

Falling over a precipice; echoes of the phenomenology in the postcolonial heteroglossia of space-other times

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Abstract: To deconstruct phenomenology in semiopraxis means deconstruction itself (if itself means still want to be). Through Derrida's sliding critics on phenomenology, the opening of semiopraxis gives back the thought and faces social science to a spreading dialogical recognition of enunciating stances and discursive interactions.

Key words: phenomenology, deconstruction, semiopraxis, body, sense.

Resumen: Deconstruir la fenomenología en una semiopraxis cuesta la deconstrucción misma (si misma quiere aún ser). A partir de señalamientos críticos por parte de Jacques Derrida que se deslizan sobre la fenomenología, la apertura a una semiopraxis devuelve al pensamiento y enfrenta a la ciencia social a un reconocimiento dialógico más amplio de los lugares de enunciación y las interacciones discursivas. **Palabras clave:** fenomenología, deconstrucción, semiopraxis, cuerpo, sentido.

Margins of phenomenology

Jacques Derrida says in *Of Grammatology*: “a thought on the *trace* can neither break with a transcendental phenomenology nor be reduced to it” (Derrida, 2000: 81). A belonging that is neither an allegiance nor non-belonging as (“modern”) rapture and freedom of progressive reconstruction and exhaustive pretension: *trace* and phenomenology do not go through election; they have sunk into a constitutive.

If the *trace* is a constitutive transcendental, it makes it impossible any start from itself, any containing in a present, any logical purity of a self-possessed sense: triumph and failure “against all empiricism”, because it is not fulfilled that “a pure and originaive representation is possible and original”, as Derrida pointed out in *Speech and phenomena* (Derrida, 1995: 91-94), however neither is commencement in direct contact with the sensations of things:

Something I have learnt from the great characters of the history of philosophy, from Husserl in particular, is the need to make transcendental questions so as not to remain trapped in the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse, therefore in order to avoid the empiricism, positivism and psychologism, it is endlessly necessary to renew transcendental questioning (Derrida, 1998: 159).

If there is *trace*, “there is no constituent subjectivity” (Derrida, 1995: 143, note 9), for *trace* is becoming (Derrida, 2000: 62), game (64-65), it is “subject” to absent forces. An “originaive *trace*”, beyond contradiction and the logic of identity, oxymoron of a non-origin in the origin, it indicates “the non-representation (the unrepresentability of temporarization, the spacing, duration, the dilation in which it eludes the *diferensia*)¹ and de-presentation (by the strength of the relationship with other, absent-preset in deferring), as ‘originaive’ as ‘presentation’ (the ‘Living Present’, *lebendige Gegenwart*, by Husserl)” (Derrida, 2000: 81).

¹ I resort to that analogous spelling to the Derridian *différance* in our Latin American Spanish, as in diverse spellings, underneath the dominant voice-conscious-presence, where the *intercultural* relations which make us move critically. Indeed in our postcolonial *diferensia* of the *ways* of speaking, writing and making that which is not said and not even pinpointing the castizo *diferenzia*, which is the option of José Martín Arancibia (Derrida, 1997a: 9), also taken by María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia and Manuel Garrido (Derrida and Bennington, 1994: 16, note 2); neither is in the *différence* as Oscar del Barco and Conrado Ceretti translate-write (Derrida, 2000); much less in the *diferancia* of Carmen González-Marín (Derrida, 1989: 39). Patricio Peñalver and Cristina de Peretti in their translations directly copy *différance*, which may be pointed out as Francocentrism rather than translating laziness, mummifying fidelity, authorizing fetishism, and a very paradoxical scriptural colonization, taking into account the silently subversive intension of (and specifically that) writing for Derrida

Hence, phenomenology, for us, places the scene of the body, sense, knowledge and subjectification in a relation of domination that names the otherness of *trace*. And this relationship tenses the “body” in *inter-body relationships*, the “sense” in *symbolical struggles*, the knowledge in *ways to learn*, diverse and opposed, and subjectification in *discursive interactions*.

But, why even so indeed phenomenology? Because it makes it possible to think of *traces* and *replicas* in *constitutive relationships* and not in the objective engineering of constructivism: it makes it possible to think in terms of belonging to times, anomalies, mismatches, confrontations and silencing; there where writing has always silenced its metaphors, where the marks in the bodies topograph the *intercultural* surfaces, where varied matter, in its cycles, idealizes. Repetition brings ideality, says Derrida in *Of Grammatology* (Derrida, 2000: 364):

The project of repeating the thing already corresponds to a social passion and carries, therefore, a metaphoricity, an elemental translation. The thing is moved to its double —this is to say to an ideality— for other... it opens the appearing as an absence... Never is there paint of the very thing, and, in the first place, because there is no very thing (Derrida, 2000: 367).

Mimesis is the copy or representation of an absence (oxymoron), a supplementary reiteration (another oxymoron) operates the phantasmal of the *éidos* and the *fáineszai*, an increase in the retention of absence.

Deconstruction is not yet phenomenological for it changes from the constructive to the constitutive yet showing in the constitutive radical struggles between *space-times*, orders, cosmos and *episteme*. “There is no constituting subjectivity. Even the concept of constitution has to be deconstructed”, Derrida states in *Speech and phenomena* (Derrida, 1995: 143, note 9). The constitutive is not the phenomenological concept without “constitution”; but it is not about leaving it behind, not even, disavow it. “Deconstructing” the “constitutive” put us in a game between “constitution” / “construction” / “de-construction”, which is the same that circulates between presence / absence / re-presentation: the impossibility of seizing of sense of a language that operates beyond (or close by) comprehension. To “construction” corresponds the “presence” / “re-presentation” tension; to “constitution” and “deconstruction” corresponds the retention and escape of “absence”. *Deconstructing the constitutive* is demounting in the latter what constructivism made of it as a determinate place of enunciation and thought-action. Nevertheless it thus potentiates its action field a “constitutive” that is radically in the middle of *inter-body*, *discursive struggles*, as well as between *ways of learning*.

From the sign and its repetition, and the subject and inter-body relations, to heteroglossia of space-other times

Signs

The language-sign relation threatens to give back all the pretension of *presence-to-itself* of the consciousness to the remission of absence and repetition of every sign as for *(archi)writing*, which involves the structure of the sign even speech. “The sign-is-nothing-more than-its own representation”. There is no way to save the pure ideality of the sense, neither subordinate, therefore, the sense to the truth, nor to bring the whole being to the presence of a conscience, current or teleological. Language, and mainly, writing, always comes from behind, from other, it is what is given, in-the-course-of-which, it is repetition; it is also in tradition, as for becoming without *télos* (Bennington, 1994: Husserl, 87-91).

Writing turns out repressed and unknown under the assumption of a “full and originally spoken language”. Sense-sound: in the conception of language as a first speech there would be a natural link of the sense with the sound (voice); thought-sound, thought-voice or the “voice of thought” (or of “conscience”); and from here silently would come the usurpation of the first visibility plane by the image-writing as a representation of the speech, which substitutes the audible by the visible: thought-sound-image as one-directionality of the sense (Derrida, 2000: 47). Underlying is the “absolute proximity of the voice and being, of the voice and the sense of being, of the voice and the ideality of the sense”. In words of Hegel in *Lectures of Aesthetics*: the sound of voice as a “soul of the resounding body” is theoretically perceived by the ear, “(subjective) interiority of the object” in its ideality; the “hearing-oneself-talking” in the “presence” of the *foné* which corresponds in correlate to see in the “presence” of *éidos* (Derrida, 2000: 18, emphasis in italics in the original).

Speech and phenomena discusses on the phenomenological distinction between “indication” and “expression”, valuing this last one by its phenomenological ecstasy. The wanting-to-say of the “expression”, Derrida critically points out, is explicitness of a monological voice; body signs, the “indications” weave *inter-body* relationships from schizo-body, heteroglossical folds. Because of this phenomenology ignores power relationships in its intentional optimism devoted to “interpretation”; conversely, body weavings are always complexes of power, never autistic senses neither silent monologue of a “solitary conscience”. The indicative of language in general, universal, its *(archi)writing*, surpasses the presence immediate to itself of the living present, conscience, in the nondiaphanousness of the *discourse of bodies* (Derrida, 1995: 83).

“The archi-writing as spacing cannot take place, *as such*, in the phenomenological experience of a *presence*”, since it both constitutes and dislocates the “subject”. “Subjectivity” becomes, in any case, the *retention* of the *trace*, the relation with death as a desire of presence, as a becoming-absent and becoming-unconscious in an “economy of death” (Derrida, 2000: 88-89).

Subjects

Derrida points out in *Of grammatology* that the “vocative point” is impossible: we always name in the *diferencia* (Derrida, 2000: 144); the names come from others. “Language, originally, is metaphorical” (Derrida, 2000: 340); as Rousseau expresses so in *Essai sur l'origine des langues, Chapitre III*, “On how the first language had to be figured”: “how the first motivations that made men talk were their passions, their first expressions were tropes. Figured language was the first to fall and the proper sense was found later” (cited in Derrida, 2000: 340).

The lapse of logical non-continuity between words and things, which nonetheless becomes natural and is forgotten, also speaks on this irruption that links the other:

“The in-motivation (arbitrariness) of the sign requires a synthesis in which the wholly other announces as such —no simplicity, no identity, no similarity or continuity (the “no-coincidence” of Bajtin)— inside what it is not... the movement of the *trace* is necessarily hidden, it is produced as a hiding of itself. When the other announces as such, it appears in the dissimulation of itself (Derrida, 2000: 61).

In-motivation is the others that break all continuity, the irruption of the *trace*, a raft without an anchor, adrift (language is the “always undone form of the outside” Foucault said in *La pensée du dehors*, Foucault, 2000: 80). Because of this, of those *inter-body* marks and that pressure that pushes and signifies, “the meaning is only given halfway (*n'est qu'à moitié*) in words, all its strength abides in the accents” (Derrida, 2000: 285, citing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Essai sur l'origine des langues, Chapitre XI*; see Voloshinov and Bajtin, 1992).

This natal irruption of others inscribes in communal belonging and speaks, in the language of Norbert Elias, of a “social need” which coexists and is subtended underneath the no-“natural necessity” and of the solidifying naturalization of the material-maternal primary sense of the world (Elias, 2000: *Sección Cuarta*). Primary “social need” that may be understood by what it “performatively” associates, or more radically, constitutively: by social relations that are enunciated in its making-sense. The language, and in general the symbol, is enunciation of the *symbolical struggles* from/in primary associations of belonging sedimented in the *inter-body emotiveness*.

Hence Elias recognizes the heavy “sense of reality” and emotive pregnancy of the natural language with the “things” enunciated in their world. A “truth” which is not analytical of the content, but of the social fabric in which the forces of the sense make community and contrasts, oppositions and misgivings strive: a “natural sense” that fulfills the “social need” of counting on the others who we share the quotidian management of the world with; “almost all the names that have a reasonably lengthy career, says Elias, have a specific aura in a specific language” (Elias, 2000: 112). A communal “aura”, that which the structural has placed in cognitive levels and as logical matrixes that pressed individual lives, there is talk now of the language of discursive interaction (Voloshinov and Bajtin, 1992), in a radicalized phenomenology crossed by other as stitches hidden from every subjectification, always exterior, always on the “outside” (Foucault, 2000).

As we pointed out at the beginning of the text, in a translation (even with a phenomenological impulse) from phenomenology to deconstruction

If the space-time we abide in is *a priori* space-time of the *trace*, there is neither pure activity nor passivity (nothing is either received nor created from (an) itself: there is neither world nor itself before). This pair of concepts (“space” and “time”) —and it is known that Husserl crossed them out ceaselessly, one by one— that belongs to the myth of the origin of an inhabited world, of a world alien to the *trace* (which still seems to be that of the phenomenology) (Derrida, 2000: 366).

Inscribing is not dwelling; there is no world before; the writing of the *trace* makes the world living in it, it creates relational space. *Trace* in the writing-reading-rewriting of the others: as Duclos expressed it, in 1754, “it is a people in full body that who makes language (Derrida, 2000: 215, note 6, citing Monsieur Duclos, *Remarques (ou Commentaire) sur la grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port-Royal*, 1754).

Phenomenology becomes spectral in this impossibility of presence of signs and subjects, however it is, in this writing drift, its new (im)possibility. The *archi-writing* (the generalized writing, radical), as a condition of the “*epistémè*”, is impossible object of “science” (because it precedes the latter and it is its condition of possibility), and shows the “incompetence of science” and the “incompetence of philosophy”: the “closure of the *epistémè*”, its “out of reach”. A “*thought of the trace*, of the *diférençia* (*diférence*) or the reserve, must advance as well beyond the field of the *epistémè*”, yet it belongs, because of the face which is seen, to the inside of a time bygone” (Derrida, 2000: 126, emphasis in italics in the original).

Because neither is writing for Derrida the new form of the (phenomenological) “presence”: “writing is a representative of the *trace* in general, not the very *trace*”. *The very trace does not exist*”: it is a gesture (decision, action-of-absence), not identity (it is relational) (Derrida, 2000: 212). It is “supplement” as a “blind spot”: the

not-seen that opens and limits visibility” (208), constitutive addition, “supplement of origin”, maladjusted sense, oxymoron, catachresis, primary and irreducible metaphoricalness, untranslatable,² catastrophic obliquity.³

In *Notes on deconstruction and pragmatism*, Derrida says:

In relation with the other, which actually is the one on behalf of what and of whom the decision is made, the other remains inappropriable by the process of identification; this is the reason why I would say the transcendental subject is what makes decision impossible. The decision is erased when there is something as a transcendental subject [...] This is a much more radical alienation than the classical meaning given to this term [...] the other is the origin of my responsibility being impossible to define in terms of an identity. The decision is annunciated from the perspective of a much more radical otherness (Derrida, 1998: 164-165).

Then he adds:

I would say, for Lévinàs and myself, that if the infinitude of responsibility is abandoned, there is no responsibility. It is because we act and live in infinitude that responsibility in relation with the other (*autrui*) is irreducible. If responsibility was not infinite, if every time I have to make a political or ethical decision in relation with the other (*autrui*) this was not infinite, then I would not be capable of committing to an infinite debt in relation to every singularity. The relation with the other does not close in itself [...] our relation with issues such as election, decision and responsibility is not a theoretical, verified and determined relationship; it is always suspended (deferred, different) relationship (Derrida, 1998: 167-169).

Signs and subjects are crossed by absence, they come beyond themselves; phenomenology is threatened by its own aperture to the phenomenon, which exceeds its intentional aperture.

² “The metaphorical origin of language, doesn’t it send us back to a threatening situation, of indigence and dereliction (*déréliction*) to an archaic society, to the anguish of dispersion?” To the experience of the otherness as an “encounter of the other as *another*”? (Derrida, 2000: 349, emphasis in italics in the original) This is to say, untranslatability that states that discursive interaction in its irreplaceable diversification and polemic.

³ “The one who wanted man to be sociable touched with the finger (‘catastrophe’) the axis of the world and lean it in respect to the axis of the universe (generating seasons and cycles and migrations: a variation and ambulation that generate sociality)” (Derrida, 2000: 321, citing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Essai sur l’origine des langues*, *Chapitre XI*). We weave relations because we are out of axis; the deviation creates encounters.

Deconstruction and semiopraxis: the heteroglossia falling over a precipice

Edge: Derrida stated in *Of grammatology*: “the fact that a speech, called live, can lean to spacing in its own writing is what originally it places in relation with its own death”: the “di-ferensia” as spacing,⁴ the “diferensial value” of signs between signs (“what is around the sign in the other signs”, says De Saussure in *Course of General Linguistics*) (Derrida, 2000: 68): “the operation that substitutes the speech by writing also replaces presence with value (differential in the sense of De Saussure)” (Derrida, 2000: 182-183). Hence, the semiological reduction to the social: the “logical” beings of the classical Greek philosophy and the “rational” beings are the “social” beings of semeiotics. Everything can be reduced to an interchange and maps of signs among humans gathered in society.

Crumbling: but the otherness of *space-times*, in the opening through which the non-representability of the sense below the cap of the transcendental subject, of the intentional awareness, of the pure logicity, of the presence-to-itself, places us before the “barbarism” of not-only-social beings (in the aforementioned sense of the “social”). The colonial situation and *intercultural relationships* which struggle in it, therefore, suppose the intervention of power and domination relationships in which social and non-social beings interact; but also in all the subaltern relationships social and non-social being interact; relationships that we should not submit to the socio-logical, but at the expense of the epistemic colonialism.

This phenomenological overlapping, beyond the semiologic (archi)writing, in which finish and stay Derrida and deconstruction,⁵ takes me to *malice (indigenous)*, *fugitive (black-skinned)*, *sagaciousness (Mestizo)* and *smartness (criollo)* as our *intercultural postcolonial* “science”, “history” and “philosophy” (Grosso, 2009i).

⁴ “Since never the *diferensia* is in itself, and by definition, full plenitude (it is sense-in-absence, relation), its need contradicts the affirmation of a natural phonic essence of the language” (Derrida, 2000: 68).

⁵ However, and taking all risks, Derrida pushes the phenomenology of the speech and the phenomenon at the edge of “we the men” “means” “we the white adult carnivore male Europeans, capable of sacrifices” (Derrida, 1997b: 42-43): a “carno-phallogocentrism” in the “totality of the metaphysical-anthropocentric axiomatic that dominates Occident” (44) which separates and extrapolates the paradigm of the adult male in relation to woman, child or animal (44-45) and questions “all the apparatus of limits within which a history and a culture have confined their criteriology” (45). In this questioning operates a justice not reducible to the logicalness of “logos”, which becomes stronger in its truth and because of this it calls to belief: they become strong there, and imply all passion and commitment, excited reasons of the possible that bite the *inter-cultural constitutive relationships*. This way, “law would have a closer and more complex relationship with what is called

Let us begin once again from here, from another angle: a phenomenology located and (dislocated) in the mainstream of the hegemonic “knowledge”.

The new public perception and demand in relation to science and technology, practitioners and experts; the *new territorial configurations*, what I call “elliptic cities” in the consumerism capitalism (Grosso, 2009d) and that are expressed in the *social use of the networks*, broadened by information and communication technologies (Grosso, 2009c) which deform *abemoidally* the circular and centered territories of colonial cities; and the agency-becoming of knowledge of the social, ethnical, sectoral, territorial and gender groups have created *new social fields of the policies of knowledge* that are bilged in space-other times that operate in the intercultural discursiveness of the bodies (Grosso, 2008b; 2009f).⁶

strength, power or violence”, not an exterior relationship (32): justice presses, tears the pretended homogeneous fabric of history, it operates through a “display of strength”, with “performative (or performing) and interpretative violence”, with no justifying discourse (33). It is “the mystical”: “a silence enclosed in the violent structure of the funding act “, silence enclosed in the language (33), a “violence without a fundament” (34): that possible which “logos” does not manage to capture. In the deconstruction oriented by this belief that questions the limits (always cosmic-socio-historic-cultural, in this case “Eurocentric”) of the “human” (which circumscribe and separate it) operates the real justice: “deconstruction is justice”, for none of them (neither deconstruction nor justice) is in itself and because deconstruction (re)formulates issues of law (35-36, emphasized in italics in the original). Justice (the pure instauration blow) is indeconstructible (because it deconstructs, it is the very deconstruction); law is de-constructible (36). Deconstruction operates in the interval between justice and law, between the indeconstructible and the de-constructible, between the impossible and the possible (36); in an oblique manner (37); its aporia (undecidability, ambivalence, elliptic tilting, hesitation, double-bind) (is opened) opens (to) the mystical (38). Justice is never secured by a rule (39), it establishes the rules in a law upon which (it re)turns oblique, deflecting, differing, deconstructing; it does not go through law to the conventional road and direction (socially agreed) of the other, but through detours that search for another rectitude that invents rules in each situation (40). Justice opens other possibilities of *being-in-the-world*; yet, even in those edges of cosmic otherness, Derrida ends up listening to other social only: justice is infinite, insatiable, responsibility, performative always open, hyperbolitis obsessive for the pending in the messianic for of the other, to-arrive in the arrival of the other, occurrence (58-64).

⁶ I make a difference between the “Discourse on the body” (Discurso sobre el cuerpo) and “discourse of the bodies” (Discurso de los cuerpos) (Grosso, 2008a; 2009e). Discourse *on* the body corresponds to the objectivist tradition in social and human sciences (as well as in natural sciences, Bajtin, 1999), in which the body is taken as an “object” which is discussed, drawn, described, read, subjected to all manner of technical descriptions and analysis in the protocols of representation. Discourse of the bodies, always plural bodies,

This puts us once again, regarding science, technology, innovation and knowledge management, in the face of the intercultural scenario of our histories, subalternized, silenced and unknown (Grosso, 2009g). There is not single *knowledge*, as neither there is a single society: everything is so fractured as marks and grooves have the histories. These breakages (unevenness and cracks) enable stray and marginal steps, *laugher and mockery*, unruly *metaphors*, *rhetoric of intonation and style* (Grosso, 2009b), *i.e.*, dissonant and corrosive *senses* in the *ways of thinking, feeling and making*, which have formalized an *economy of knowledge in a practical state* in the *epistemic-practical matrixes* of the “malice” (indigenous), “fugitive” (black-skinned), “sagaciousness” (Mestizo) and “smartness” (criollo), which are relational patrimonies (more than “cognitive” or “objectual” ; Tunes da Silva, Tunes e Bartholo, 2006: 9), reservoir of *tactics* formalized as knowledge in a heavily uneven with the other social positions and that operate in the *intercultural* network they manage through the different historical experiences in which they are recreated (Grosso, 2008b; 2009f).

For the least favored social sectors in the “world order”, and thereby, most in the need for policies to manage the necessary social tradition, *science and knowledge* are surviving and struggle issues, beyond all cognitivism and epistemologism. The very concept of “knowledge” is battlefield of *symbolical struggles* (Bourdieu, 1983; 2000a; 1998; 2002; 1984; 1997; 2000b; 2000c; 2001; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1995).

because there is never a single body: it is its material-relational, discursive, condition; it consists in heteroglossia (Voloshinov and Bajtin, 1992) as existential, social, political and epistemic *medium* in which already we are always and forever; non-representable, non-grammaticalizable, impossible to close, and which keeps active and struggling the production of senses. I share with Zandra Pedraza that “the notable emphasis in subjectivity as environment of the modern individual, of the agent, of the knowledge and communication can deviate the drive given by Foucault, Nietzsche or Marcel to deepen into the hermeneutics of the modern individual, sweep the body under the carpet and manage to continue analyzing the metaphysical forms of the exercise of power and to perpetuate the very discussed confusion that comes from the idea that consciousness, reason and language precede and produce the body. The insistence on subjectivity as a disembodied entity may fumble the attempts to shake modern rationality”. Even, “it is perfectly possible to make a thorough analysis if the functioning of biopower without mentioning the body”, following mimetically and uncritically the same course that biopower imprints on the standing and movement of bodies (Pedraza, 2007: 9). *Discourse of the bodies* pinpoints the voices and bodies silenced and hidden of the enunciation in the discursive interaction, which acquires a chronic emphasis in our *postcolonial inter-cultural* socialities.

There are symbolical reserves for the *critical praxis* in the *social management of knowledge*, in the shape of life, plays on words and *ways* of learning are crystallized in those *epistemic-practical matrixes* and preserved in the *discursive folds of the bodies*. Forced by the making-sense under the subtle stony veil of the colonial, national and global hegemonic formations, said mineral work grows underground in the silent and elusive delay of the tactics (De Certeau, 2000), maintaining active and in “hidden polemics” (Bajtin) “the turbulent genesis / of the ardent and growing stones / which live ever since in the cold”, as Pablo Neruda says in *Stones of the sky* (Neruda, 1979: XI, 34). The “cold stone of knowledge” moves and grows (since it is a belief of the Andean populations regarding the veins of minerals and the metals in the tunnels) even behind and underneath their precious, elitist and immutable appearance, extracted and retained by the capital.

In an analogous manner, and in parallel to the discourse of science, technology and innovation (however sideways and askance, with *malice* and *sagaciousness*, for in this displacement there have to be some critical definitions), *the economy of social knowledge of malice, fugitiveness, sagaciousness and smartness* can be understood as “a process of objectification of procedures” similar to the one that takes place in mathematics. Also here, in the *popular epistemic-practical matrixes*, “abstraction is crystallization in a reduced number of invariant features of the numerous operations indeed realized” (Arboleda, 2007: 19); “hypostatic abstraction (which tends to incorporate and naturalize the formalization of historic procedures and processes) carries a tremendous economy of thought” (Arboleda, 2007: 15).

As Thurston states and Arboleda cites:

Mathematics possesses an admirable compressibility; for a long time arduous work is carried out, step by step and from different approaches, on a process or idea. However, once the it is really understood (the issue) and the mental perspective is ready to consider it as a set, often there is huge mental compression. It can be registered separately, immediately remember it when necessary and use it as a step for another mental process (Arboleda, 2007: 16).

“Mental”, cognitivist formalism must be re-understood from the *discourse of the bodies*, mainly taking into account that what it is about is a formalization of *ways of doing*, of knowledge that operates in the body of practices, “in practical states”, says Bourdieu. Also in *malice, fugitiveness, sagaciousness and smartness* there is decantation and sedimentation after diverse historical experiences of *tactics* exercised in colonial power relationships, national and global, which have been submitted to a *symbolical work* of compression, distortion and application, transferring them to the different interactions and acts of discourse, configuring non-official and stabilized *discursive genres*.

This *corporality of practices* indeed would radically challenge all idealism of the fetishized in “objects”; this reverts the previous analogical displacement and turns it against mathematics, against certain “naïve Platonism”, very generalized in the epistemological discourse of the scientific and academic communities (which the very Arboleda denounces), which tends to substantiate the ideal and hinders the conception of the process of idealization as “typing” actions (Schutz, 1995) (and not as “representations” that fulfill the (Kantian) function a priori historicized, in the fashion of Durkheim, and even as its structuralist ambivalence and its self-ascription to the mainstream of sociological tradition is understood by the very Bourdieu).⁷ Even, one might think, from the indomitable power of analogy, if in our own mathematics, in Latin American postcolonial contexts, mainly the epistemic practices *matrixes of malice (indigenous)*, *fugitiveness (black-skinned)* and *sagaciousness (mestizo)* and *smartness* do also operate in re-appropriation and creation productions, polluting it all from *situated epistemic economies*, unknown in the *official policies of knowledge* that procure “education” and the “management of knowledge”.

Because of this (because of its dialogical pressure), our critical epistemic action on the *policies of knowledge*—if we do not want that once again the criticism reinforces and sinks with new self-propelled boost colonialism— consists in building a *network of malice, fugitiveness, sagaciousness and smartness* in *ad latere* theoretical-methodological opposition. That is the configuration that should be taken among us the very announced “society of knowledge”, waking us up once and for all from the illustrated dream of the broadening of the users of the rational argumentation in a “well” formed “public opinion” and raised to a “cult and civilized” dialogue (Habermas, 1999; 1989a; 1989b; Arato, 1999) toward the long journey of democratic deepening through dark and tortuous practical rationalities, that barely begins (in the broad day light) but which has been fighting for (nocturnal) centuries (Grosso, 2009a).

⁷ “All our knowledge in the world, both in common sense and scientific thinking, supposes constructions, i.e., set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations and idealizations proper to the respective level of organization of thought” (Schutz, 1995: 36-37). In the case of the social world, it “has a particular sense and a structure of significations for the human beings who live, think and act inside of it. These have preselected and pre-interpreted this world by means of a series of common sense constructions (“typifying”) on the quotidian reality, and those objects of thinking determine their behavior, define the object of their action, the means available to reach it; to sum up, they help humans orient inside their natural and socio-cultural environment and to relate with it (Schutz, 1995: 37).

Erecting those *matrixes* and *networks* in a theoretical-methodological position may seem to change the content inside the very format with a dreamy decolonizing euphoria (being those framed and depowered under the hegemonic formation); however, the *matrixes* and *networks* of subaltern emergence combat the hegemony of “knowledge” at the same discursive level as enunciation, making the “regimes of truth” upon which the dominant “order of discourse” seats screech (Foucault, 1997; 1992). *Style* combats in a seismic manner, with a power of gnawing that is neither argumentative nor cynic, but which neither creates agreements nor naively believes. It is worth noticing that *malice*, *fugitiveness*, *sagaciousness* and *smartness* have always been considered with suspicion, and that they affect in the first place the sense of confidence: the *knowledge* they produce is touched by suspicion and is generated in the *medium* of who “do not totally believe”, or simply do not believe at all. There is a suspension (an *epojé*) in said positions before the “world order”: it is our social phenomenology. There, *knowledge* is only mocking wear out, subduing to the shaking of laughter the hygienic logic of the Apollonian architecture, taking the metaphors of Nietzsche. The *symbolical struggles* that in our days produce (neo)baroque torsions (Calabrese, 1994) under the dome of “informational biopower” (Branco Fraga, 2007) which works under the collective *sensorium* (Benjamin, 1982), incentivizing self-perception and self-care, the “attention” to a stimulated “user”, convoked in its desire in the frameworks of the media common sense, translating the *heteroglossia* of the world (Voloshinov and Bajtin, 1992) into a hyper-communicable binary code, infinitely reiterated and cellularly assumed in the planetary organism: every subject, says Branco Fraga, is seen as “a ‘system’ of information processing” (citing Paulo Roberto Vaz, *Agentes na rede*, 1999), which must learn to decode messages on their own and to consume in a broader sense” (Branco Fraga, 2007: 351). It is what goes from “analogical biopower” in a “disciplinary society” to “informational biopower” in a “control society” (Branco Fraga, 2007: 343).

Under this dome still persist unnumbered body fights that twist the volutes of the symbolical which mortally gathers and re-links us (Grosso, 2009h; 2009j). *Knowledge* in the hands of collective action is, phenomenologically and politically, the most radical assignation and, because of this, the greatest concern, obsession or fear of the dominant sectors: “knowledge” becomes *epistemic struggles* which are social struggles, as repeatedly Bourdieu pointed out. In said collective action, social protest campaigns twist the coagulated metaphoricity of the symbolical (where “knowledge” enters as perhaps the most effective *symbolical capital* in our configuration of “modernity”). I cite Adrián Scribano:

Demonstrations imply a signal of the limits of systemic compatibility in relation to the mechanisms to solve conflicts and clearly manifest the disintegration of the political as a social summary and hypostasis of the totality, of politics as indication and mark of the sense of an originaive and performative pact, reason why one has to pay attention to the utilization and re-signification of expressive resources anchored to traditions of resistance (Scribano, 2008: 10).

These fissures encourage, in those interested in symbolic control, a “policy of prejudice” from the apparent

uselessness supposed by the incapacity to articulate a political movement that systematically challenges the government; the demand for systematism does not visualize the dissolution of the ties to the political system and hides the transforming potentiality of demonstrations, which lies in the possibility of surpassing invisibility, reconstructing collective ties, re-signifying traditions and using expressive forms to point out the limits of the system (Scribano, 2008: 10).

But

in the first place, demonstrations refer to vacuums, to moments of social relationships where the social logic cannot join the “natural” ties between the agents that said relationships suppose. As absences, they also refer to the failures in the social structure that generate cracks, places where social structure has broken and there are no bridges to link the severed parts. Demonstrations make us see the places where society does not have cement, where one cannot joint, where one cannot suture. In the second place, collective actions are an epiphenomenon of what occurs in society, for they come from networks that always have to do with the structural and the structuring processes, either in their material and/or symbolic moments. The symptoms work by metaphoric transposition: from a sign the sense of a set of relationships to which this sign does not directly refers, but supposes them. Demonstrations are signs of the social production and reproduction processes, in such manner that they enable seeing what takes place on the “inside” of this process, as they give visibility to what, by social logic, is “turned upside down” —or inverts— or to what blocks an immediate access. In the third place, demonstrations are messages because they fundamentally speak of the limits of systemic compatibility. Showing the state of the mechanisms to solve conflicts, demonstrations prophesizes, this is to say, they announce the precarious relation between the limits of systemic compatibility and incompatibility; they send signals of the places where, if the system requires pushing farther, it will not be done, save at the stake of the very redefinition or dissolution (Scribano, 2008: 13).

In these failures, hidden works and critical margins, social protest in collective action generates its high-density oblique *policies of knowledge*.

The phenomenological overlapping has ended up in *malice* (indigenous), *fugitiveness* (black-skinned), *sagaciousness* (mestizo) and *smartness* (criollo) as our *postcolonial intercultural* “science”, “history” and “philosophy”. In it, *semiopraxis* allows placing the social analysis on the *body-sense-power-knowledge* fabric, where the *constitutive* processes of socialization and *symbolical struggles*, tacit or implicit around the *interpretative schemas*, *configurations of sociality*, *ways of doing* and *structures of feeling*, as primary elements of social relationships take place. The *epistemic-practical formalizations* that operate in the “popular” *semiopraxis* (understanding as such that which ethnographically is called so by the social semiopraxis and which establishes its differential value in the hegemonic space-time; Grosso, 2009k) sediment as *matrixes of thinking, sense, and actions* assigned through the *habitus* in-corporated in socialization and take specific modalities in the diverse regional spaces.

Space-other times, *discursive heteroglossia overlapped* by the cosmic-cultural configuration of the interaction between *non-social beings*: animals, trees, rocks, hills, places, gods, towers, apparitions, things, demons, celestial phenomena, cataclysms and people (as one of the possible historic conjunctions), and *popular epistemic-practical matrixes* sink the phenomenological sliding in the untold challenge of our *postcolonial intercultural* histories; to say something, finally, deconstructing the *phenomenology* into a *semiopraxis* means the very *deconstruction* (if it still wants to be). The *non-sociologic diversity of beings* from the transcendence of *space-other times* will be that which in each case *local knowledge*, i.e., epistemic-practical matrixes, puts in the game. Decolonizing the epistemic road will mean, sometimes, not to semiologize in social projections or symptoms the enunciations of the *non-social* beings, not to reduce them to anthropo-logy nor to the “familiar” scene of collective trauma, for instance, the colonial as identity and difference relationships between social beings (as Derrida does in *Monolingualism of the Other*, (1997c) or Todorov in *Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, 1985). One cannot but barely glimpse what in these avatars will occur to social sciences: what decolonization will do with them. Nonetheless, thrown to the sense of other “grounds” (Kusch, 1976), cast in the fate of other “ways-of-being-in-the-world”, still resounds the spectral phenomenological echo in the monstrous fabric of other subjectifications.

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