphere of God and the sphere of Caesar to depoliticize society, as well as the voluntary associations encouraged by the Puritans (20).

5. So the beliefs of pluralism are not revealed 'faiths', but make up a *secularized* culture (31 s.). Unlike the defenders of multiculturalism, they do not require the mere recognition of multiculturalism as a fact, but rather a voluntary, *mutual recognition* (33 s.).
6. Pluralism is based on the dialectics of dissent, it domesticates conflict, and makes it peaceful because it starts out from an underlying consensus (36).
7. Pluralism uses majority rule as an instrument, but with respect for minorities so as to maintain a genuine pluralism (37 s.).
8. Pluralism understands politics as *peace* not as war in the Hobbesian sense because it respects the different spheres of life: religious, political and economic (38).
9. Pluralism is not mere fragmentation, but is formed by *voluntary* associations and *multiple affiliations*. If a society is based on ethnic, religious or linguistic identity alone, or on their coincidence, it is not a plural society but a closed society, which may turn invasive and aggressive. The lines that divide us cross each other (cross-cutting cleavages) (40).
10. Against this backdrop, he explains that tolerance is neither indifference, nor mere relativism. One who tolerates holds beliefs that they consider true, and accepts that others have the right to cultivate 'mistaken beliefs' (41). It is therefore not unlimited, although it is elastic. Its degree of elasticity is set with three criteria: we must provide reasons for what we consider intolerable, we must do no harm, and it must always be reciprocal (42 s.).
11. In turn, consensus always involves *sharing* linked to the notion of *community* that in some way *unites* (43); a community not necessarily bound to the Nation State, which has accomplished its role, but in any case a community (*koinonia*, *Gemeinschaft*) to which we feel we belong. He believes neither in the friend-enemy opposition, nor in the cosmopolitan community. He admits there is always a *frontier* between *us* and *them*. Otherness is the necessary complement to identity (48).
12. However, the community is not uniform, but pluralist (tolerant, structured into voluntary associations, multiple affiliations and cross-cutting cleavages). These characteristics are only found in the *western* or *westernized* world (50).
13. In the period 1845–1925, around 50 million people arrived in the United States, and between 1900 and 1913, 10 million. The *melting*

pot simile refers to the crucible where the origins, races and languages of 100 million immigrants were mixed together to constitute a nation of nationalities. Those who arrived found “an immense empty space; they wanted and actively sought a new homeland, and they were happy to become Americans” (51).

14. In contrast, the European states are constituted nations –although non-assimilated borders (Flemish, Basque) are recognized– a world without empty spaces and with relatively few ‘newcomers’. Today’s immigrants to Europe are *contra-nationalities* because they may reject the constituted national identities, which is why western Europeans “are worried, they feel invaded and they are reacting” (51).
15. He rejects describing this reaction as *racism* because it is necessary to be specific rather than generalize. “The reaction is, above all, defense of jobs and salaries” in the case of immigrants from Eastern Europe. It is “xenofear”: “feeling insecure and potentially threatened”. It can lead to rejection (xenophobia), at which point it is real, authentic racism (52).
16. Xenophobia targets African and practicing Muslim immigrants. It is not only a racial rejection, because it is not applied to the same extent to those of Asian or Indian origin. “Above all, it is a reaction of cultural-religious rejection”, characterized by fanaticism or religious militancy, or not fanatic but with a theocratic vision that does not accept the separation of state and church, politics and religion, that underpins western pluralism. He also says that “Sharia does not recognize the rights of man (of the person) as universal, inviolable individual rights”. “The westerner does not see the Muslim as an ‘infidel’. But for the Muslim, the westerner is” (53).
17. Can pluralist tolerance yield not only to ‘cultural strangers’ but also to openly aggressive ‘cultural enemies’? Can pluralism accept the collapse of the pluralist community or, in parallel, can democracy accept its democratic destruction, that its citizens elect a dictator?
18. Diversity is not merely enrichment. It requires “a reciprocity in which the beneficiary (the incomer) *owes* the benefactor (the host) their recognition as a beneficiary, *recognizes their debt*” (54). Pluralism is living together in difference with compensation; there is an acquisition and a concession.
19. He criticizes the current version of multiculturalism, which he regards as anti-pluralist: English neo-Marxists influenced by Foucault,

- cultural studies focused on the *hegemony* and the *domination* of one culture over others, the replacement of the anticapitalist class struggle with an anti-establishment cultural struggle; they are intolerant, they reject mutual recognition, and they prioritize separation over integration (63 s), referring not only to ‘races’, but also claimed by feminist proponents of separate cultures (66).
20. From this theoretical section on pluralism and the critique of multiculturalism, he considers the immigrant as *alien*, *straniero* in Italian, who causes ‘alienness’; they are distinct from the domestic different, a different alien, ‘strange’, ‘foreign’. That is, “the immigrant possesses—in the eyes of the host society—an additional diversity, an extra or excess of otherness” (107), which may be related to language or customs (“surmountable aliennesses”); or many be religious or ethnic (“radical aliennesses”) (108).
 21. *Who* to integrate? Nationality and race were integrated in America; in Europe, rich and poor classes. He insists that, to date, migration out of Europe has been greater than its role as host to immigrants because of accelerated demographic growth and because the New World offered a free, welcoming space (110). Today it imports immigrants because it is *rich* and there are jobs that not even Europeans will take, as they can live on unemployment benefits without having to work; but also because they *do not know how to stop them*. It is not only because Africa is poor –it always has been– but because of the demographic explosion and the erosion of the agricultural population (111). The problem cannot be resolved, nor even ameliorated, by taking in more immigrants...because that just incites others to make the journey (112).
 22. *How* to integrate? Fools say by giving them citizenship (112). That is not always the case: it depends whether they are alien just because of their language and customs, or because of their religious and ethnic alienness. In Europe citizenship is determined by inheritance from our parents in the old countries (*jus sanguinis*) or by *jus soli*, by place of birth in new countries formed by immigrants. Muslims only recognize as citizens the faithful and *optimo jure*, full entitlement or full rights (113); they identify *citizen* with *believer* and do not allow dual citizenship. *Therefore, citizenship is only granted to those who can be integrated, and who, in addition, commit to contributing to production and are legal, ‘with papers’.*

23. *How many* to integrate? “A foreign population of 10 percent can be accommodated; 20 percent probably could not be; and 30 percent would likely result in strong resistance. Would resisting be ‘racism’? Admitting (but not consenting) that it would, but then the blame for this racism would lie with those who created it” (121).

My reflections on this author, whom, it must be said, I have studied and whose research on democracy I have learned from, are detailed in what follows.

1. In the first two points in my summary, he gives an exclusionary definition of pluralism in that it does not include ethnic and cultural differences as constitutive elements of this pluralism. It is a way of ‘closing’ what he considers an open society, even more so when he poses the problem of how open it should be. The pluralistic society he proposes from the same stance intrinsically includes in its own definition that it will have “strangers or foreigners” that could cause it to unravel as a pluralistic society. It is a pluralistic society since in its definition it stokes fear of difference and diversity and takes a defensive position. Diverse and different people are strangers who must be defended against, as Huntington said, in case “they cause the disintegration of our pluralistic society”. I suppose it will be pluralistic just ‘for some’.
2. In points three, four and five, despite the contradictions I point out above, Sartori claims that his proposal of pluralism is based on diversity and dissent. Yet it is obviously diversity and dissent within a limited set of people and groups because it excludes strangers and foreigners. He claims that unanimity becomes suspicious, but he is actually defending a plurality confined to “our group”, which is unanimously against those it considers strangers and foreigners. A sign of distinction is the religious tolerance that has led to the separation of religion and politics, a secularized culture that presupposes mutual and voluntary recognition which, however, is incapable of voluntarily recognizing the possibility of other people and groups having other beliefs, although he says he respects the spheres of life, religion, politics and the economy, as noted in point eight. He says nothing about whether politics and the economy will become the new ‘revealed faiths’, now with arguments cloaked in science explained from a certain way of understanding knowledge, which may use “para-religious dogmas” to restrict liberty and the possibility of alternatives with new market-based idols and theology

- (Assmann, 1997; Sanahuja, 2001; Sen, 1997). In point nine he does not accept that ethnic and religious elements can also be lines that divide us and interweave, and form our mixed or hybrid identities.
3. In point eleven, he accepts that some communities may not necessarily be bound to the Nation State, but that are communities of belonging. However, despite claiming not to believe in the friend-enemy opposition, nor in the cosmopolitan community, he does accept that there are frontiers between us and them. This seems to lead him to conclude that “otherness is the necessary complement to identity”. Certainly, but in reciprocal interaction and, in my view, precisely ‘without frontiers’. Certainly, the identities of people and communities of belonging are always forged through interaction that can frequently arouse fear in some against others. These fears can be confronted by regarding these others as foreigners and strangers-‘enemies’ in the end despite Sartori’s denial that this is the case; or they can be confronted by considering, as we attempt to do here, by clarifying the interactions of all people and groups in the cosmos, although Sartori states that he does not believe in the cosmopolitan community. However, he does presume its existence because he cautions that we must defend ourselves against strangers from other parts of the cosmos who do not share our “unanimous idea of plural society, open exclusively to us, and that is the good society”.
 4. *My interpretation is that up to this point, the book’s general argument is circular:* certain *apparently universal* characteristics, linked to the western tradition, are set out that *all pluralism* should have. He then concludes that *only* the western world can have these characteristics. Obviously only the west can have them because it is precisely the western world that has universalized them.
 5. Turning now to the subject of immigration in point thirteen, it seems that those arriving in the US did not find the nations, peoples and cultures that they subjugated, but rather “an immense empty space”. I think that statement speaks for itself. There were no *counternationalities* in those migrations. Counternationalities do arise in the migrations to Europe today, because these immigrants may reject our constituted national identities. And with these arguments, the great democratic theorist, whose work many of us studied avidly, continues to propagate fear among European citizens based on ‘intellectual’ arguments to exacerbate their

concerns, feelings of invasion, and their justification for reaction. He does not believe this is racism (and even if it is, he goes on to say that the blame lies with the incomers, since they are the ones that provoke it), but rather “*xenofear*”, which can lead to xenophobia, especially against African and Muslim immigrants and those of Islamic faith. *As we can see, he has prepared the ground to socially construct the enemy and now clearly states who that is.*

6. The problem is precisely the reaction of cultural-religious rejection, based on their theocratic vision, fanaticism, etc. Despite having claimed not to believe in the friend-enemy opposition (48), now he claims they are “open and aggressive cultural enemies” (54).
7. We Europeans are benefactors; those who arrive are beneficiaries who must recognize their status as such and their debt to us. Sartori speaks of reciprocal recognition and mutual concessions, but also states that immigrants do not know how to live in our pluralism. It also seems that this recognition is not symmetrical: Europeans are benefactors and immigrants are beneficiaries. Recall our previous arguments: have we no responsibility for the way the world is organized and the fact that others come in search of the well-being we have taken from them? Sartori remains silent on this, arguing on the contrary that immigrants come and give nothing to us who have given them everything. But do we give them decent jobs or just those we do not want to do? Do we recognize their rights as workers? In point 19 he claims, with no arguments against multiculturalism other than that those who consider the immigrants’ position are neo-Marxists under the influence of Foucault, feminists... etc. They do not come because Africa is poor, because it always has been –and apparently we in the north have no responsibility for this– but because of the demographic explosion and the erosion of the agricultural population. In Europe we do not know how to stop them coming... Perhaps we might start by tackling the poverty, misery and marginalization that we cause in their countries of origin? That would be my proposal. Integration is a “fools’ game”, he claims; the only ones to integrate are those who can be integrated, who will contribute to production, and who have the right papers. And whatever the case, no more than 10%.

After June 2001, with a new preface added on 30 September 2001 following the attack on the United States in that month, Sartori (2003) wrote an appendix to his book. He accepts the need to nuance his arguments,

especially the claim that the most difficult foreigners to integrate in western society are Muslims. Some of these new points are:

1. He is only referring to an Islamic subgroup driven from their country by hunger and who enter Europe, sometimes by force (139).
2. He revises his notion of Islam, but still maintains it is more totalitarian than Catholicism, based more on the “power of the sword” (140), without mentioning, to my understanding, the Christian crusades, the ‘discovery’ of America, and the holy war. He forgets the initial idea that these Muslims are driven from their countries by hunger as he previously claimed, and states that the fundamentalist argument is that the loss of true Islam is what once again triggers the holy war and missionary proselytizing (152 s). In the vacillations of his new arguments, he admits that not all Muslim immigrants start out as fundamentalists, but that finding themselves uprooted in a new country means their only refuge is in their faith and the mosque (163).
3. Having put forward some conceptually interesting and debatable distinctions, he proposes that the necessary acculturation in a pluralist community is that of western political-social values, and reiterates the importance of the separation of church and state (169). We would agree that it is “our responsibility” to ensure immigrants “understand and appreciate the *value* of legal protection and the freedoms and equalities that transform subject into citizen”, and that conflicts can be resolved without violence and slaughter (169). However, I believe it is an ethnocentric assumption to deny that those arriving have their own ways of solving conflict by peaceful means, through consensus and consultation for example, as Sartori previously recognized (148).
4. For our part, as we will see below, we would agree with Sartori that “pluralism believes in mutual fertilization (between cultures)”. But, precisely, this coming together must be *reciprocal*, and must *enrich* (nourish the cultural identities involved so they live side by side in harmony), without accepting the axiological relativism (172). However, we would emphasize that symmetry must be mutually promoted, whereas for Sartori, as stated in our earlier analysis, ‘they’, the beneficiaries, must reciprocate towards ‘us’, the benefactors.
5. We would also agree, and this is one area of our research, that we are not interested in the ‘already formed’ society, but rather the good or bad politics of social intervention (173). For this reason, it is not a

question of merely granting citizenship without taking into account the problem of qualifications, as in the US with the 'Latinos'. It is not a question of the destitute arriving to continue living among the destitute, but of encouraging specialist workers. He also claims that the Hispanics in the US and the Muslims in Europe come from "work-shy cultures" or are "slow workers" and that they lack the work ethic of the immigrants that built the "American nation" (176). I would say these claims require no comment.

6. In sum, the thesis would be that in the name of recognizing their rights, we have arrived at "humanitarian" rights, proposed by "those ignorant of the law" (191), in which we can glimpse Weber's distinction between the ethics of conviction or intention (*Gesinnungsethik*) and the ethics of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*) (197). Or, in line with the proverbial wisdom that the road to hell is paved with good intentions (204), good intentions have led us into an ethics of irresponsibility, repeating the clichés that "charity and compassion can aggravate the diseases they are trying to cure".

I believe this last distinction, which Sartori says underlies all his argumentation, has greater philosophical significance than the author credits it with, and I am currently exploring this issue. For reasons of space, I simplify my reflections as follows:

1. Weber's dichotomy arises in the context of 1917, in which he was trying to set objectives for the social sciences at the expense of demanding their value neutrality and academic freedom (Weber, 1984b: 69); or the context of 1926, when the ethics of conviction were attributed to everyone, while leaving responsibility to the politicians (Weber, 1988: 114 s., 160 ss.). And this occurs, despite Weber advocating the need for a "comprehensive" sociology that captures the meaning of human actions (Weber, 1984a), which to my mind are inevitably full of values and dialogic intersubjectivity that subjects understanding of human actions and the values involved in them, not to any arbitrary subjectivity, but to the mutual interpellation of those affected (Martínez Guzmán, 2000).
2. It also arises in a broader context of the legacy of western philosophy in which it seems that truth was separated from rectitude as in Aristotle, the *is-ought* question that dates back at least to Hume and is known as the "naturalistic fallacy": where arguments jump from statements of fact to what they ought to be without distinguishing

- value facts. In my interpretation, Sartori's intention to not fall into the naturalistic fallacy could be formulated using his own words as follows: "Therefore, the ethics of intention is good if, *and only if*, it acts in the sphere that concerns it. Otherwise, it becomes a bad ethics of irresponsibility, and therefore a pernicious ethics, when it invades the sphere of the ethics of responsibility" (Sartori, 2003: 201). Here it would be fallacious or deceitful not only to confound truth with rectitude, *is* with *ought to be*, or facts with values, but also the ethics of intention with the ethics of responsibility.
3. However, from the theory of speech facts (Austin, 1971) we learn that what is really fallacious or deceitful is the idea that these dichotomies can actually be established. Truth and rectitude, *is* and *ought to be*, facts and values, intention or conviction and responsibility: we are always subject to ask each other for explanations about our truths, beings, facts and intentions or convictions, because they intrinsically form part of our ways of understanding what human relations should be, what values we promote and what responsibilities we assume. In this sense, what is fallacious is the naturalistic fallacy, what Searle (1980) calls "the naturalistic fallacy fallacy". What is a deception is to think that we can establish these dichotomies and be free of value judgments or convictions, and only act responsibly.
 4. In Kantian terms it can be said that the excuse of responsibility and consequences to avoid principles or convictions, or vice versa, is to act as a *political moralist*, which is "one who fashions his morality to suit his own advantage as a statesman" (Kant, 1991: 48). However, with a view to establishing peaceful coexistence, there is no discrepancy between moral and political. To live in peace we must act like the *moral politician*, that is, "one who understands the principles of statesmanship to be such as do not conflict with morals". For this reason, when the evangelical maxim "Be wise as serpents" is applied to politics, morals adds the limiting condition: "and guileless as doves" (46). What would certainly be irresponsible, as Sartori warns, is a well-intentioned moral towards immigrants without paying heed to the consequences, but it would be immoral to heed merely the consequences in the name of an immoral responsibility for 'practical' reasons.

The problem is obviously not one of particular arguments, but of placing diversity policies in broader contexts of analysis, as we propose in the next section. This is especially so because, as we have stressed, we are not concerned

with deep academic discussions, but with placing these discussions on the horizon of transforming, through peaceful means, human suffering caused by other humans, which is what underpins our research.

Fear, cultures, diversity and alienness

We now turn to the instruments we have been developing in philosophy for making peace(s) in relation to the concepts implicit in the above concerns, fears and arguments, which needless to say, arouse considerable unease.

1. We reclaim the meaning of culture as cultivation and a way of caring for each other as human beings, and for nature. Culture is a uniquely human trait. We can always demand explanations of ourselves for how we do things, because the way we can do things among ourselves will differ from the way we do things to nature. Hence, we can demand explanations for what we do, what we say and what we do not say (Martínez Guzmán, 2001).
2. Yet we do not speak only of culture, nor only of peace. We speak of cultures and peace(s). We are learning that cultures are diverse. Groups of people organize their own way of cultivating and caring for each other and nature.
3. It is true that diversity, difference, distinctness arouse fear and we find them 'strange'. We therefore study the way authors like Betty Reardon (1985) understand the origin of sexism as masculine domination and the organization of relationships based on war, a male reaction of fear to the discovery of difference that begins with *sexual difference*. They establish a security system "in self defense", based on frontiers and on attempts to separate *female others* and others in general. It is better to dominate than allow oneself to be dominated. "The first blow is half the battle", as the old refrain goes.
4. There is a lack of recognition of human *frailty* that shocks us, that can generate violence because it may mean the consequences of our actions slip out of our control, leading to arbitrary consequences. This might be a tragedy (Nussbaum, 1995); indeed, it is there in the mythologies. In Genesis, human frailty is not assumed: Adam and Eve want to "be like God", and when they become conscious of how much good they can do, but also how much evil, they are afraid and hide. From that moment, he "rules over" her, he cultivates the land with the sweat of his brow, and she "in pain...brings forth children".

- And in the Greek *hybris*, not accepting the human condition and ‘wanting to be like the gods’ will be punished by the goddess of vengeance, Nemesis.
5. Hence, in the west we have spoken of the constitution of politics, the origin of states, as a way of ending the arbitrariness of violence and we grant the State the “monopoly of legitimate violence within a given territory” (Weber, 1988: 83 s.).
 6. Another woman, Hannah Arendt (1996), points out how the Greeks showed us that *politics* is one way of confronting human frailty, *the capacity to act in concert*. Plurality is, in effect, the condition of all human action. Hence, *our proposals for politics for diversity are politics that promote the communicative power of consensus* (Martínez Guzmán, 2001).
 7. Our group is researching how although awareness of frailty, even fear, certainly does lead to violence and systems of domination, it can also strengthen *tenderness* and the creation of institutions that promote justice, participation and solidarity. We therefore encourage research that promotes the ethics of care and tenderness as complementary to the ethics of justice as an ethics of minimums, and the morals of different beliefs as an ethics of maximums for those whose beliefs give meaning to their lives.
 8. We have studied how Kant presented the resistance of the constitution of human societies as an alternative to a government tempted to turn itself into a world government. In his own terms, he said that “nature” seems to want something else, and makes use of the diversity of beliefs and languages to oppose the uniformity of a world government: the diversity of beliefs and the differences of language. Differences can be a motive for exclusion, but it depends on *culture*, on the way we cultivate human relationships, whether they are a source of exclusion or a mutual demand for peace (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 280).
 9. We say western philosophy began as an experience of wonder, curiosity and amazement about what we find strange (Martínez Guzmán, 2002a). Passion for strangeness is a way of interpreting the real task of philosophy. The Greek word was *thaumazein*: the capacity to be in awe, to admire, to be amazed, to deal with the strange. From this we have *taumaturgo* in Spanish, meaning one who works (*ergon*) miracles, marvels, things worthy of admiration. Being curious can imply indiscretion, but also careful, meticulous thirst for

knowledge. My interpretation is that the philosophical experience of the curiosity of amazement for the strange, as the origin of the passion to know, of wanting to know about philosophy, also has to do with a way of caring for things and for others. Thus, *curious* can be related to *thaumastós*, the adjective derived from *thaumazein* (Coderch Sancho, 1997) as a manner of caring.

10. In the philosophical proposals we are working on, one's own identity can only be constituted with others. We are united by strong, solid bonds, such that "I would be nothing" without the recognition of others. These solid bonds that unite us to form our identity, to hate, marginalize and exclude each other, but also to love, include and act justly to each other, are indicators that solidarity is the bedrock and the origins of human relationships. Violence begins with the rupture of this foundational solidarity.

What I am saying is that *there is no single way of dealing with the strange, the different and the diverse*. It is true that we are surprised, often negatively, by other ways of speaking. The Greek word *barbaros* (barbarian), onomatopoeic in origin, refers to non-Greeks whose language was considered unintelligible, and goes back to the Indo-European root *baba*. It mimics dribbling, babbling speech, like a like a fool (*babulus* in Latin), or a stutterer (*balbus* in Latin). However, in some languages it has positive meanings, referring to those who "can hardly speak" or who "stammer or stutter", but who elicit tenderness. In Albanian, *bebë* and in Welsh, *babán* mean baby. In Polish and Russian *baba* is old woman, and in Italian, *babbo* is father (Roberts and Pastor, 1997). In Spanish too, the expression *caerse la baba*, as well as dribbling saliva also means drooling over something affectionately or in rapture; someone may also be *embobado* (fooled) negatively because they have been tricked, or positively because they are fascinated or enraptured by something. In Catalan, *babau* refers to someone who is stupefied by or indecisive over trivial things.

In our philosophical proposal for making peace(s), a propos of the dialogue of civilizations, we follow Habermas's suggestion that even the communicative rationality we universally attribute to all human beings must pass the acid test of communicability with those cultures that we find strange, foreign, mythical and, as we have sometimes said, primitive. Understanding other cultures opens our eyes to what we have failed to learn, or what we have forgotten. It also makes us critical of our own reasons, thus triggering a process of unlearning brought about by the interpellation of other cultures (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 139). I recall a conversation with a journalist on a trip to the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf (Algeria) where, driven by our

Eurocentric pride, we regarded the men and women in the desert as strange. We suddenly realized that we were the ‘strange ones’ there. This is a good example of ‘unlearning’ that resulted from contact with others.

At the same time, it is true that we experience the desire to “flee from the strange, the different, the outsider, because they frighten us”. This is the meaning of *xenophobia*. In Ancient Greek, *phobéomai* means frighten off, cause to flee, terrify, scare, and in its passive form, to be terrified or scared, in fear of; to move away from someone out of fear. This fear is aroused, in this case, by the *xenos*, the foreigner, the different, the alien. The same root gives us, for example, the Spanish *proxeneta*, which refers to an outsider who acts as a mediator. Curiously, in Greek the *proxenetés* was the person responsible for protecting their compatriots in a foreign country (Moliner, 1997).

Derrida (2000) points out that in the western tradition, the arrival of the foreigner calls into question the “naturalness” with which we accept what we are like. For this reason the foreigner arouses hostility. However, from the same Indo-European root *ghos-ti* (Roberts and Pastor, 1997), we have hostile on one side, and hospitality and guest on the other. Its meaning of stranger shifted into Latin as *hostis*, enemy and foreigner. In turn, the compound noun *ghos-pot*, related to *pot*, host, came into Latin as *hospes*, originally the person offering hospitality, and later also those receiving it. Hospice, hospital, hostel, hostelry, hotel, and guest (meaning hosted) all share the same root.

In Greek, hospitality is *filoxenia*, love for the stranger, as opposed to the foreigner. Hospitality between Greeks was realized through a *sumballō*, a symbol that sealed a type of contract made by splitting a stone or some other object in two. Each party to the contract kept one half. When one of the parties traveled, they would show their token and try to match it with a second piece to ask for hospitality. During the Roman Empire, it was the *tessera*, half a piece of clay or other object that symbolized the contract and served as authorization or a password, and also to ask for hospitality. Leonardo Boff (2001) often says that the human condition is shaped by the *sym-bolic*, that which throws us together, and the *dia-bolic*, that which separates us or throws us apart. Quoting Morin, he speaks of *homo sapiens* and *homo demens*; in our terminology in the Kantian tradition, human “unsocial sociability”. And as we saw above, Genesis gives us the realization of how much good we can do, but also how much evil.

The right to hospitality

Our alternative starts by recognizing the complexity of the relationship we have with the strange, alien, different, foreign. While it can make us afraid, divided and unsociable, equally we can feel attracted, we can marvel and be marveled at. *Moreover, the test of communicative rationality, according to Habermas, the test of life, we would say, of our own way of conceiving human rights, democracy, and even governance, lies in nurturing the capacity for understanding those we find strange, alien, different, foreign. It depends on which cultures we promote; in what ways we cultivate human relationships and how we care for each other, and always with the possibility that we can be asked for explanations.*

Some of the indicators for transformation we are working on in the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace are from the Kantian legacy (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 277 ff.). The aim is to replace immigration laws with hospitality laws. Kant initially thought of hospitality in terms of Europeans who traveled to other parts of the world. Indeed it was these emigrants who made use of the right to hospitality. Kant reproached them for “turning colonization into conquest” and for their frequent arrival in places where “they took no account of those already there”. These were the attitudes of people who boasted of their “moral superiority”.

The right to hospitality is placed in the context of a much broader understanding of rights, even beyond the context of international law. It is the new *cosmopolitan right* or *public right of humanity*, based on the premise that we have come so far in relations between human beings in the world that *the violation of rights in one part of the world affects all humanity*. This is the principle we must take into account to advance in constructing different ways of making peace(s).

It entails a *new form of governance*, above and below the nation states of the present world order. The actors introduced in this world order are states, relations between states and citizens of other states, relations between citizens, and international organizations like a reformed UN or a more effective Criminal Court, as well as controlling bodies of the standardized economy –the source of exclusions– and among citizens themselves in social movement networks and not necessarily governmental civic organizations.

It does not entail, as we have seen, establishing a world government, but rather, more local and more global forms of governance based on the premise of reciprocal recognition of the multiplicity of beliefs and languages. In this sense, the public right of humanity is the *right of interculturality*, not

merely the recognition of multiculturality, nor the simple multiculturalism understood as the mere fragmentation without mutual interpellation among different languages and beliefs, which seems to be Sartori's understanding of it. It is in this context in which the right of hospitality is understood as: "the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility... This right [...] belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, [...] originally no one individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot" (Kant, 1991: 27).

We have common possession of the earth in the sense that we can make exchanges, which is the original meaning of trade. Recall the Kantian criticism that "they took no account of" those already there. Our alternative is that the right to hospitality only works when we consider others. It can thus be understood as the *right to interlocution*; with symmetrical reciprocity, not between beneficiaries and benefactors as expounded by Sartori. We would all be beneficiaries and benefactors.

We have also been working on the idea that the etymological roots of *ethos*, from whence *ethics* and *moral*, are related to *inhabit* and *dwell*, with the same possibility to be hospitable and share our habitat and our dwelling place. *We can hardly consider ourselves moral if we do not share our dwelling, if we are not hospitable.*

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