

Citizenship, development and violence: some connections

José María Tortosa

Grupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrollo (Development and Peace Study Groups)
Universidad de Alicante, España

Abstract: This paper is divided into four parts. The first one gives a general context about the three words in its title. The second part analyzes a proposal to link peace and development, namely, the one made by UNDP on human security and the difficulties to get it. The third one deals with some prognoses in which links between the three words are more evident. Finally, the fourth part is dedicated to topics that remain open to further discussion.

Key words: citizenship, development, violence, world system, peace.

Resumen: Este trabajo se divide en cuatro partes. La primera consiste en un contexto general sobre las tres palabras de su título. En la segunda se analiza una propuesta de vincular paz y desarrollo, a saber, la efectuada por el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y que es la de seguridad humana. También se abordan las dificultades para conseguirla. La tercera está dedicada a algunos pronósticos en los que las conexiones entre las tres palabras se hacen más evidentes. La cuarta parte se dedica a resaltar los temas abiertos.

Palabras clave: ciudadanía, desarrollo, violencia, sistema mundial, paz.



This work is divided in four parts. In the first part will be a general context, tendentially qualitative on the three words of the work's title, with a particular reference to the subject of the radical political Islamism, or the "war against terror" begun by the US government and its followers, although the discourse on the State of the nation of 2006 was substituted by the "long war" against the "radical Islamism". In the second part a proposal of linking peace and development, namely, that by the United Nations Development Program, mainly starting on 1994; the one on human safety will be seen too. Also the difficulties faced to achieve it will be mentioned. The third part will be dedicated to some prognoses where the connections between the words become more evident. If the diagnosis has received attention so far, the fourth part will be dedicated to the open issues that mainly are those of the prognosis.

I. Context

1. Citizenship

A month before the Italian elections of April 9th, 2006, Umberto Eco wrote:¹

There is not discontent, as justifiable as it could be, that can be equiparable to the fear of a fatal involution of our democracy, with the indignation that every sincere democrat feels before the ravage done to the laws, the division of powers, the very sense of the State. This is what all of us should continue repeating to our hesitant and disillusioned friends. From them and their commitment will depend that Italy frees for another five years from being rapine territory of those defendants of their private interests.

The ravage Eco meant, personalizing it in Berlusconi would not be much different from that other observers in other countries could verify about their own political system, where the respect for the law, the power division and the very sense of the State are in several difficulties. In any case, and independently from those extremes, cases of disenchantment with the democracy that are maybe the most numerous, are detectable, world-wide,

¹ Eco, "Salvemos la democracia", in *Libertaegustizja.it*

since strong is the pressure that leads to that disenchantment and that it is observable at least from the "9/11 syndrome" (Tortosa, 2002: 41-55; Tortosa, 2005a: 21-42). Some data that the citizens take into account in their more general sense, less worried for the inclusion formalities in the inclusion in the administrative range of the citizen and do worry by the relation between the individual and his political system in the terms Almond and Verba defined as citizen's "political culture" as opposed to that of the subject (Almond and Verba, 1989).

It can be started with the Latinbarómetro (Latio-meters) series. With other data from 2005, the surveyed Latin Americans are not particularly happy with their democracy. Asked about their countries and with the option between 0 (non-democratic) and 10 (totally democratic), the median is in about 5.5, with some countries being clearly above such media (Venezuela —7.6 that is the highest grade—, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile, in that order) and some other clearly under that media (Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Paraguay —4.2 that is the lowest grade—). In temporal terms, although the trend is not clear since 1996 when these Latino-meters begin, it is difficult to subtract to the impression that being in the disjunctive between democracy and dictatorship ("Democracy is preferable to any other government", "under no circumstances I would support a military government") the trend goes against democracy, although not with noticeable differences between countries. Mexico is the country where the percentage of those people who believe that "in certain circumstances an authoritarian government would be preferable to a democratic one" decreases to a 13% of the surveyed people; whereas in Paraguay is the nation where such percentage is the highest with 44% of the population.

The seven analyzed countries by the *Pew Research Centre* (study published on January 5th, 2006), show something similar. Four of them (Morocco, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Jordan) are the ones who believe the most in supporting on democratic governments before than on a strong leadership. In Morocco, they even reach 73% of those in favor of a democratic government. However, in Pakistan and Russia occurs the opposite: there are more (53% and 66%, respectively) those who prefer a strong leadership before a democratic government.

It is not a malady exclusive of some Latin American countries (Quijano, 2004: 75-97). Since 1976, the Euro-barometers make oscillate the percentage of the people satisfied with the functioning of their democracy to about 50%, although with some depressions in the 90's, when it dropped to 40%. Also here are differences among countries (in Italy there are satisfaction percentages that reach the 10% although, and in spite of what Eco said, it recovered in the last years), and even within countries as the case of unified Germany where the percentage of people satisfied with the democracy is sensibly higher in the old Federal Germany than in West Germany.

The Spanish situation is not exceptional either. In the barometer 2, 633 of January 2006, the Sociologic Research Centre (CIS) asked about the kinds of feelings that politics inspired the interviewees. The answers were unequivocal: the enthusiasm, the commitment and the interest for the politics did not reach the fourth part of the interviewees, before the 30% of those who feel distrust for politics, 15% who are bored, and 18% indifferent and even 8% of irritation.

It is not that the United States are exempt of problems (Tortosa, 2004a). A study of Harris Interactive (published on March 12, 2006) very clearly showed who did the American trust; in the last six years: the Congress and the Federal Executive were among the lowest positions, whereas the highest trust position was granted to the army. In any case, with a clear decreasing trend even for the Army, although in 2006 had a trust of 47% of the interviewees, it was far from the 71% it had reached in 2002. The White House had the 25% of trust (the Congress, 10%), half of what it obtained in 2002.

To continue with the case of the United States (but applicable to many others, not to say all of them) is the degree of deceit the governing people have with the citizens and that these accept with the help of the mass media. Probably, the most evident case is the excessively high percentage of Americans who think that Saddam Hussein had mass destruction weapons (26% in December 2005, being reduced to 41% in October 2004), 41% still believed that Hussein had links with Al Qaeda and 24% who thought that several of the hijackers of 9/11 were Iraqis (24% in December 2005, but 44% in February of the same year).² The surveys made to American

² *The Harris Poll*, published on December 29th, 2005.

soldiers occupying Iraq about the reason they were in the country were revealing as well³: 93% affirmed that it was not for the existence of mass destruction weapons in Iraq, but 85% said that it was a "retaliation for the Saddam Hussein's role in 9/11", 77% said that it was about to "stop the help of Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda in Iraq"; and, in better percentages, that it was about "establishing a democracy that can be a model for the Arabic world" (24%); to ensure the oil provision (11%) and to provide bases for the long term for the American troops in the region (6%).

The disenchantment with the democracy seems to keep a relation, as Umberto Eco suggests, with the corruption level the citizens perceive in their daily lives and in their means of communication. It is not, obviously, about the very arguable "corruption (perception) rate" National Transparency publishes every year and that there are always enough reasons to doubt about. In any case, it is not a corruption rate as some reports seem to suppose, but of perception of corruption, *from the outside*, with the more than probable sequels of prophecies that are self-realized and with the evident errors when comparing the small corruptions ("bribes") with the general corruption used by the Federal government, as it is well known occurs in the enriched countries and, in concrete, in the United States⁴, and that the supposed "rates" do not reflect⁵. Probably, whatever International Transparency says and its supposed and not very trustful "corruption (perception) rate", the percentage of people who practices corruption is higher in Cuba, according to what Fidel Castro informs, that in the United States, but the percentage of corrupted money over the Gross Domestic Product is, almost surely, lower. The level of business corruption is, really, considerable in the United States being visible and well documented the achievements of governmental

³ *Le Moyne College/Zogby Poll*, published on February 28th 2006.

⁴ Some examples at random and from different means: Mark Rice-Oxley, "Why Graft Thrives in Postconflict Zones", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 17th, 2005; Craig S. Smith, "Poor Planning and Corruption Hobble the Rebuilding of Iraq", in *The New York Times*, September 17th, 2005; Richard Cohen, "Culture of Intellectual Corruption", in *The Washington Post*, March 9th, 2006.

⁵ See VV. AA., *Vicios públicos. Poder y corrupción* (2005) and, in particular, La contribución de Miguel Ángel Mateo, "Corrupción política. Enfoques y desenfoques desde la cultura, la economía y la propia política", pp. 307-328.

contracts without license, abusive and without control, besides the conventional corruption (political favors in exchange of money) with cases as the Abramoff, De Lay or the enterprises of the current governing people, which belittle the mini corruptions of the other countries. That indeed is *business politics*.

This matter is particularly transcendent for the following subject; in fact, in the "world Resources 2006: the richness of the poor" study, combined result of the United Nations for the Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB) and the World Resources Institute (WRI), it was clear that at community scale, the poor considered the own organizations more effective, the religious institutions and the NGOs above the town councils and ministries which received higher percentages in the sense of being considered as less effective.

2. *Poverty*

Not to call it a deceit, it is suitable to take note that the discourse on development, dominant in the 60's and 70's, has been decreasing, being substituted, first by the "cooperation to development", after by the "cooperation" *tout court* or also "helps" and, when it was seen that this did not work either, it was substituted by the "fight against poverty", to end up, many times and a simple and technical "fight against hunger" that does not question the mechanisms that produce it and stays in the *De subventionem pauperum sive de humanis necessitatibus* (1526) of Luis Vives.

The poverty maps are very coherent if we set in the graphic the population who live with less than the equivalent of two American dollars a day, which is one of the measures the World Bank uses, the percentage of sub-nutritioned according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the insufficient consumption of calories per person and day, also calculated by the FAO. Over-fed and with overweight problems on one side and death by hunger on the other.

It is complicated to know if these figures have increased or decreased in the last years. They are, obviously, figures hard to obtain and can be manipulated in various ways by interest. Taking the data from the WB as good (which, we have to insist, produces many reluctances), it does indeed

seem that the absolute number of people who do not earn two American dollars a day (in parity to the acquisition power, where resides one of the calculation's difficulties). Between 1991 and 2001 —last data offered by the Bank— the percentage had decreased (in any case, we would be talking about of more than 50%), by the absolute figure would have increased. There is not so much controversy, as it shall be seen later, about the called "aid to development".

3. Violence

Seen from this context, it would not be strange that it had effects on the violence levels around the world. However, it is not exactly so. It is true that the violence, measured as the homicide rate per each 100, 000 inhabitants, and with the anomalies of some punctual events such as Lesotho in 1976 and Rwanda in 1994, seem to have started a slight descent in the last 10 years, with clear differences by regions and, in particular, with clear increments if the rates from the central countries are separated from those from the peripheral ones, being the increment in the latter much clearer, which would have to raise some kind of reflections.

It is also true that if it is about the deceased in armed conflicts or their percentage over the total of the world population, the increment that came along the XX century over the last is clearly visible. The *2005 Inform over Human Development* from the United Nations Program, was in charge of documenting it. The XX century would have produced almost 10 times more deceased than the XIX century (109 million according to that calculation) and its percentage would have increased to more than 4% before 1.6 that had presented in the XIX century, with the aggravating that, progressively, the wars have had more civilian casualties every time (mainly children and women).

However, most of the attempts to quantifying the general tendencies about the violent conflicts or conflicts for the auto-determination, give, from 1950, a gradual increment in all the considerable variables, which stops at the beginning of the nineties, about the avatars of the Soviet Union (1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall; 1991 collapse of the PCUS and with it, of the Soviet Union). Curiously, the same could be said about the purpose

of the terrorist attacks documented by the American "National Counterterrorism Center": with a maximum in 1987 and a second place in 1991, it is difficult not to see the impression that the terrorist attacks were decreasing even counting extreme facts, advertised and of doubtful cataloguing, such as the one on September 11, 2001.

It seems that something has changed. According to the calculations from the State Department from the United States of America, in 2003 there were 172 significant attacks worldwide...but 655 in 2004 and 11,000 in 2005. This is, that first the invasion to Afghanistan and after the invasion to Iraq would have been a detonator for an increment of the terrorist violence until reaching the highest levels that the publication had had historically.⁶ Not every known public opinion would equally agree with these purposes. Among the 36 countries under study for World Public Opinion with published data on February 27, 2006, Mexico was distinguished for having the highest percentage of those people who think that the Iraq's occupation did not influence in the increment of the terrorist attacks. Following, but a bit far, there were the United States, Brazil, Canada and Russia. Egypt, China and South Korea presented higher percentages of people who thought that they had had some kind of influence. Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya, on the other hand, presented relatively higher percentages of people whose opinion stated that the war in Iraq had influence in the decrement of the terrorism.

4. Comments

The disenchantment with the *democracy* seems to be a proven fact that breaks the democratization tendency and raises fear for the return of the strong governments.⁷ It is not about the US government rhetoric that considers the Venezuela government as "little democratic" after having succeeded in

⁶The reaction before these data that could be question the efficacy of the "war against the terror" (or the "long war") proclaimed by the government of the second president Bush was to change the inform's name (from Patterns of Global Terrorism that had existed from 1985 to 2004 by legal imperative, to Country Reports on Terrorism), change the definition of terrorist attack and the methodology used by the gathering of the data that after 20 years was considered as inappropriate.

⁷Since the postures conventionally called "of right" these governments usually are labelled as

several clean electoral processes⁸ and, however, they do not hesitate in signing free trade commercial agreements with the United Arab Emirate (UAE). According to the CIA web page⁹, the UAE do not have elections or political parties, the "legislative" is pointed and cannot change the laws, the Supreme Court is designed by the president, it has drug traffic and money laundry problems and, outside the web page, it is suspected that it has relations with terrorist activities. Conversely, there is not a single problem with its "democracy" and it is not object of the US government's *democracy building* and its Army.¹⁰

The problems with democracy can come from spheres less affected by the rethoric.¹¹ On one hand, by the possible increment of the inequity in many countries. It is discussed if it has increased at global level, but cannot be discussed that it has increased in some places, as for example, the United States. The increment of the inequity is difficult to concur with democracy. But, on the other hand, the policies of harassment for the population so that they feel scared and insecurity, are policies that are made to dominate the population because they feel afraid and are more easily submitted.¹²

"populists"; from the "left" is preferred the qualifying of "fascists". It is matter of knowing from where it is observed the phenomenon of the strong government, and it is obvious that it is not about analytic categories, rather, pejorative adjectives. It has been long ago since it was noticed that this problem is not applied to central countries, which solve it by means of a higher resource to the political manipulation through the media (Tortosa, 1994: 31-38).

⁸Regarding the clean voting, cleaner than the American elections whose use of computers is very problematic and have not been object of the international observer's work internacionales (OEA and Carter Foundation) as the Venezuelan.

⁹<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>>

¹⁰The list of little democratic allies of the US, in particular in the world of the Muslim majority, includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates Union and Kuwait. A regimen, as that from Libya, can move from "scoundrel State" to object of American visits or its servers (as the case of José María Aznar as president of the government), as suitable.

¹¹A systematic case of the "democracy discomfort", in this case the United Kingdom, is the inform published by Power Inquiry and presided by Helena Kennedy, Power to the People ("The report of Power: An Independent Inquiry into Britain's democracy")

Edited in 2006, and which can be obtained at <http://www.powerinquiry.org/report/documents/PowertothePeople_000.pdf>. Its starting point: in the British political life "the principles and the ideas are being substituted by managerialism pragmatism and public relations".

The *development* problems, and more with the oscillation towards the fight against hunger, have to do with those policies. The documented fact is that the "safety" has now an absolute priority before any other decision criterion, and even the already decreasing "aid for development" is being subordinating to the so-called "War against terror". As indicates the second president Bush in his 2002 *National Security Strategy for the United States*, probably the poor are not terrorist, but the poverty, along with the weak States, are the perfect culture for terrorism and drug trafficking. The cooperation, then, is, as it has probably always been, to satisfy the interests of the elites from central and peripheral countries. Violent crime and war—as it will be seen later—maintain a problematic relation with poverty and democracy (or the violence keeps a problematic relation with development and citizenship). But, before, it is worth making a reference to the most discussed issue, also in part for the demands of the hegemonic potency, and that it is of the *radical political Islamism* (Amin, 2001).

To begin with, it can be deceitful the use of the word fundamentalism to refer to this problem; the same can be said about Islamic fundamentalism; and, with much more reason, of Islamic terrorism. There are other fundamentalisms (protestant, catholic), most of the Arab or Muslim populations are not fundamentalist, and in any case, the terrorism is not an ideology or a movement, rather it is a movement that is not exclusive of a religion (Tortosa, 2005b).

The radical political Islamism, which supposes a threat to the world peace, is part of a very heterogeneous conjunction and it is precise to try to understand it without more or less interested simplifications. In fact, it is frequent to appeal to the role of the religious ideas in social action from the fundamentalist (literal) lectures of the Cora; some non-Muslims find in the Book the origin of the "Muslim wrong". Independently from, survey after survey, the Arab populations or from countries with a strong Muslim

¹²In this context is inserted the "other campaign". As it was said in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (Mexico on the sixth month of 2005): "of course there are problems that can be solved separating more the political-military from the civil-democratic. But there are things, the most important, as our demands we are fighting for, that have not been completely reached".

implantation, defend and support democracy, these hermeneutists affirm the radical incompatibility between Muslim beliefs and democracy. Such purpose does not have much sense, as neither would have it deducing from an interested reading of the Jewish or Christian Bible the intrinsic incapability of Judaism or Christianity for the tolerance, non-violence, peace, understanding or meekness. Not all the Jewish or Christians are like that, neither all the Muslims. But the origin cannot be reduced to the religious ideas transmitted by the Kitab.¹³ There are cases where the political Islamism is, in fact, the vocabulary that the discontents with the functioning of their societies and the rapines of their respective elites find available. The cause is somewhere else, not in the ideas, for much they do help.

Seeing these so heterogeneous cases, it seems that besides these ideal factors, we have to include some real factors. Poverty and inequity are not a "cause" but they are indeed, at least, a cultivation for these movements to appear, as the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*¹⁴, signed by George W. Bush in February 2003. It also takes into account the maladjustments to new contexts, for own interest or rejection from the receptive society and, indeed and after the occupation of Iraq, the reaction before the humiliation, tortures and profanations, when not the provocations from the outside or the manipulations from Arab governments. As shows the case of purpose of the "Jyllands-Posten" cartoons have, after reproduced in other media, it is not that simple to assign one single cause to such complex phenomena¹⁵ or even less, to reduce then to a simple matter of expression freedom that the same actors do not recognize for other matters.¹⁶

¹³ In this sense, it is illegitimate to deduce that if there is presence of wahabit communities or madrasas financed by Saudi Arabia in certain territories, let us say, Chiapas, due to that all the Muslims are "terrorists" or, what would be even more arguable, the Zapatistas are suspects of connivance with this "terrorism".

¹⁴ In: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf>.

¹⁵ The reactions to the cartoons published in Denmark are an accumulation of possible manipulations, starting for the very "Flamming Rose", Ukrainian Jewish, Cultural director of the Newspapers and suspect of collaboration with the secret Israeli services (Mossad). After the governors from the countries where there was a violent action, that were just a few, but very visible and with evident internal problems to be forgotten (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia).

The more the abundance, the considerations on the origins do not exhaust the questions of this particular kind of Islamism. It is genuine to ask about its possible purposes or objectives. The first and more evident is that of using this instrument (terrorism is a means, not an ideology) to influence or reaction in the "north-South" relations. The vengeance is not excluded (at least so the videos or internet messages attributed to Al Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden say) or the re-composition of those relations that, by the way, an alternative for capitalism is proposed. The second, and normally forgotten in the North, is that of influencing in certain countries with an Islamic majority such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan or Jordan that have been object of terrorist attacks as those in the United States, Spain or England. Finally, the terrorism attacks look for the recognition of the organization and works as a way of acquiring notoriousness and, in doing so, widen their social bases, which it seems that today are a minority.

II. Human safety

Issues such as the extension of international terrorist attacks have propped the need of facing the citizenship problems, the development and violence in a different way. It is not that the magnified "9/11" has caused an oscillation in the proposals. Perhaps, there was an argumentation so that the neo-conservatives legitimize policies decided long before. But it does seem that, at least from the decade of 1990, the problem has growing from very precise local conjunctures and long lasting historical wounds which now it is not the time to mention (Álvarez, 2001).

We have to include also the Danish Muslim authorities reacting before the growing xenophobia and exaggerating the offence. Finally, the situation of Israel after the Ariel Sharon' coma and the democratic victory of Hamas or the president bush moving of his "war against terror" to the war against the "radical Islamism" in his message on the Union State on 2006 or the "global war against the enemies of the freedom, the enemies of the civilization" (Rumsfeld, 2006).

¹⁶It is the case of the criminal character that have in France or Germany the mere scientific (empirical) discussion on the existence and outreach of the "shoah", the Jewish holocaust by the Nazis.

1. *The proposals*

In 1990, the United Nations Development Program started to publish its annual *Inform on Human Development*. It was —as some of its promoters have acknowledged— an attempt for offering an alternative to the old and economical *Inform on World Development* that the World Bank had been publishing. The authors of the new *inform* introduced, before the "human development" measured as increment of the Gross Internal Product, the concept of "human development", affirming that such growth said nothing on the satisfaction of the concrete human needs and their possible welfare. Before the rankings of the countries by their GDP (developed, intermediate and underdeveloped), introduced that of their own index, that of the Human Development (Rist, 2002; Escobar, 1998) that, without leaving aside the economic issue, they pretended the introduction of another kinds of variables (education, health), or another kind of considerations (the role of the women).

The central message of the 1994 *Inform* was that of the "human safety". The document did not give a clear definition of it (because, as it said, "most of the people understand instinctively the meaning of safety"), but they did emphasized on the "search for the human safety has to be achieved through the development and not through the arms", which was their main argument. Human safety would be the combination of peace and development; peace by non-violent means (and not *si vis pacem, para bellum*), and the satisfaction of the basic needs of all the citizens of a country (and not the search for the GDP without its distribution).

Human safety is not a development strategy (it is not a therapy) and it only takes part of a diagnosis to the extent that it is an objective that is proposed for the approach of certain contemporary problems such as violence and poverty, which tries to present as part of the same problem. However, some attempts for the quantification of some objectives have been done, setting terms and establishing indicators to know their achievement, although it is about, rather and respectively, of the aid to development and the struggle against violence and not merely of the "development", according to the old narrative. It is about, evidently, of the 0.7 percent objective and of the development objectives of the millennium.

The former is part of the Declaration of the General Assembly of United Nations over the second decade of the development, in the 1970 decade. In a simple way, it proposed that the "developed" countries dedicated 0.7% percent of their GDP to help. The second is that from year 2000 and is produced in the Millennium Summit, in September of the same year. Along with other objectives, the signing countries are proposed to "reduce to half, between 1990 and 2015 the percentage of people whose income is lower than one dollar per day" or to reduce to half, between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of people who suffer from hunger".

2. The achievements

Independently of knowing if the "development" is possible —and it seems that it is not (Wallerstein, 2005: 321-336)¹⁷—, in general, the known practices do not take that direction (Chang, 2004; Perkins, 2005). And the same can be said about these two objectives.

In the case of 0.7 is well known. From the countries of the Aid Development Committee (ADC), the percentage that dedicate the help in relation with the correspondent GDP and that should be 0.7, that in 1983 was in 0.36 (a record). After, it would drop to 0.22 in 1997 with slight increments until 2004, which would reach 0.25. Anyway, and as it has to be acknowledge that the number of poor people has increased in absolute figures, it has to be recognize here that the total amount of "aid for the development" of the ADC countries has increased in absolute figures after the drop they had in the mid nineties, in the middle of the neo-liberal crisis.

Also in this case there are differences between the countries that are part of the ADC. Some comply with their commitments of 1970 of

¹⁷If "development" is -to say something- as Denmark, the planet cannot support such waste of energy and non renewable resources, and it is not possible that all the countries, for example, export more and import less: some have to lose so that others win. If it is contra-argued saying that there are cases, as Spain, where there has been an economic growth, then "development" is possible, it is forgotten that it is achieved at other countries' expenses. The years of the Spanish return to the centre, leaving the periphery, are the "lost decade" for others. If "development" is leaving the periphery, it would have to be obvious that there is not development for everybody: in order to everybody leave the periphery is precise to change a system based, precisely, on the centre-periphery structure.

dedicating 0.7 of their GDP to the "aid to development" and are Norway, Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Portugal could be included, although it does not give 0.7, but only 0.63. On the other end are Italy (which in 2005 dedicates) 0.15, the United States 0.16 and Japan 0.17. Spain is in a low-medium place with its 0.26, before Canada, Austria, Australia, New Zealand and Greece.

An issue that is important not to leave aside is the proportion between the military expense of the governments and their respective official aid to development. Independently from the high percentage that some military expenses imply over the total budget (more than one fourth in the United States and Greece, and more than 10% in the United Kingdom, France, Australia and Portugal) and that, in some cases, to say the less, they are difficult to understand, it is even more striking their comparison with the percentage of the expense in the official aid to development, where the highest percentage is from the Norwegian government with something more than 4% of its expense dedicated to the official expense and Italy, Portugal and the United States have the lowest.

But the old objective of 0.7 not only is not accomplished but it is not wanted to be accomplished and has been followed by more modest objectives (such as that of the Conference of Monterrey in 2002), and what is more symptomatic, it is affirmed that it must not be comply with because it was based on wrong data and erroneous political suppositions. That is, at least, the trend that the neo-conservative administration and the *think tanks* seem to show, which give consistence and respectability to their decisions (Clemens and Moss, 2005).

There are founded reasons to think that the *objectives of the millennium development* will not be accomplished either. An inform from the United Nations of 2005 recognized that despite the fact that the number of poor (measured by the World Bank by means of the mythical dollar per day at parity of acquisition power) would have been reduced in Asia (from 936 millions in 1990 to 703 millions in 2001); however, in the south-Saharan Africa it had increased (from 227 millions to 313 millions) as well as in the rest of the world (from 57 millions to 74 millions). The title give to one of the graphics referred to the objective of reducing the hunger was expressive

"The drawbacks almost surpass the advancements in the fight against hunger". Between 1990 and 2002, Asia would have had a visible regression in the number of people who consume an insufficient quantity of food, but in Asia, and mainly in the South-Saharan Africa, the increment had been similarly visible. The graphics that accompany these purposes do not make us supposing that if the current rhythm was kept, the mentioned objectives of development would be reached. If this is how it works, it would not be surprising that the ideal of the human safety also had serious difficulties to being put into practice, despite the known and documented cases of peace processes (Fisas, 2004).

III. Connections

It is common sense that "the conflicts and disasters worsen the poverty and the hunger": they are classists and feed from the most vulnerable part of societies, sinking it in the misery. Nonetheless, the connections are not always lineal and, in many cases, they are not even clear, most of the times due to the willingness of the analyst in finding what he wants and has to do more with already decided policies than with "concrete analysis of concrete situations" (Illán, 2006: 79-94).

1. The connection between peace and development

There is an important bibliographic production that attempts to make emphasis on the arguments in favor of the human safety, or in favor of a higher connection between the proposals on peace and the proposals on development. A brief list, incomplete by definition, appears in the annex.¹⁸

The argument that, in one way or another, rests on this kind of proposals is easy to expose and has several facets. The first and more obvious one is the sense of collective responsibility before the suffering caused by the poverty as well as due to violence. The second, which could be called of "illustrated egoism", consists on the interest of the collective safety and the recognition that this includes the peace as well as the development. The third is based on the comparison between the preventive action and

¹⁸ Carlos Illán, from the University Institute of Development and Cooperation (Universidad Complutense, Madrid), called my attention on most of such texts.

the solution of a conflict and the finding that, in function of the "international community", is cheaper and effective the prevention than the help after the problem.¹⁹

The preventive action before the violence that indeed affect the reduction of the human development (PNUD) can be summarized with the well-known "fours D's"; Democracy, Human Rights (Derechos Humanos in Spanish) Development and Disarming. The last point would have to be obvious: to reduce the access to the media to practice violence is a way, along others, to reduce the probability of their use. The same can be said about the development and the human rights: it seems evident that the poverty, inequity and the negation of the human rights do not cause or justify the different kinds of violence (attacks, terrorism, occupation wars; international or civilian), but is it also evident that they increase the instability and the violence. The strengthening of the democracy is among the essential measures for the prevention of the conflicts: in numerous diagnoses that had been done, the cause (precipitant, last, fundamental) of the violence explosion is related to what it is called "fragile States" or, more directly, with manipulations of the governments to stay in the power or to get benefits that they would not get by other means. From there what was said about the discredit of the democracy has the importance it has and, besides that, of the ambiguity that the work for the peace and the development can have "outside the budget". It is about the substitutive role of the State that some NGOs²⁰ can have and that, even if it can be justifiable as immediate palliative, it does not stop being problematic if what it is about being done is strengthening the State, as it seems that there is a consensus on what it is to be done.²¹ However, the current responses sub-dimension the military and sub-dimension the human safety, which is particularly visible regarding democracy.

¹⁹ For example, the preventive action of Rwanda, in 1994, could have cost 1,300 millions of dollars, whereas the aid after the genocide was of 4,500. Four times that, rounding it off.

²⁰ Observe, once more, that its definition is negative (No) regarding the political instance (governmental): the NGOs can debilitate the State or can alleviate its failures, but they do not necessarily strengthen the State, matter as important as the strengthening of the civil society.

²¹ Since 1997, with the proposal of the PNUD in favor of the "activist State" in the development,

2. The subdued development to safety

The literature in the opposite sense to the one expose is also abundant (Matthews, 2005: 33-54; Piris, 2005: 55-66). There are some examples in the annex and it has to be admitted that it is the dominant trend. The argument is as simple as the previous ones, but the motivations change: now it is about of practicing that thing of "the well understood clarity start on one self"; given that the resources are limited, they have to be applied to what is prioritary. And the self defense is prioritary. In the practice, the already mentioned disproportion between resources dedicated by the governments to the defense and the resources dedicated to the "development" is reflected.

The arguments are known and are proclaimed from the United Nations Assembly to the discourses about "States of the nation", parliaments and means of communication: the problem of the "terrorism" is very important, they will say, and there is no time to look for the causes²² or to prevent it with "development"; what it has to be done is overcome with it. However, in these arguments seems to lie behind the Old discourse of the central countries that have never really wanted development, but that used this rhetoric to maintain the central-periphery structure unaltered. When the rhetoric of the development stopped being useful, it was shortly, but intensely, appealed to globalization rhetoric; and now that it does not work to legitimate the not very equitable functioning of the world system, the vocabulary has changed and the globalization is being substituted by the safety (Tortosa, 2004b: 108-120). In this neo-conservative context, the citizenship acquired characteristics equally rhetoric with a "permanent enemy" to agglutinate the population and a use and abuse of the "noble lie" to maintain the pretended citizens in order and peace, although not necessarily in wellbeing.

the acknowledgements of the destructing role the recipe "less State more market" have taken place. What is now known is that "less State" means more violence, and as it was seen in Yeltsin's Russia, without reducing poverty, but totally the opposite.

²² Curiously in this position about the discourses on the cultural "causes", of the "clash of civilizations" kind that, in any case, would be better to call "clash of fundamentalisms".

3. The causes of the kinds of violence

In the last five thousand years it seems that the species has dedicated more time to the peace than to the war. It is the called "imperfect peace" (Muñoz, 2001; Muñoz y Molina, 2004). However, that longer time without War has not been exempt of conflicts, oppression or marginalization situations and pulses of greed and personal ambitions and, maybe, collective. These factors have led to frustrations that have produced an increment of aggression and have turn into war, civil war or more or less diffuse violence. In these processes it has been frequent, when not determinant, that the political leaders have dragged their peoples to these combats for territorial ambition or for projection to the exterior of the domestic contradictions.

And alternative version would be: the war is a cultural institution that, as such, resides in the minds of the men who think that it is the way of facing some matters and that has to be promoted with glorious, heroic terms, most of the times virile and in many cases, religious.

These two postures lead to wide initiatives to avoid war. Some, let us call them "materialists", will propose —as it has been seen— the democracy (with the strengthening of the State and the fight against corruption), the respect to the human rights, the disarming (with particular attention to the commerce of short weapons) and a development as struggle not only against poverty or hunger, but also against the inequities. This perspective had received the attention of the World Bank and has had two recent examples: the V chapter ("Violent conflict: identify the real threat") of the *2005 Inform on Human Development* of the United Nations Program for the Development and the *2005 Inform of the social situation in the world*: the dilemma of the inequity of the United Nations, in its IV chapter ("Inequities and social integration").

The proposals of the latter, which could be called "idealists", would be other: if the war is in the minds of the people, it has to be substituted there for peace, in agreement to what was affirmed in the "Declaration of Seville on violence" on May 16, 1986 and would lead to the peace culture campaign promoted from the UNESCO. Acknowledging the role of the ideas in the human acts, their point of support is in the ideas themselves; so that if

we find groups standing opposite due to their ideas, it will be necessary to look for compatibility or understanding among them or, if possible, it will be necessary to look for a different idea that transcend those. For example, between the idea of sovereignty of the Basque peoples with the right for self-determination and that of the Spanish peoples, one and indivisible, apparently incompatible, Johan Galtung has proposed the idea of co-sovereignty (with France, as in Andorra), no matter if a "peace by means of the recognition of right" that would be one of the possible "materialistic" proposals. For example it shows that only promoting the culture of peace or leaving in the field of the ideas is not achieved too much.

These approaches do not exhaust the possibilities of facing the violence. The dominant has been the *militarist: si vis pace, para bellum*, this is War is avoided by preparing for war, and the best way to face violence is violence itself or its threat. In general, as it has been said, the current answers over-dimension this eventuality meanwhile under-value (or deny) the role of the human safety and of the underlying factors. Probably the paradigmatic example was the discourse of the former president José María Aznar in the LVIII United Nations Assembly: there is no sense asking for the reasons of terrorism, I would say; what it has to be done is defeat it. In the same direction are the document signed by the second president Bush *National Security Strategy for the United States of America*, since September 2002 to march 2006 where it is reaffirmed the doctrine of the preventive attack before the threat is materialized and the causes are disdained, being these "materialistic" or "idealistic".

Five thousand years of history should have taught that this last strategy, isolated, usually generate more death and destruction. It is not realistic (Martínez, 2001; Martínez, 2005). The best proof is the Iraq's occupation that, for now, has created terrorism in a country where there was not any, has multiplied the "torturism", has Islamized a laic Constitution, it has installed a culture of violence, it has give place to a civil war and has increased the number of terrorist attack worldwide. It is very probably that what provides more safety to the citizens is a mixture of the three approaches (the police-military also), always supposing that this is the finality of the political class and not of achieving or maintaining in the power at any cost,

including, including the manipulation of the insecurity to achieve it. And the three of them, combined, suppose the best prevention.

If there were not any well organized created interests at world scale, we would make more efforts to that prevention. Some situations, such as that of Rwanda, are well studied. However, the weapons producers and sellers (official and smugglers) are an important pressure group and make forgetting that the only solution, in many cases, is the prevention and the only preventive practice is the solution of the problems that cause the confrontations. They are, indeed, the increasing of arms the ones that finish an armed confrontation.

In the XX century the war casualties reached a proportion, in respect to the total population, until then unknown. The XXI threatens with not being left behind, and the human and economic effects of those wars are easy to evaluate both if they are produced among periphery countries (as it usually happens with most of the wars), as well as if there are confrontations among superpowers for the hegemony of the rest of the world, that was what happened with the World Wars and in particular, the Cold War. Besides, and with known historical roots, it is now evident the peculiar violent role recently assumed by what can be called international *jihad* salafista or radical political Islamism, used now by the American fundamentalism to legitimate its particular "war against terrorism", after having using it directly against communism or against Arab nationalism. Now, as the Islamic Jihad, the IRA in Ireland, and the ETA in Euskadi, to focus the problem as "war" is one of the best ways to not solving it and even more if the confrontation is "de-territorized" as happens with the new transnational movements.

But this last problem is a real one, and without a doubt, demands police-military responses of safety, protection, collaboration among bodies and countries, infiltration, finance and materials control, persecution, dismantling, etc. However, other two approaches are necessary, besides the reiterated reservation on the police-military approach: it should never be applied violating the human rights since, in such a case, it achieves the opposite it states to be pursuing. But there are problems. On the other side, the "idealists" field has them if they do not want to stay only on the education for the peace. Indeed, little can be done with fundamentalist readings of

the Koran done not by Muslims who find there what would find a fundamentalist reading of the Bible, slanted in the same sense than the previous. It is also problematic to directly take the religious ideas when they are not the cause of the behavior but the vocabulary with which the confrontations are expressed. Besides, it is not easy to find an interlocutor, Muslim or Christian, who represents ideas of the collective: not even the Pope or the Queen of England or, by definition, the headless orthodox churches (sic!) are representative. And exactly the same happens with the different divisions of the Islam.

The "materialist" side has a long tradition regarding proposals, but it has not being accompanied in any moment by real policies (more than rhetoric as the 0.7 or the millennium objectives) on inequity, poverty, human rights, disarming and democratization that, obviously, would have to be applied not only to a part of the involved but to all of them and, therefore, also the United States and the European Union.

As we know that the worst way to solve a problem is presenting in a simplistic way, the search of the causes of the old wars and the new violence has t be accompanied by the understanding of the *objectives* the involved actors are pursuing: it is not indifferent that some do not want to take the power and some others want to keep it at world scale, that differ in the purpose of "change of regimen" applied to different countries in different senses, and that they use, ones and the others, the violence as means to mining the safety of the opponents. And that violence goes further the war. It includes attacks, torture, genocide, "politicians' extermination" and even the mere nihilist explosion before the frustration and the disenchantment.

IV. Prognoses

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been publishing some prospective exercises from the encounters with professionals, first American and then moving to other nationalities. The presented scenarios in the most recent one (Tortosa, 2005b; Tortosa, 2006) with which are next reproduced and mark different contexts for the prognostic on citizenship, development and violence.

However, the futures for the citizenship, peace and development are

not written down. These possible worlds are not the only possible ones. It can always be thought of other worlds as possible. To make them probable, it is necessary to intervene on the present according to the local and global scales. If "thinking locally, acting globally" is the privilege of the successive hegemonic powers that, as now the United States, think in local terms what later transform in action at global scale, to the rest of us there are at least three options (Acosta, 2005):

To think locally and act locally, that is in the end, the characteristic of Scenarios for 2020, according to Mapping the global future:

American Peace: scenario where the predominant of the United States survive the radical changes in the global political panorama and allows the entrance of a new global and inclusive order, facing the energy demands and the exhaustion of the American unipolarity.
Davos' world: here is illustrated the way with which a strong economic growth, led by China and India, can remodel the globalization process while giving it a less occidental look, transforming the political game field but maintaining the social inequities.
A new Caliphate: is an example of how a global movement fed by identity policies of religious radicalism becomes a threat to the occidental norms and values that constitute the fundament of the global system.
Fear cycle: In this scenario, the worried for the international terrorism and the internal conflicts grow until taking extreme safety measurements to prevent mortal attacks and produce a new Orwellian world with new world power centres.

every policy, and in his days Tip O'Neil said: every policy is a local policy. It is the place on which we have immediate responsibility and we have to be prepared so that local action does not become a "strategic advancement over the hinterland", this is, in a retreat. There are necessary, indeed, two options.

To think globally, acting locally, that was for a long time the ecologist motto by excellence. It is a step farther the last and maintains the sphere of the acting really available. The warning here is that the emphasis in the

local action do not lose sight of the power problem of and in the State as it has happened since many of these options are identified with the world of the NGOs. To think globally, acting globally is the field where the most charged confrontation of the future is taking place: the multinationals work this way, but also the different forums that, from different ideological perspectives, are trying to respond to this challenge. Probably the contemporary problem of the citizenship, development and violence are so acute that there is no point in attaching to only one of these perspectives. All of them are necessary and, in my opinion, all the sincere allies are good and would have to be welcomed.

Bibliography

Acosta, Alberto (2005), *Desarrollo global. Con la Amazonía en la mira*, Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.

Almond, Gabriel y Sidney Verba (1989), *The civic culture*, Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Álvarez, Ignacio (2001), *El miedo a la paz. De la Guerra de los Seis Días a la Segunda Intifada*, Madrid: IUDC y Los Libros de la Catarata.

Amin, Samir (2001), "Islam político y globalización imperialista", in *La Jornada*, October ,17.

Chang, Ha-Joon (2004), *Retirar la escalera: La estrategia del desarrollo en perspectiva histórica*, Madrid: ICEI e IUDC, Libros de la Catarata.

Clemens, Michael and Todd Moss (2005), "Ghost of 0.7 % : Origins and relevance of the international aid target", in *Working Paper*, núm.68, septiembre, Center for Global Development. Available at: <http://www.cgdev.org/files/3822_file_WP68.pdf>.

Eco, Humberto, "Salvemos la democracia", in *libertaegiustizia.it* [translation in Spanish]. Available at: <<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=27918>>.

Escobar, Arturo (1998), *La invención del Tercer Mundo: construcción y deconstrucción del desarrollo*, Bogotá: Norma.

Fisas, Vicenç (2004), *Procesos de paz y negociación en conflictos armados*, Barcelona-Buenos Aires-México: Paidós.

Illán, Carlos (2006), "Ayuda al desarrollo y seguridad: ¿Dos agendas in compatibles?", in *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación*, núm. 17, Madrid.

Martínez, Vicent (2001), *Filosofía para hacer las paces*, Barcelona: Icaria.

_____ (2005), *Podemos hacer las paces. Reflexiones éticas tras el 11-S y el 11-M*, Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer.

Mateo, Miguel, "Corrupción política. Enfoques y desenfoques desde la cultura, la economía y la propia política".

Matthews, Robert (2005), "La política de seguridad estadounidense en Oriente Medio", in *Cartografías del poder. Hegemonía y respuestas*, Anuario CIP, Barcelona: Icaria.

Muñoz, Francisco [ed.] (2001), *La paz imperfecta*, Granada: Universidad de Granada.

_____ (2004), "La paz", in Molina, Beatriz y Francisco Muñoz [eds.], *Manual de paz y conflictos*, Granada: Universidad de Granada.

Perkins, John (2005), *Confesiones de un gángster económico. La cara oculta del imperialismo americano*, Barcelona: Ediciones Urano.

Piris, Alberto (2005), "Seguridad nacional y terrorismo en Estados Unidos", in *Cartografías del poder. Hegemonía y respuestas*, Anuario CIP, Barcelona: Icaria.

Quijano, Aníbal (2004), "El laberinto de América Latina: ¿Hay otras salidas?", in *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales*, vol. X, núm. 1.

Rist, Gilbert (2002), *El desarrollo: historia de una creencia occidental*, Madrid: IUDC y Los Libros de la Catarata.

Tortosa, José (1994), "Pobreza y violencia", in Papeles. *Cuestiones internacionales de paz, ecología y desarrollo*, núm. 50.

_____ (2002), "Elementos fascistas en el síndrome del 11 de septiembre", in *Sistema*, núm. 167, Madrid.

_____ (2004a), *Democracia made in USA. Un modelo político en cuestión*, Barcelona: Icaria.

_____ (2004b), "Un mundo inseguro: Usos y abusos de la inseguridad", in *Economías. Revista del Departamento de Investigaciones, Postgrado y Tesis*, núm. 2, Ecuador: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Cuenca.

_____ (2005a), "De nuevo el nuevo (des)orden mundial", in Ecuador *Debate*, núm. 64, Quito.

_____ (2005b), *Problemas para la paz hoy: El aporte de los Estados Unidos*, Toluca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.

_____ (2006), "Sobre el carácter humano del poder mundial", in *Polis*, vol. V, núm. 13, Santiago de Chile: Universidad Bolivariana.

Ugarteche, Óscar [comp.] (2005), *Vicios públicos. Poder y corrupción*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (2005), "After developmentalism and globalization, what?", in *Social Forces*, vol. LXXXIII, núm. 3.

Annex

Arguments in favor to the connection between peace and development

Collier, Paul y Anke Hoeffler (2001). Available at:

<http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance_23oct.pdf>.

Fearon, James y David Laitin (2003), "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war", in *American Political Science Review*, núm. 92, vol. 1.

Naciones Unidas, "Desigualdades e integración social", in *Informe sobre la situación social en el mundo 2005: el dilema de la desigualdad*.

NN.UU. / Banco Mundial, Political Economy of Civil Wars (2004), "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War", in *Perspectives on politics*, vol. II, núm. 2.

PNUD, "Conflicto violento: identificar la verdadera amenaza", in *Informe sobre el desarrollo humano 2005*, PNUD.

50th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War", 2000.

Arguments to subdue development to security

A development co-operation lens on terrorism prevention, A DAC reference document, OECD (2003). Available at:

<<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf>>.

Cragin, Kim y Peter Chalk (2003), "Terrorism and development. Using social and economic development to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism", Rand Corporation. Available at: <<http://www.rand.org/pub>

lications/MR/MR1630/MR1630.pdf>.

Global Security and Development Network, "Conflict security, and official development assistance (ODA): isues for NGO advocacy". Avail

able at: <<http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf>>.

National Security Strategy for the United States signed by George W. Bush, September, 2002. Available at: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>>.

[second version (2006) <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>>].

José María Tortosa. Ph. D. in Social Sciences (Rome, 1973) and Sociology (Madrid, 1982). Professor of the Department of Sociology II since 1991, member of the Studies on Peace and Development Group (GEPYD: <<http://www.ua.es/es/cultura/gepyd/index.htm>>) and of the Social Trends Observatory (OBETS: <<http://www.obets.ua.es/obets/>>) of the University of Alicante. His is the author of more than twenty books, among which are: *Violencias ocultas* (Quito, Abya Yala, 2003), *La guerra de Irak: un enfoque orwelliano* (Universidad de Alicante, 2004), *Democracia made in USA. Un modelo político en cuestión* (Barcelona, Icaria, 2004) and *Problemas para la paz hoy: El aporte de los Estados Unidos* (Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 2005). He has translated to Spanish works by Ralf Dahrendorf, Johan Galtung e Immanuel Wallerstein. His lnes of research are: social inequities, violence and the world system. E-mail: jm.tortosa@ua.es

Sent to dictum: April 17th, 2006.

Approval: May 12th, 2006.