

Recognition and Care: Philosophy for Peace and Imperfect Peace in Dialogue

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Abstract: The article addresses the intellectual legacy of philosopher and peace researcher Vicent Martínez Guzmán. His theoretical and conceptual proposal of philosophy for peace will be presented in dialogue with the theory of the imperfect peace by historian and researcher for peace Francisco Muñoz. Both authors significantly contributed to the development of peace studies in Spain and Latin America, a legacy we want to revisit, bringing to light the potential of their proposals as analytical and normative frameworks of peace, as well as the synergies and confluences between their approaches. To that end, recognition and care will be taken as analytical lines. From the conceptual tools of philosophy for peace and imperfect peace, recognition and care will be examined as competences for peace, which we can, and should, normatively reconstruct in the common goal of moving toward building cultures for peace making.

Key words: peace, recognition, care, intersubjectivity, conflict.

Resumen: El artículo aborda el legado intelectual del filósofo e investigador para la paz Vicent Martínez Guzmán. Se presentará su propuesta teórico-conceptual de la *filosofía para la paz* en diálogo con la teoría de la *paz imperfecta* del historiador e investigador para la paz Francisco Muñoz. Ambos autores contribuyeron significativamente al desarrollo de los estudios para la paz en España e Iberoamérica, un legado que queremos visitar, visibilizando el potencial de sus propuestas como marcos analítico-normativos de la paz, así como las sinergias y confluencias entre sus planteamientos. Con ese fin se tomarán como ejes analíticos el reconocimiento y el cuidado. Desde las herramientas conceptuales de la *filosofía para la paz* y de la *paz imperfecta* se examinará el reconocimiento y el cuidado como competencias de paz, que podemos, y debemos, reconstruir normativamente en el objetivo común de transitar hacia *culturas para hacer las paces*.

Palabras clave: paz, reconocimiento, cuidado, intersubjetividad, conflicto.

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Introduction

In this article we will update the analysis, debates and research that we have been developing from UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace at Universitat Jaume I de Castellón (Spain), inspired by the conceptual tools bequeathed to us by our founder, Vicent Martínez Guzmán.¹ In short, we will focus on analyzing the links and bonds shared by the proposal developed by the aforementioned philosopher and peace researcher, with the theoretical proposal of *imperfect peace*, devised by historian and peace researcher Francisco Muñoz. Both authors made significant contributions to the development peace studies in Spain and Ibero-America, a legacy we intend to review and dignify from this text, bringing the conceptual tools they bequeathed to us, the potential of their proposal and the synergies and concurrence of their statements.

The curiosity comes from the proposal of philosophy for peace is looking for the appropriate conceptual framework to contribute to reduce through pacific means to the reduction of various sorts of suffering human beings can inflict on each other and on nature. In these actual relationships of human beings there are moments of much suffering that have to be transformed by pacific means, but also moments for peacemaking what have to be made explicit (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b).

The notion of imperfect peace produced by Francisco Muñoz (2001 y 2004b) tried to express the moments when in the history of relationships human beings have exercised their capability to live in peace, the various ways they express from diversity, cultures and beliefs. Far from the single consideration of single absolute peace imposed by a group of humans onto others, this notion allows addressing the various ways for peacemaking that will always be in the making, that will always be in movement. From there, as we will realize, the consideration of peace as imperfect in a positive sense.

This ontology, this way of looking at the world, where not only we recognize our experiences and competence for violence, but also our experiences and competence for peace, will lead these authors to propose an epistemological change in direction of studies for peace (Martínez Guzmán, 2001 and 2005b).

1 UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace was born in 1999 at Universitat Jaume I de Castellón (Spain), as a recognition to the dissemination and diffusion of peacemaking approaches by Professor Vicent Martínez Guzmán (1949-2018), founder of the Master and doctorate in International Studies for Peace, Conflict and Development in Universitat Jaume I.

An epistemological change that helps us overcome what Muñoz (2001: 24) called “cognitive schizophrenia” of consider ourselves researchers for peace and nevertheless, we have spent a long time researching “what is not peace” (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 208); this is to say, the various forms of violence. We have even considered that “the positive” —which in the sense of actual or authentic— was the various ways of violence and that peace was the ways to act nonviolently.

One of the characteristics of the epistemological turn is to consider the various ways of making peace as the positive of the human actions, while we deem the various forms of violence and suffering as “the negative”; i.e., the rupture of the various manners of peacemaking we human being have (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 208-214).

In order to develop these ideas, in the first place, we will update and summarize the connections between philosophy for peace and the notion of imperfect peace (Martínez Guzmán, 2001c; Comins Mingol *et al.*, 2011). Secondly, we will find out how philosophy for peace dialogues with the notion of imperfect peace in the research work we have carried out in UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace on the theories of recognition (París Albert, 2009 y 2018a) and the philosophy of care (Comins Mingol, 2009).

Philosophy for peace and imperfect peace: analytical-regulatory frames of peace

In research for peace we can find, by and large, two main lines or perspectives of work. On the one side, the critical or polemologic standpoint, in which we make an analysis-diagnosis, visualize and denounce the various sorts of direct, structural and cultural violence that human beings and nature suffer. On the other, the constructive or irenological standpoint, in which we carry out an analysis-diagnosis, visualize and rebuild our competence for peacemaking.

And it is that “Studies for Peace are not only the explanation of how bad everything is, but it is an essential part of them to put forward alternatives from which to build new futures” (Martínez Guzmán *et al.*, 2009: 95). Philosophy for peace and imperfect peace are two analytical-regulatory frameworks comprised in the second standpoint, that of studies for peace, of research for peace.

The proposal of imperfect peace developed by Francisco Muñoz (2001 and 2004b) emphasize the importance of visualizing, recognizing and analyzing experiences of peace. Experiences of altruism, compassion,

solidarity, cooperation, recognition or care —among others—, which in spite of being part of the history of humankind have not been the central object of study, neither in human or social sciences in general, nor for the research of more traditional peace. Recognizing these peace experiences, such human capabilities for making peace, reminds us that “it is real, if we want, we can make peace” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b: 158) and, thereby following the famous thesis by professor Vicent Martínez Guzmán, we have no excuse, but responsibility.

The epistemological and media invisibility of peace is not free from consequences. The centrality of violence in sciences and in the media is not only a biased representation of the complexity of the world of life, but has important implications for social change, for our comprehension of human being, politics or security. Seduced by the analysis, study and narration of violence, media and science contribute to its naturalization and in doing so, they perpetuate it (Comins Mingol, 2018: 152).

“We the pacifists are the realistic” is one the best known theories by researcher Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2005b: 17) and elaborates on the importance of recognizing the complexity of the human capabilities and experiences for violence, but also for peace. According to this author, false realistic will be ones that recognize only violence and this way they contribute to normalize and reproduce it, “they are ideologists that conceal the possibility of alternatives with their argumentations” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b: 16). Moreover, researching on the experiences and capacities for peace allows us to discover peace as an original experience and build a definition of “violence as a rupture of that intersubjective solidarity” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b: 25).

Vicent Martínez Guzmán worked in the thesis of inter-subjectivity as an essential foundation for philosophy for peace. To so, he resorted to rereading the works of the founder of phenomenology, Husserl (1991: 356):

The I stops being a thing isolated from other things of the same type in a previously given world, and in general, the exteriority and contiguity of egological people loses its relevance to make room for a being-in-the-others and being-for-the-others interior.

In this context of an intersubjective phenomenology of the various ways to make pace, Vicent Martínez inspired in Muñoz’s concept of imperfect peace, in the way that pacific interactions between human beings are a constituent part of intersubjective relationships. In such manner that violence would not be the basic or essential of human relationships, but its denial or rupture: the rupture of intersubjective relations that constitute basic human relationships.

Adding the adjective imperfect means that speaking of peaceful intersubjective relationships does not imply speaking of absolute peace. It rather seems a diverse peace, peace, which is noticed in human interactions, always dynamically. Methodologically, both authors renounce to speak of perfect or absolute peace, since historical examples show that when it has been expressed thus, what in reality has been done is to impose forms of understanding peace by some human beings into others.²

On the contrary, imperfect peace in intersubjective relationships of human beings is always in the making, they are always in interactive process relationships between human beings. Here, imperfect would be similar to the use of imperfect in grammar, which according to RAE, refers to the verbal aspect that expresses an action going on, or at least, unfinished.

It is indeed in inter-subjectivity where the peace we are always making (imperfect) appears, together with the other things that also we human beings make to one another and nature, which provides us with some key elements of the epistemological-turn proposal developed by Vicent Martínez Guzmán. In addition to changing standpoint to study peace from what peace is, and considering that the various forms of violence as its denial, which is an important epistemological inversion, it also changes the way of understanding sciences from objectivity to inter-subjectivity.

Sciences, among which peace research is (Martínez Guzmán, 2000 and 2004), as they are not based on “objectivity criteria”; that is to say, in conceiving knowledge as a relation between a subject and object, in a way that affirmations are more scientific “the more they explain the objects’ reality”. With the epistemological turn we change from objectivity to inter-subjectivity. “More scientific” will be the knowledge that not only refers to objects of knowledge, but subjects its affirmations to inter-subjective comprehension of “scientific community”, of the relations between subjects, owing to this it is inter-subjective. The imperfect peace that we human beings are making, as well as the other things we don onto each other, we know them, we say we know about them, in interaction with the others who are always able to question us about what we do, say and even conceal.

In like manner, adding to objectivity, the proposal of epistemological standpoint change put forward by Vicent Martínez Guzmán challenges the alleged neutrality; indeed, neutrality means “neither this nor that”.

2 Following this line, in the face of an ethnocentric peace imposed by the dominant culture that excludes other worldviews, professor Eduardo Sandoval Forero (2013: 22) proposes working with ethnographies for peace that consider the contributions from the diversity of cultures and worldviews to make peace.

Conversely, in the epistemological proposal to find out how we make peace continually and imperfectly, as mentioned, Husserl's quotation that we make human actions in our being-one-in-the-others and one-for-the-others. Peacemaking know-hows and peacemaking from the recognition of the dynamic of imperfection are not neutral just because they are intersubjective, plural.

Hence, those who mediate the conflicts to transform them by pacific means may be relieved from the burden of being neutral, in the knowledge they help such transformation. Instead, they have to be intersubjective, open to the plurality of proposals, capabilities and competences the parties in conflict have to perceive the situation in different ways and recognize one another as human beings capable of empowering: intersubjectively express capabilities and competences, also imperfect in a dynamical way; so they become aware that they are able to do the things by pacific means. Evidently, the mediators themselves must have their values clear and submit them to intersubjective and reciprocal questioning so as not to turn mediation into a subtle form of domination disguised as neutrality.

Furthermore, it also contests the neutrality on values. Not only in peace studies cannot we be neutral regarding what we deem worthy, in any sort of human action it is fundamental to explicitly disclose the values committed in the context of intersubjective and plural dialogue. There are other characteristics of the epistemological change proposed by Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001b: 114-115), though we will conclude reviewing the term adopted from the linguistic phenomenology and the Speech Act theory that Austin changed into communication phenomenology: performativity. It is a term that initially appears in Austin (1990) to distinguish those expressions we use to make things (performative utterances) from those used to refer or describe (constative utterances, which call or refer things or facts).

Owing to this, we stress not only what peace calls or refers to. Instead, we emphasize the intersubjective contexts in which it is demonstrated that saying something is not only to refer, describe, name or verify facts, but make things onto us human beings to one another with words. Of what we do when we speak we can always be accountable. Hence, performativity becomes a human-being characteristic, as it expresses by means of the linguistic phenomenology of what we do onto ourselves by speaking, how interrelated we human beings are when, by and large, perform, carry out or execute actions, always subject to mutual interpellation (Martínez Guzmán, 1992 and 2015).

Clearly, between what we do onto one another or perform as human beings is the use of our competences and capabilities to exercise the various forms of violence we are capable of, but also the various ways in which various ways to make imperfect peace, not because they are defective but continual, unfinished and always perfectible, which we are also capable of.

Vicent Martínez Guzmán defined his proposal of philosophy for peace as the “normative reconstruction of our peacemaking competences” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b: 67), a proposal related to “pacifist empowerment”, which Francisco Muñoz speaks of (Muñoz and Bolaños, 2011: 31-36); that is to say, that individuals, peoples, human beings have to give one another the opportunities to exercise our powers, capabilities or competences to make peace.

In the analysis carried out by Vicent Martínez Guzmán on the word performativity, he considered the contributions from various authors among them feminist philosopher Judith Butler (Martínez Guzmán, 2007). In the context of the reflections by Martínez Guzmán on imperfect peace, the notion of performativity has an iterative or repetitive character, as expressed by Butler quoting Derrida. In such manner that human beings constitute our identities always imperfect in a positive sense, we are here studying. This is to say, we human beings perform or configure our identities, not perfectly, absolutely and for ever, but in continuous repetition or interaction, in the intersubjective relationships we have with somebody else, as we do with the performing or realization of the various ways of making peace.

Let us see how we apply this notion of imperfect peace in the context of the research work we have carried out in UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace at Universitat Jaume I as regards the recognition and care as competences to make peace.

Interpretation of the mutual recognition from the theory of imperfect peace

Our intention in this section is to retake the ideas previously commented, even though on this occasion referred to mutual recognition relationships in the contraction of peace culture. With this intention we can summarize the image of imperfect peace as an attempt to overcome the “utopian” dreams of too “perfect” ways of understanding peace impossible to reach; this way, “the moments of peace, assuming their imperfections” are underscored.

Then, if this notion is extended by saying that “imperfect peace is the one that leaves pending tasks, the one that never ends” (Martínez Guzmán, 2001b: 206 and 217), it is understandable that in this work we are interested

in reflecting was well on that imperfection of peace applied to mutual recognition relationships.

It is plain to see that the imperfect peace theory can contribute with a new way of understanding mutual recognition as unfinished actions, in the positive sense we commented before that they can always be improved and also a new way to understand our human capabilities to recognize them as ongoing capabilities, also in the positive sense that they can be developed so better recognition relationships appear, though as we have been stating, they will always be imperfect.

This interpretation fits in the following asseveration that helps summarize the theory of imperfect peace, according to which “the advantage of imperfection is that we will never be totally in peace nor absolutely fair, we can always ask more from ourselves” (Martínez Guzmán, 2001b: 227).

The proposal we make from philosophy for peace that we have been working in UNESCO Chair for philosophy for peace is that the mutual recognition has an important role in the construction of culture for peace and from there our interest to analyze it regarding the theory of imperfect peace. So much that it is considered another pacific means, though basic and fundamental, in the practice of the pacific transformation of conflicts owing to the form in which it may influence the configuration of each individual identity. This last idea that links mutual recognition and the creation of identities is mainly taken from Axel Honneth, whom we will study in detail further in the text.

The concept of recognition comes from the Latin word *cognōscere* (cognition) (Corominas, 1996: 162) which is added a prefix, “re-”. Then, it may be said it is “to find out again” about an object or individual which we no longer know. In reality, this definition of the term as “find out again” has led to various studies that vary according to the philosophic theory from which it is approached.

For example, Ricoeur (2005) points out that the uses of the term recognition can vary in function of the context in which we are and of the philosophic theory from which reflections are made. In this sense, the author demonstrates that the uses for this term may be ordered as though it were a process from active voice (recognize) to passive voice (be recognized) (Ricoeur, 2005). This way, in the first place, he mentions recognition as identification (in which he includes Cartesian and Kantian philosophy); secondly, self-recognition (in which aspects which the author refers to as the “Greek background”, among others, are included); and, third, mutual recognition (where he includes the philosophy of Hegel, Honneth and his own, among others).

As it has been glimpsed in the previous lines, in this last recognition (mutual or reciprocal) is the one in which it is intended to deepen into this work, in such manner that we still are inline with the epistemological turn that stresses inter-subjectivity.; that is, in the pacific ways in which relationships between subjects can be build and preserved, to prevent human and nature suffering as study object of philosophy for peace.

From studies for peace, recognition has been worked by a number of authors such as Bush and Folger (1994), who also relate it to revalorization or empowerment, and Lederach (1995), who mainly uses training to refer to empowerment. However, as stated before, in this chapter we would like to deepen into the theory of recognition by Honneth (1997) because of link with mutual recognition relationships (inter-subjectivity) intending to connect it with the theory of imperfect peace.

Axel Honneth belongs to a New Generation of the Frankfort School that broadly characterizes by considering that modern societies exhibit a pathological deformation of rational human faculties caused by certain social practices. This is the reason why one of the goals of Honneth (2009: 7) is to ponder of the social causes that produce the pathology of human rationality.

It is here where he includes the notion of mutual recognition as a part of his theory to show that these mutual recognition experiences, “well managed”, might help avoid such pathologic deformations of modern societies, eve though we know, bearing in mind the theory of imperfect peace, that such expressions of mutual recognition will never be perfect, but will be improvable in a positive sense that we will be always able to ask more from ourselves when we mutually recognize.

Understanding that mutual recognition relationships will never be absolutely perfect is also a counterargument for the assertions that we the pacifists look for ideal peace, in this case, concentrated on the experiences of absolute mutual recognition relationships. In like manner, the theory of imperfect peace help us overcome this vision.

The primacy of mutual recognition as the core of social life in Honneth’s philosophy is one of the reasons to break with research work by the First Generation of the Frankfort School and which to a certain extent, with Habermas (Basaure, 2008: 59 and 62). The priority Honneth (2007: 61, 63 and 65) places on recognition takes him to state that recognition goes before learning, for if a child links with their word from the perspective of a reference person (the mother), it is necessary to have a previous identification with such individual, before such person’s attitude becomes their corrective stance.

Therefore, this positioning in the attitude of the second person refers to a previous form of recognition that allows us to modify our image of reification, not as opposed to recognition but as an attitude that appears when we forget that knowledge comes from previous recognition attitudes.

The aspects thus far commented show us the important role that mutual recognition relationships have in the configuration of each individual's identity and thereby the construction and establishment of culture for peace. Owing to this, Martínez Guzmán (2001a), influenced by his studies on Communication Ethics, reminds us that in order to make peace we have to recognize ourselves as valid interlocutors.

In any case and as stated before, Honneth distances from such communicational paradigm of his predecessor, Habermas. That is to say, the Honneth's theory of mutual recognition does not restrict to a vision soaked in Habermas' writings, and goes beyond when it identifies recognition as the drive for social change, as it speaks of "recognition struggles", which generate social conflicts, which have the goal of facing injustice from lack of recognition (Honneth, 1997).

Honneth produces such interpretation of mutual recognition heavily influenced by Hegel. Other philosophers before Hegel also demonstrated the role of recognition in their philosophies, for example when Kant pointed out in his categorical imperative the need to recognize human being as an "end in themselves" and not a means to an end. However, Hegel (Honneth, 1997) strains to underscore that the recognition of people's dignity, and therefore we may say of excluded people as well, is accomplished by the struggles for recognition that take place in social movements. This is the idea that Honneth retakes in his writings.

The conception of human being changes for Honneth from Renaissance when trade, the improvement of communication networks and changes in social structures occur. In such moments, Hobbes (Honneth, 1997) and Machiavelli (Honneth, 1997), in particular, offer a rather egotistical image of human being, concerned by their own protection against the attacks other individual, deemed as an enemy, can carry out on the first. There is here a self-preservation struggle that Hegel would transform into struggles for recognition by means of his researches.

In Jena's period, these ideas on recognition we have been referring to are clearly shown from the differentiation that establish three forms of recognition: love, law and lifestyle. For Hegel (Honneth, 1997) every individual must experience these three forms of recognition to constitute themselves with full integrity.

Honneth will retake this three-fold partition of mutual recognition from Hegel and indicate that every human being shall be reciprocally recognized in the three following ways to have full integrity (París Albert, 2009: 79) (see Table 1³):

1. *Recognition of our physical integrity.* It is the first type of reciprocal recognition everyone has to undergo and it is based on the attitude of love, but not only in the “limited meaning the concept has taken from the romantic valuation of sexual intercourse”, but in a broad sense. “[...] love is the first stage of reciprocal re-cognition, as in its culmination subjects reciprocally confirm their needing nature and recognize as needing beings”. Therefore, here “[...] love must be conceived as a being-one-self in another” whose need remains over life (Honneth, 1997: 117, 118).

This first recognition, favorable to the development of self-confidence, is damaged with the disdain that eliminates the possibility to use our body with absolute freedom. For example, this situation takes place when a woman is denied the use of her own body due to the possession another body (a man) exercises on her.

2. *Recognition of people as individuals that are part of a community and as such are have rights and obligations.* The second type of recognition stresses law relationships. Honneth (1997) makes a difference between juridical and social recognition as follows:

In “juridical recognition”, as it is written in the text, states that every human being, with no difference, must be valuable as “an end in itself”; while “social respect” stresses the value of an individual to the extent that it is measurable with socially relevant criteria. In the first case, as demonstrated by the Kantian formula, we face the universal respect to the “freedom of the individual’s will”; secondly, on the contrary, in the face of recognition of individual realizations, whose value is measured by the degree at which a society deems them significant.

Therefore:

[...] in the two cases a man is respected because of certain capabilities, but in the first, it is such general quality that make them a person, and in the second, on the contrary, particular qualities that distinguish them from other people (Honneth, 1997: 137-138, 139).

This sort of recognition favors the development of self-respect, as it is defined by respect.

The contempt that makes this recognition difficult is the one that excludes some people from society. This attitude is usually noticed at present when we see how certain people and institutions treat immigrants, who

3 Table 1 is Annex, at the end of the article (Editor’s note).

left their countries, traditions and families behind looking for better life conditions.

3. *Recognition to different lifestyles.* This is the third type of recognition that is linked to solidarity. It helps understand the particularities of each lifestyle such as those that refer to music taste, ways of dressing, ideologies and religious traditions, among other things. It is clearly a recognition linked to respect to basic human rights from the intercultural standpoint we have worked in UNESCO Chair Philosophy for Peace.

This form of recognition favors self-esteem, while the disregard that makes its practice difficult would be that which hinders the recognition of certain lifestyles that are still congruent regarding certain basic human rights, as stated in the previous paragraph.

Honneth (1997) focuses on three sorts of recognition to elaborate his theory on reciprocal knowledge. As stated at the beginning of this section, Honneth's emphasis on mutual recognition makes him devise this theory, which he deems, is useful to end a number of pathologies of modern societies.

In any case, these are two aspects to bear in mind if we value this image or mutual recognition under the notion of imperfect peace:

1. Never can the three sorts of mutual recognition, Honneth speaks of, be interpreted as "perfect" experiences of mutual recognition, but else, as "imperfect" experiences in the positive sense that the ways in which we physically recognize one another, as citizens with rights and obligations and in our particular ways of life, are always improvable.
2. The personal identity configured by feeling recognized in these three forms of mutual recognition will never be a "closed identity", but an identity in process, which is continuously built, while our relations of mutual recognition improve at once.

Such is the importance that Honneth gives his theory that he debates it with Fraser in *Redistribution or Recognition?* (Fraser and Honneth, 2006). The text above clearly shows that Honneth starts from an intersubjective interpretation of mutual recognition influenced by identity politics, while Fraser starts from a more sociological view of recognition.

This way, for Honneth, it is in intersubjective relationships where recognition takes place and the identity of each individual is built. However, for Fraser, recognition is linked to social structures, working from them in favor of recognizing all the people. Therefore, the already-institutionalized social structures have to be transformed, if contempt and disregard are to be prevented (Zurn, 2003).

These ideas make Fraser point out (Fraser and Honneth, 2006) that social justice not only depends on recognition, but also on improvements to policies based on distribution, unlike Honneth who supports the entire weight of social justice on recognition.

In this section, we particularly focused on studying the conception of recognition in Honneth. However, we would like to include some lines on the way Ricoeur completes, surpassing Honneth it may be said, when he speaks of the “states of peace”. In this case, Ricoeur (2005: 227) points out that “the alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition has to be sought in pacific experiences of mutual recognition” with a view to, this is our interpretation, giving a more positive meaning to the origin of mutual recognition which will no longer be found in the struggles driven by the search for recognition, as Honneth states, but in the experiences of peace that make us feel recognized.

It is here where Ricoeur (2005: 251) wonders if an individual can be understood as a recognized subject and, then he questions: “is the request for recognition not at risk of being never-ending?” And doubts: “maybe the struggle for recognition is still unending”. As noticed, these considerations may be connected to the theory of imperfect peace and considering the comments made before. Now, let us observe, the relationship between care and imperfect peace.

Synergies between philosophy of care and the theory of imperfect peace

The analysis of the theory and praxis of care and its contributions to peace may be significantly enriched if it is carried out in the light of the analytical-normative proposal of imperfect peace. In short, the dialogue between philosophy of care and the category of imperfect peace may be organized in three main lines, namely: ontological, epistemological and axiological.

1. Imperfect peace and care from an ontological standpoint. The first thesis of imperfect peace is that “peace is a practice and social reality over the entire history of humankind” (Muñoz and Molina, 2003: 35). Peace is a primal reality, linked to humans from the start. We may say that peace is ontologically, phenomenologically more original than its opposites (Martínez Guzmán, 2001c). From this thesis, we state that practicing intersubjective care would be one of the most common and representative examples of that imperfect peace. Care as a primary way of being, biologically, essentially and socially constituent, is fundamental for human development and peace, this may be called, in words by Waldenfels (1997: 44), an “ontology of the worlds of life”.

Furthermore, the word *imperfect*, as we notice, also refers to the unconcluded and complex dimension of human beings and their relations. Care is always present as a dialogue and response to these imperfections and fragilities of our existing. Moreover, care on its own is never perfect, but has to be dynamic and open to interpellation and complexity of situations and contexts. Care tries to address our imperfect nature, not finished, always under development. From the philosophical proposal we have been working on in the research group of UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace of Universitat Jaume I, human being is characterized by its fragility and vulnerability (Martínez Guzmán, 2005a).

In this sense and with a view to comprehending care as factum, it is decisive to start from acknowledging the weight of nature and the biological. According to Gehlen (1987: 22), human being has, as a specific morphologic characteristic that differentiates them from the rest of human beings, a needy or deficiency-prone nature, which they carry as a vital starting point.

This way, for example, human being lacks a self-sufficient physical morphology adapted to the environment, a suitable physical body protected against the weather. Moreover, human being lacks an instinctive automatism unlike other living beings, which entails greater freedom, but also vulnerability and fragility, given the unpredictability and disorientation experienced in a number of situations.

In human beings, this lack of instincts is counteracted by the creation of culture; one in which care, as value and knowledge, is a fundamental component. Human being needs care as no other animal does, since at birth they lack the capabilities proper to the species (walking, speech, manual dexterity, etc.), but depends on the interaction with others, via care, to acquire the features that will specifically characterize them as human. Then, from the mother's womb and birth, every human being needs others (Pintos Peñaranda, 2010: 56-58). What Muñoz and Molina (2009: 19) call inter-specific species dependency, in a complex world that offers the uncertain and irreducible and which necessarily makes us cooperative and solidary.

Owing to such needy nature, human being is one in continual coexistence and conflict with others. Care is an experience of inherent intersubjectivity, a way of coexisting, of accompanying the other in the world. Care, according to Heidegger (1971: 214), is in the primary root of human being "as original structural totality, care is existentially a priory to every 'stance' and factual 'behavior' of 'being-there', i.e., it is always already in it.

As it is known, one of this author's main thesis is that human being is a "being in the world". The world Heidegger speaks of is neither the world of

knowledge understood as the relation subject-object nor the nature sciences deal with. What this world is we see in the everyday world or in the world that surrounds us in our daily lives. Human being is essentially a being with others, “cares for them” or “looks after” the others (*Fürsorge*) in their various forms. Care refers to a phenomenon that enables human existence, as human. In Heidegger’s (1971: 216) words, “‘Care’ refers to a fundamental ontological-existential phenomenon”.

This way, the theory of imperfect peace and philosophy of care start from a common ontological analysis, which we can summarize as follows: peace is inherent and in the root of human being, intersubjective care practices are an instance. Moreover, human being is complex and imperfect, thereby, peace is imperfect and dynamical, always developing. Practices of care address this lacking nature of human being and are the expression of the constructive, dynamical and outward expression of peace.

2. *Imperfect peace and care from epistemology.* Imperfect peace is found in the frame of debates on the epistemologic characteristics of Research for Peace, as mentioned, and contributes to a change in the discipline’s perspective from its inception in the 1940’s to the present day.

We can define such change as the change from one that approaches focusing on the study of violence, to another broadened for the study of peace. Thus, surpassing the “cognitive dissonance sometimes close to schizophrenia” (Muñoz, 2001: 24), which made us deem violence an object of greater epistemological relevance, despite we all recognized the primacy of peace as a goal to reach. Early peace research had prioritized studies on war and violence, also called polemology (war studies) (Martínez Guzmán, 2001b: 63), and only recently appear what professor Muñoz (2001: 13, 22) calls “autonomous theories” of peace, non-directly dependent on violence. Philosophy of care, in the context of peace research, intends to join this set of theories.

In the sphere of epistemology for peace, it is important to be aware of what Muñoz calls “original sin paradigm” (Muñoz, 2001: 24), heir to a cultural tradition that has emphasized, from Genesis to Hobbes or Darwin, an egotistic and competitive vision of Humankind, disregarding other dimensions.

Not only are these cultural beliefs unilateral and empirically biased, but also imply the risk of turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Eisler and Fry, 2019). For example, if we consider that war is original and natural, therefore societies prepare to fight one another, raise armies or gather guns that threaten their neighbors; war can easily become a result.

This way, our ontological-epistemological approach has clear axiologic consequences. In addition to becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, these cultural beliefs end up biasing research as well, by construing them to reinforce the previously existing belief. These beliefs affect us all, and the scientists as well, who interpret history, archaeology or anthropology from these standpoints, see violence and war wherever they look. Since it is a self-fulfilling and self-justifying prophecy.

By and large, research for peace has two objectives (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b). On the one side, visualize and denounce human and nature suffering whenever it takes place, both if it is direct, structural or cultural violence; and on the other, analyze the proposals and realities for peace alternative to such violences and which offer indicators to build more pacific futures. We can place the theory of imperfect peace in this second frame and inside it the philosophy of care.

For long time, care has been ostracized from the sphere of academy, as it is the case of peace, as it was not considered a sufficiently scientific object of study, worth analyzing. As a peace praxis, care has remained unnoticed, in spite of being an indisputable cultural and existential background. One of the large challenges in this regard, it is to elucidate and visualize the contributions of care as one of the capabilities of human beings to live in peace.

To begin with, the study of peace or care, as a legacy of women (Comins Mingol, 2009) means to deeply transform scientific knowledge and, at once, recovers a silenced history (Díez Jorge and Mirón Pérez, 2009: 103). It implies, among other things, placing value in daily experiences, ideas and procedures before the abstract construction and formulas of the scientific episteme (Waldenfels, 1997: 44). This may be called a process of making everything quotidian by means of the quotidian and revaluing of the specific forms of experience.

3. *Imperfect peace and care from axiology*. In addition to the ontological-existential principles above, it is worth presenting a last and fundamental step in our reflection: the axiological. We may say that we move from an analysis of care and peace, not only as factum, but as telos. "Peace must be studied in order to learn their circumstances and development possibilities better" (Muñoz and Molina, 2003: 35).

In this sense, imperfect peace not only defines as "analytical category" at the service of peace research, but also as "regulatory category" with implications for praxis (Muñoz, 2001: 13). Hence, the importance of analyzing the practice of care deepening into their contributions for peace.

The analysis and reconstruction of our competences for peace allows us to elucidate indicators for peace. Care becomes a regulatory horizon, with great potential to guide us toward the construction of more pacific future.

As stated by Boff (2002: 71), “we are care”; care defines a basic ontological-constituent dimension of human being. However, care is not only an origin factum, but also our task to carry out as telos. In spite of being a constituent element of human being, care as a habit is in crisis at present and a necessary reconstruction is placed before us.

On one side, because scientific technologic development, instrumental rationality, “liquid society” (Bauman, 2005) tensions solid and care relationships between people. On the other, because the Unequal distribution of care as value and occupation between men and women generates injustice and unhappiness, and calls us for a nongeneralized reconstitution of care.

Care as a daily practice and at reach shows us that “everyone is able to be protagonists, actors and actresses of peace, rather directly and at every scale”. If we define peace as the “the greatest degree of wellbeing or satisfaction of needs” instead of only as a mere absence of direct violence, we widen the range of justice and development contents, for which an outward attitude is necessary, commitment and care for others to accomplish the highest degree of wellbeing and satisfaction of the needs of human beings. “Peace has continually fulfilled its mission of establishing good relationships between human beings and so meet as best as possible their needs” (Muñoz, 2004a: 31, 30 and 23).

Practices of care, traditionally invisible in the media and neglected by the academia, have the necessary potential to contribute with a paradigm shift in our conception of human coexistence and intersubjectivity. Owing to this, it is necessary to visualize their contributions, as well as a reconstruction of care as human practice and value beyond any gender role. Moreover, the daily activities of care are important because they are a fundamental axis to support the people’s lives and wellbeing and because the values and capabilities developed by the subjects that practice them.

This way, on one side, activities of care are necessary to meet the basic needs of every individual are fundamental for survival and wellbeing. Owing to this, they are important for human development and also for the existence of social justice. According to UN Development Programme, care is relevant for human development, as it is the vehicle by means of which the satisfaction of basic needs is carried out, at once the usefulness of the available resources maximizes (Comins Mingol, 2009: 87 and ff.).

But as we stated, care activities are not only important because of their contribution to life sustainment, but also because of the values and capabilities they generate in the individuals that practice them. The practice of care implies the development of a series of abilities such as empathy, commitment, patience, responsibility or tenderness, which are elements comprised in peace culture. What we do makes us, and the historical assignation of the role of care to women has made them develop certain competences for peace, which all human beings might be able to share, if caring tasks were shared with men.

Gilligan (1986) made it explicit for the first time the different moral capacity women have developed from the socialization and practice of care. Up to that point, the Theory of Moral Development adhered with no reservations to Kohlberg's theory, including an analysis on the moral experiences of women, as he built his theory on a study with 84 males. In an analysis on women, Gilligan detected a more relational moral voice, which considered the preservation of relationships preferable, as opposed to the ethics of justice, of the moral development theory according to Kohlberg (1976), in which the obedience to universal moral laws is preferred. These different perspectives are the result of the sexual division of labor and the sharp division between the public and the private.

The thinking and practicing of care, as stated, imply developing moral values and competences such as empathy, patience, perseverance or responsibility. In addition to these values, the practice of care contributes to develop fundamental abilities to build a culture for peace: abilities for the pacific transform of conflict, and abilities for civic and social commitment. Abilities that are not exclusively destined for the private sphere, but can be taken to the public sphere.

The socialization and practice of care develop in women commitment to wellbeing of society in general, not only of their particular families. So, we notice a larger number of women participating in social movements and in the various forms of informal political participation in civil society. As of the late XIX century, there has been a myriad of women's movements and initiatives for peace in the face of successive harrowing wars, both in countries with armed conflicts and also in those that have not experienced war in recent decades.

It is worth underscoring the women's movements for peace in the Middle East, in former Yugoslavian countries and in Latin America as well (Magallón Portolés, 2006); all of them helped to build imperfect peace. Plus, care might effect a paradigm shift in our conception of citizenship (Comins Mingol,

2015), building what is known as “caring citizenship” (Sevenhuijsen, 2003). It is but an example of how the practices of peace interrelate and reproduce, and an expression of the ethical and regulatory potential of imperfect peace.

There are causal interrelations and feedback between the staged of peace (Muñoz, 2001: 31; Muñoz, 2004a: 30), and also between the various praxes of care. In this way, care as a value surpasses the private sphere to nourish the public one. We can consider know-hows and praxes of care as a background and legacy for recognition, reconstruction and development of peace.

Conclusions

Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s philosophy for peace provides us with invaluable tools to approach the ontological, epistemological and practical debates found in research for peace. An intellectual legacy we have made interact with Francisco Muñoz’s imperfect peace proposal. Both authors asserted in their works, from philosophy and history, respectively, the importance of research and make peace visible, because of epistemological rigor, committed to overcoming the bias of the violence-based approach of sciences, and also because of the ethical-political implications of the recognition of peace.

An increasing number of researchers become inspired by the contributions of these authors to work within the scope of a phenomenology and axiology of peace, which observe and scrutinize dimensions such as liberty, justice, equity, concord or solidarity (García-González, 2018a: 16; 2018b: 42). “Trying to change the preeminence given to war and its theories, transferring it to peace studies; in the knowledge we are compelled to think of peace as an way of life” (García-González, 2018a: 14), especially imaginatively and creatively.

From UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace in Universitat Jaume I, we carry on working in such regard, deepening, in our case, into the complexities and richness of knowledge and care as human competences for peace.⁴

We, human beings, are capable of mutually excluding, marginalizing and hurting, but also capable of acting out of solidarity, dialogue, recognize and care for one another. Taking the first part above would not be realistic, as we would be covering an important part of reality. Instead, we would be concealing ideologists of actual alternatives.

4 Another competence for peacemaking we have been working on is communication (Nos Aldás, 2019) and more recently, creativity (París Albert and Herrero Rico, 2018).

The contemporary approaches of research for peace may be enriched by proposals based on epistemic approach and imperfect peace these authors, which help us move from a war-studies approach to another from peace studies. It is urgent to balance the weight we can give to the study of violence and the study of peace, not only because of epistemological, but axiological reasons. In order to overcome the apathy and interiorized impotence of contemporary societies it is necessary to research on peace and make it visible. The regulatory reconstruction of care and recognition as competences for peacemaking contests us and reminds us that we are not excused, we are responsible.

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Annex

Table 1

Types of recognition according to Axel Honneth (1997)

Type of recognition	Value benefitted	Attitude that favors it	Despise that Corrupts it
Recognition to physical integrity	Self-confidence	Love	Th one that suppresses our freedom to make use of our own body. Example: gender violence
Recognition of people as individuals that are part of a community and possess a series of rights	Self-respect	Respect	The one that excludes certain people from society and that produces the feeling of not being a valuable being Example: immigration
Recognition of different ways of life	Self-esteem	Solidarity	The one that prevents us from practicing life habits, of course, not contrary to basic human rights. Example: cultural traditions

Source: own elaboration.

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