

Gaps, Representation, and Elite-Mass Congruence in Chile and Uruguay

Brechas, representación y congruencia élite-ciudadanía en Chile y Uruguay

Bastían González-Bustamante  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1510-6820>

Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Chile, bastian.gonzalez.b@usach.cl

Original article
language:spanish
Translated by
Luis Cejudo
Espinosa

Abstract: This paper analyzes three dimensions of elite-mass congruence in Chile and Uruguay: (a) ideological; (b) public issues, support, and satisfaction with democracy; and, (c) economic preferences on the role of the State. Data from probabilistic national surveys and surveys on elites financed by IDRC-Canada and carried out from 2013 to 2014 in each country are used. Congruence indexes are calculated to identify gaps between citizens and representatives. The main indexes used are Relative Citizen Congruence and Earth Mover's Distance, a recent innovation borrowed from computer science. The findings show a greater ideological congruence in Chile, a greater congruence on support to democracy in Uruguay, and important gaps on education issues in Chile. Furthermore, in both countries there is greater congruence regarding relevant public issues between higher socioeconomic level population and the political elite.

Key words: elites, representation, congruence, Chile, Uruguay.

Resumen: Este artículo analiza tres dimensiones de la congruencia élite-ciudadanía en Chile y Uruguay: a) ideológica; b) temática, respaldo y satisfacción con la democracia; y c) preferencias del rol del Estado en la economía. Se utilizan datos de encuestas nacionales probabilísticas y encuestas de élites financiadas por IDRC de Canadá y realizadas entre 2013 y 2014 en cada país. Se calculan indicadores de congruencia para identificar brechas entre ciudadanos y representantes. Los principales indicadores con los cuales se trabaja son Congruencia Ciudadana Relativa y *Earth Mover's Distance*, una innovación reciente de las ciencias de la computación. Los hallazgos muestran una mayor congruencia ideológica en Chile, una mayor congruencia en el apoyo a la democracia en Uruguay e importantes brechas en materia educacional en Chile. Además, en ambos países se advierte mayor congruencia sobre problemas públicos relevantes entre los sectores de mayor nivel socioeconómico y la élite política.

Palabras clave: élites, representación, congruencia, Chile, Uruguay.

Received:
August 08th, 2018

Approved:
October 26th, 2018



Introduction¹

In contemporary democracies, political systems comprise processes that allow including and channeling the citizens' preferences and demands. These processes are linked with political representation and suffrage mechanisms, which for their part, operationalize the election of authorities, while at once generate a divide between the governors and the governed. This is usually associated with the existence of certain suppositions such as, for instance, the citizens elect their representatives according to their preferences; or else, the political elite has incentives to suitably channel citizens' demands to obtain popular support, attain legitimacy, and perpetuate in power.

These suppositions are in line with the electoral theory of representation and a confluence of responsibility and mandate in the context of the representation theory. While the electoral theory assumes that citizenry elects freely and periodically their representatives; on the other side, understanding representation as a confluence between responsibility and mandate entails supposing that the elite responds to its governed, and at once that it is the agent or delegate of these governed (Pasquino, 2011; Sartori, 1999). However, this does not necessarily have an empirical correlate; in point of fact, the consensual theory of representation assumes that citizenry accepts the decisions of governors (Sartori, 1999), which tends to keep representation from participatory conceptions.

In this context, wondering about how close the political elite's preferences are to the citizens' entails assessing the gaps between governors and governed in the political system. The classic work by Miller and Stokes (1963) may be identified as the point from which a research line on the preferences of the citizens and their represented was opened. Political congruence may, in this context, be understood as the correspondence degree between the citizens' preferences and the positions of their representatives (Powell, 2004; Real-Dato, 2017).

1 This article was funded by IDRC-Canada via the project "A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges of the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay" (Alfredo Joignant, head researcher). The preliminary results of this research were presented at *XXXIV Congreso Internacional de la Asociación de Estudios Latinoamericanos*, later: LASA, New York, May 2016. I am grateful for the financial support by LASA (Travel Grant 2016/40071). I also acknowledge the comments by Antoine Maillet and recommendations by Lucía Selios.

This is relevant because of the possible links with the theory of representation and democracy;² however, it also has practical importance due to the growing concern regarding the existence of gaps between the elite and citizens, a context in which a possible break of the principal-agent relation may be associated with a representativity crisis (Mainwaring, 2006).

In this sense, it is important to clarify that such conceptualizations focus on representativity; therefore, more than citizenship as a broad concept, voters are specifically referred and understood as the segment of citizenry which possesses political rights.³

This work describes the levels of elite-citizenry congruence in Chile and Uruguay with measurement methods that allow for disaggregation in dimensions focused on ideological self-identification, topics of public policies, support and satisfaction with democracy and preferences about the State's role in economy. Data from national and international surveys applied to political elites in both countries over 2013 and 2014 are utilized in order to ascertain whether the governors' perceptions align with those of the citizens at an aggregated level. Moreover, distinctions are made on the basis of the socioeconomic level of Chilean and Uruguayan population, which enables identifying the existence of better alignments between governors and individuals with more economic and social resources, which may be an indication of political inequality.

The countries in this study are, together with Argentina, part of the Southern Cone, in Latin America. Chile and Uruguay have presidentialisms with high human development levels in the region. Furthermore, even if these countries have high quality level democracy (Levine and Molina, 2011), they exhibit relevant behavioral differences. While Chile has high rates of political disaffection and low confidence in institutions (Siavelis, 2017), Uruguay is a regional leader in aspects such as these (Morales, 2014).

The present article is divided into four sections. Firstly, there is a theoretical section that offers a brief state of the art regarding studies on

2 It is important to indicate, as pointed out by Otero-Felipe (2014), that congruence is an indicator of the existence of political representation in its substantial or representative dimensions according to Pitkin's (1967) typology. However, in strict sense, congruence and political representation are not equivalent terms.

3 In this context, it is essential to indicate that there are several dimensions associated with the concept of citizenship. Marshall (1950) was early distinguish between civil, political, and social citizenship. By and large, these three sorts of citizenship usually operate separately, and only the intersection of these three categories would entail full democratic citizenship (PNUD, 2014).

elites and elite-citizen congruence measurement. Secondly, a methodological section is developed to display the utilized surveys, the operationalization of variables and congruence indices used for measuring three dimensions: a) ideological congruence by political parties; b) thematic congruence, support and satisfaction with democracy; and, c) congruence in preferences in the role of the State in the economy.

Later on, the results of the three analysis dimensions are shown. Finally, conclusions are presented with a summary of the main findings.

Literature review

Elite studies and elite-citizenry gaps

Even if the political elite and governors, as objects of study, precede the appearance of the modern State, a relatively contemporary starting point, accepted by the specialized literature, can be fixed at the theoretical aspects of classic elitism by the end of XIX century. The main exponents of classic elitism were Mosca, Pareto and Michels. Decades later, in the mid XX century, a division in the study of elites is noticed and it is possible to identify an approach rather pluralist in the study as well as a unitary one (González-Bustamante, 2016; Joignant, 2011).

In the context of the pluralist approach, it is possible to locate works such as Dahl's (1961), in which the existence of a dispersion of power is assumed, since several groups struggle for dominant positions. Conversely, Mills (1956), one of the most relevant exponents of the unitary approach, develops the idea that there is no relation of balance in society, as the political elite is composed of individuals at the social summit, a position which they do not necessarily reach because of their personal capabilities, as during the process sources of wealth and the mechanism of celebrity operate.

In this scenario, over the second half of the XX century, Pierre Bourdieu's sociology appeared as a useful theoretical approximation to empirical studies on elites. His theoretical work frames a conceptualization of the functioning of the social space, fields of power, the individuals' resources and capitals, adding to the structuring structures (*habitus*) (González-Bustamante and Garrido-Vergara, 2018; Serna, 2006). The resources and capitals of an individual are associated with competence language, and consequently with inequalities: accessing power and being capable of maintaining power take place in a context of naturalization of

individual attributes, which strictly speaking are linked to capital inheritance (Alcántara, 2013; González-Bustamante, 2016; Joignant, 2011).

The above implies that the principle of equality in democratic representativeness is associated with deep inequalities. From the theory of elites, this renders the principle of equality in contemporary democracies an aspiration, not necessarily a reality (Arana, 2016; Parry, 2005). Moreover, the prevalence of electoral representation in modern democracies is also associated with inequalities.

A theoretical supposition that persisted over the last half a century has been the existence of an alleged bias of class in political participation (Lipset, 1960). In this regard, presently both the electoral participation and non-conventional forms of political participation contentious in nature, which in the early XX century were proper to marginalized sectors, tend to strengthen the opinion of individuals with more social and economic resources, thus accomplishing political inequality (Dalton *et al.*, 2010; Dubrow, 2008).

In this context, for most of the XX century, the theory of elites has intended to answer the question: who governs? To do so, a similar response has been produced with various nuances: a small organized minority (Bobbio, 2003). In this way, in recent decades, studies on political elites have focused on their characteristics, roles in political processes such as democratic transitions, their cohesion level and congruence with citizens.⁴

As regards consensus and congruence, there are works that address ideological gaps between the elite and citizens. It is possible to identify, on one side, works that solely deal with thematic congruence (Alcántara and Luna, 2004; Kitschelt, 2000; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). For example, Luna and Zechmeister (2005) find higher levels of elite-citizenry congruence in more consolidated party systems and in left-wing parties in Latin America. Furthermore, there are some other works that approach congruence between the preferences of representatives and represented, as Andeweg and Thomassen (2005), or Barreda and Ruiz (2015).

Congruence between representatives and represented favors responsiveness; i.e., attention to citizens' demands, which benefits the quality of representation and democracy (Barreda and Ruiz, 2015). A government is responsive when it boosts policies and decisions linked to the electorate's interests.

⁴ See for example Best (2011), Gulbrandsen and Engelstad (2005), Higley and Gunther (1992), and Pakulski (2012). For recent studies in Latin America and the Southern Cone, see Codato and Espinoza (2018), González-Bustamante and Olivares (2018), and Vommaro and Gené (2018).

In this regard, the alignment of representation and responsiveness takes place in contexts where the electorate has high information levels; moreover, it may be considered a measure of the accountability enabled by institutional structures (Przeworski *et al.*, 1999). If this alignment does not take place, gaps between voters and representatives appear, and these may produce disaffection sentiments that might become predictors of collapses in party systems, electoral realignments or representation crises (Morales, 2014).

In this context, if representation crises are considered, following Mainwaring (2006), a rupture in the principal-agent continuum expressed in the elite-citizenry relationship, then political intermediation would stop working adequately. This may have a number of consequences: diminution in electoral participation, increase of social mobilization, appearance of outsiders or antisystem movements.⁵

Before a representativity crisis, what Joignant *et al.* (2017) have called inconformity may be identified. This concept combines mistrust in institutions, disappearance of governmental management and political disaffection. Such dimensions may vary over time, and even if they are not necessarily crisis predictors, their presence is the prelude to the rupture of the continuum of representativeness (Cantillana *et al.*, 2017).

Furthermore, the study of congruence also allows better recognizing the links between representatives and represented (Barreda and Ruiz, 2015). In this sense, if it focuses on the parties and their voters, it may be associated with the programmatic links of society (Dalton, 2011; Selios, 2015). For instance, programmatic links tend to be stronger in democracies where voters have preferences similar to their representatives, a situation that tends to condition the disposition and capability to deliver governmental programs, as if this does not take place voters will stop supporting the parties (Kitschelt *et al.*, 2010; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005 and 2010; Morales, 2014).

Measurement of elite-citizenry congruence

Elite-citizenry congruence, as indicated in the previous section, tends to favor democratic stability. On the contrary, the existence of gaps is related to representation crises and problems in the political and party system. Seeing the relevance of congruence, it is necessary to reflect on its measurement.

⁵ This rupture may be explained by economic factors (Bellinger and Arce, 2011) or by the absence of institutional capability (Kitschelt *et al.*, 2010; Torcal, 2006).

An operational definition of congruence is directly linked to the degree of coincidence between representatives and represented, which has been measured with various techniques and forms of operationalization (Rivas *et al.*, 2014). Using distances between means or averages and simple distance on the basis of particular estimations has been a classic and quite simple method; however, it has methodological problems associated with inaccuracies in measurements (Golder and Stramski, 2010; Otero-Felipe, 2014).

Similarly, the correlation of attitudes, disregarding the statistical distribution of opinions tends to produce overestimations and underestimations in measurements (Achen, 1977; Weissberg, 1978).⁶

In recent years, in the context of the search to overcome the inefficiencies associated with less sophisticated measurements methods, a work by Golder and Stramski (2010) has popularized; it distinguishes three sorts of congruence: a) *one-to-one*, between citizens and representatives, which may be high when the absolute distance between citizens and representatives is small; b) *many-to-one* focused on congruence between various citizens and a representative; and, c) *many-to-many*, which intends to measure congruence between various citizens and various representatives. Following Golder and Stramski's (2010) methodological guidelines, many-to-one congruence can be measured by means of Absolute Median Citizen Congruence, AMCC (i), where MC is the average ideologic stance of the citizens, while G , that of the government or elite.

$$(i) \text{ AMCC} = |MC - G|$$

It is also possible to measure Absolute Citizen Congruence, ACC (ii), a measurement that incorporates certain information regarding citizens' preferences and allows for greater accuracy. In the formula: N is the number of citizens and C_i is the identification of the i -*nth* citizen.

$$(ii) \text{ ACC} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |C_i - G|$$

Finally, another possibility is Relative Citizen Congruence, RCC (iii), which contains useful information regarding congruence between citizens and their representatives, by incorporating the dispersion of citizen's preferences. This measurement ranges from zero to one, and the higher the

6 In this context, proximity, centrism and responsiveness indices by Achen (1978) were, in their time, more accurate distances than the distances between means or specific estimations.

congruence, the indicator is closer to zero. Similarly, when AMCC and ACC values are low, there is more congruence.

$$(iii) \text{ RCC} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N |C_i - MC|}{\sum_{i=1}^N |C_i - G|}$$

For its part, many-to-many congruence assesses the similarity of the distribution of preferences, where $F_1(x)$ and $F_2(x)$ are Cumulative Distribution Functions, CDF, of the preferences of the citizens and the elite, respectively; this measurement is also known as Manhattan (iv).

$$(iv) \text{ Manhattan} = \sum_x |F_1(X) - F_2(X)|$$

When the distribution of preferences is identical, the area between each CDF is zero and congruence is perfect (Golder and Stramski, 2010). In this sense, if a distance $\hat{D}$ is considered a numerical description of how distanced from each other these two objects are in the metric space, there is need for a set (M) and a metric (D) to define the distance between objects. Then, *many-to-many* congruence would be the same as calculating the not-overlapped area of the cumulative distribution functions of X and Y to obtain $\hat{D}_{\text{CDF}}$ (Lupu *et al.*, 2017).

Another common measurement of congruence is the overlapping of *Probability Density Function*, PDF, or Bhattacharyya coefficient (v), which calculates the intersection area of both distributions (Andeweg, 2011; Lupu *et al.*, 2017; Selios, 2015).⁷ This can lead to confusion, since for $\hat{D}_{\text{CDF}}$ and for the distances between means or specific estimations, the lower the value the shorter the distance; for $\hat{D}_{\text{PDF}}$, conversely, the higher the value the higher the congruence (Lupu *et al.*, 2017; Lupu and Warner, 2017).

$$(v) \text{ Intersección} = \sum_{c=1}^c \min(j_c; l_c)$$

⁷ Even if the concept of interception is quite intuitive, it poses a number of problems, as indicated by Selios (2015). For example, if all the elite were in a certain point and the citizenry at the opposite end (e.g., one and ten), the index would be zero, as if they were separated by a shorter distance (e.g., five and six).

Finally, another recent measurement that allows overcoming the limitation of classic measurements of congruence is *Earth Mover's Distance*, EMD, which is a derivative from the field of computer sciences (Rubner *et al.*, 2000).

According to Lupu *et al.* (2017), EMD can be explained as follows: if self-positioning is being measured on a scale from zero to ten with data on the location and density of two sets $P_x = \{(2, 0,5), (5, 0,3), (8, 0,2)\}$ and $P_y = \{(4, 0,3), (5, 0,4), (6, 0,3)\}$, EMD between X and Y is defined by the solution for the linear optimization of the problem, where the optimal flow f_{ij} for the movement of distance between these sets allows obtaining $\mathcal{D}_{EMD}$. In this way, a formal definition offered by Lupu *et al.* (2017), once the optimal flow is found, is as follows (vi). In the indicator, similarly to many-to-one indicators, the higher the value, the longer distance and the less congruence.

$$(vi) \mathcal{D}_{EMD} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n f_{ij}^* d_{ij}}{\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n f_{ij}^*}$$

Hence, in the example, there is data transfer between P_x and P_y (vii).⁸ This exercise allows obtaining $\mathcal{D}_{EMD}$, which would be $\frac{(1)(1,7)}{1} = 1,7$.

$$(vii) (|4-2|)(0,3) + (|5-5|)(0,3) + (|5-2|)(0,1) + (|6-2|)(0,1) + (|6-8|)(0,2) = 1,7$$

The main advantage of EMD is that it allows studying the congruence of a broad range of preferences and areas, enabling comparisons of distributions with a minimal data processing cost and great accuracy (Lupu *et al.*, 2017).

Methods

Data

To measure the opinion of citizens we resorted to the surveys of the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges of the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay”, which was funded by IDRC Canada and coordinated

⁸ For further details about the measurement, see Lupu *et al.* (2017). Moreover, calculations can be simplified resorting to *emdist* for R. Indeed, this program is utilized for the analyses in the present work. For more information, see Urbanek and Rubner (2015).

by *Universidad Diego Portales*, UDP. Such surveys were carried out in face-to-face interviews in Chile ($N = 1.200$) and Uruguay ($N = 1.202$). sampling was probabilistic at all stages, and surveys are representative of the national populations older than 18 years. Confidence level is 95% and error $\pm 2,8\%$. Fieldwork was carried out in March and April 2013 in Chile, while in February, 2014 in Uruguay.⁹

Furthermore, the preferences of the elite are measured with surveys to a sample of congresspeople and members of the executive in the context of the same research project in Chile ($N = 164$) and Uruguay ($N = 121$), following the methodological strategy of Lupu *et al.* (2017), Buquet and Selios (2017), and Lupu and Warner (2017).¹⁰ For this work's analysis, surveys applied to congresspeople are used only because these are democratically elected positions, not appointments based on political confidence, as in the case of cabinets in the studied presidential regimes.¹¹

In Chile, the rate of response in the lower chamber was 80,73% ($n = 97$), and 89,47% ($n = 34$) in the upper. In Uruguay, the rate of response was 77,78% ($n = 77$) for deputies, while for senators, 76,67% ($n = 23$).

Analysis and measurement dimensions

This research focuses on describing the elite-citizen congruence levels in Chile and Uruguay with measuring methods that allow congruence disaggregation in three dimensions: a) ideologic by political blocs; b) topic, support and satisfaction with democracy; and, c) in preferences of the role of the State in the economy. To do so, aggregated congruence levels are calculated and a distinction is made depending on the socioeconomic level of the population to ascertain if there are gaps between groups, which allows assessing the existence of political inequality or class bias. The three dimensions are analyzed from a many-to-many perspective with $\mathcal{D}_{EMD}$ (Lupu *et al.*, 2017; Rubner *et al.*, 2000). Additionally,

9 For further methodologic details, see Joignant *et al.* (2017). See also, other works with these data or subsamples in Argentina (Lupu and Warner, 2017), Chile (Siavelis, 2017), and Uruguay (Buquet and Selios, 2017).

10 Lupu *et al.* (2017) also identify other forms of measuring the preferences of the elite such as *party manifestos* (Powell, 2009), or voters' perception regarding party platforms (Golder and Stramski, 2010).

11 This is a difference from Buquet and Selios (2017), who use the entire sample in their analyses. It is worth bearing in mind that the full sample, as indicated, includes a non-probabilistic sample of members of the executive.

ideological congruence is also assessed by means of RCC many-to-one measure by Golder and Stramski (2010), taking as a supposition the existence of a heterogeneous citizenship and a rather homogeneous elite.

The ideological dimension operationalizes by means of the self-positioning of the elite and citizenry, using the standard measurement scale in public opinion surveys, which ranges from zero to ten.¹² The second dimension measures thematic congruence,¹³ which comprises the perception of compulsory vote, support to democracy¹⁴ and satisfaction with its functioning.¹⁵ Finally, the third dimension, focused on the preferences regarding the role of the State in the economy, uses a set of questions to measure whether the respondent agrees or not with the following: a) public transport shall be in the hands of a State enterprise; b) there should be more State banks; c) subsidized private schools shall be managed by the State; d) there should be a chain of State drugstores; and, e) every private university shall be managed by the State.¹⁶

Results

Congruence and ideological distribution by political blocs

A visual inspection allows noticing that the distance between the distribution of ideological self-positioning of the elite and citizens tends to be lower in Chile (Figure 1).¹⁷ This is verified with the area of intersection

12 Where zero represents the left-wing sector and ten, the right-wing.

13 The following question was used: "Out of the following, what do you think the worst problem of the country is? a) education; b) crime; c) health care; d) pensions; e) housing; f) public works; g) environmental deterioration; h) public transport; i) justice; j) unemployment; k) inflation; l) politics; m) corruption; n) inequality; and, o) discrimination".

14 The following question was used: Which of the following questions do you agree the most with? a) democracy is preferable to any form of government; b) in some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to another democratic; and, c) for people like us a democracy or an authoritarian regime are the same.

15 On a four-category Likert scale from "not satisfied at all" to "highly pleased".

16 Even if surveys have more questions in this regard, the items that allow comparisons were selected. Even so, the calculation of congruence between the elite and the Uruguayan citizenry in this dimension is impossible to produce, as this battery was only applied to the elite, not in the national survey.

17 Figures and tables are at the end of the present article, in Annex (Editor's note).

of those institutions: Chile has $D_{PDF} = 0,810$, and Uruguay $D_{PDF} = 0,370$. However, one has to consider that in Chile 38,08% of the citizens do not self-position in the continuum left-right; whereas in Uruguay the figure is 20,71%. Among the legislators, disaffection figures are quite low: only 0,77% in Chile, and 2% in Uruguay.¹⁸

The patterns identified in the assessment of the distribution of ideological self-positioning are ratified by the various congruence levels, calculated with D_{EMD} and RCC (Table 1). When assessing EMD values, it is noticed there is higher elite-citizen congruence in Chile ($D_{EMD} = 0,419$) than in Uruguay ($D_{EMD} = 2,995$). However, when considering the ideologically disaffected in the calculation, the stage tends to change: in Chile the distance increases 500,24% ($D_{EMD} = 2,515$), whilst in Uruguay, it only does 25,84% ($D_{EMD} = 3,769$). In this regard, the greater ideological alignment between the elite and citizenry in Chile is not as high if political disaffection is considered in the measurement.

Moreover, in Chile the population with the lowest socioeconomic level is more ideologically aligned with the elite, through in the center-right coalition there is more congruence with the highest socioeconomic level sectors. In spite of the above, the center-right coalition tends to be more aligned with the whole of society, since the center-left coalition exhibits larger gaps with the wealthiest sectors in the population. By assessing ideological congruence in Chile resorting to RCC, a measure which due to its calculation assumes the existence of heterogeneous citizenry and a rather homogeneous elite, it is noticed that there is more congruence between the political elite and the highest socioeconomic level, both at aggregate level and between the various political blocs.

In Uruguay, the population with the lowest socioeconomic level also has more congruence with the elite. At the level of political blocs, *Frente Amplio* keeps this alignment with the least favored sectors, notwithstanding that at aggregate level, there are wide gaps with the whole of society; while Partido Nacional is the closest to citizens at aggregate level. Furthermore, *Partido Nacional* and *Colorado* tend to be more congruent with the population with higher socioeconomic level. when evaluating Uruguayan

18 Moreover, it is important to consider that self-positioning operates as an umbrella term that does not account for the specific complexities of the significance of ideology and the ideological. Consequently, it is exposed to social desirability problems and measurement inaccuracies. In point of fact, in Latin America there are various meanings, for citizens and the elite, associated with the ideological axis. This mainly comprises political and economic elements (Gramacho and Llamazares, 2007; Zechmeister and Corral, 2010).

ideological congruence with RCC, an alignment with the sector with lower socioeconomic level and the transversal closeness of *Partido Nacional* are noticed.

Thematic congruence, support and satisfaction with democracy

Support for democracy is much stronger among the elite than among the citizenry. In Uruguay, all the representatives and senators interviewed prefer democracy as a form of government; whereas in Chile, this figure is 96,18%. Results for citizens are lower. In Chile, preference for democracies reaches 54,94% and in Uruguay, 73,80%. Congruence levels of support for democracy show there is higher elite-citizenry congruence in Uruguay. Moreover, in both countries, the wealthiest sectors are more supportive of democracy (Table 2). This implies that less privileged sectors might align with a certain ease to nondemocratic stances eventually.

In spite of the above, the situation changes when assessing satisfaction with democracy: in Chile, there are shorter gaps in this regard. This is because the Chilean elite is quite self-complacent: 74,05% is satisfied or very satisfied with the functioning of democracy; while in Uruguay, this percentage barely reaches 7%. Despite that in Chile, only 48,16% of the population is satisfied or very satisfied with democracy, in Uruguay this figure is 72,69%; congruence is higher in Chile.

In the case of compulsory vote, only 29,91% of the Chilean population supports it, in Uruguay, 53,47%. Among the elite support is higher: 64,89% in Chile and 88% in Uruguay. Congruence on this topic is similar in both countries, being slightly higher among higher socioeconomic level population. Finally, congruence regarding relevant public problems is similar in both countries, though focused on different topics (Figure 2). Furthermore, an important gap by socioeconomic level is noticed: there is higher congruence between the elite and the wealthiest population sectors. This may be considered an alignment associated with the strengthening of the political voice and opinion of individuals with more social and economic resources, a feature of political inequality.

Congruence regarding preferences for the roles of the State

Preferences for more State intervention are noticeable in Chile, as over the dictatorship, structural reforms, which entailed an important reduction of the State and the creation of nonconventional markets with poor regulation and

little state intervention, were implemented quite successfully (Solimano, 2014). This economic model was not altered after the democratic recovery, on the contrary, a series of elements ensured its inalterability (Garretón, 1999; Huneeus, 2014).

Figures are particularly higher in topics related to more intervention in markets that have experienced problems of collusion, monopoly activities and influence peddling in recent years. For example, 79,57% of Chileans agrees with the creation of a network of State drugstores; similarly, 75,29% considers more State banks should be created. There is also a high preference for the nationalization of urban public transport, which is noticeable because it is one of the most criticized areas as regards implementation of public policies in Chile. Likewise, noticeable is the idea that private universities and subvention-private colleges had to be controlled by the State (59,57% and 53,7%, respectively).

In this context, some evident gaps are noticed between the citizens and political elite in some of these aspects.¹⁹ The political elite strongly agrees with the implementation of State drugstores in Chile (59,54%), not so in Uruguay (37%). Moreover, there are more relevant differences in the rest of the topics: in Chile only 44,28% of the elite agrees with the creation of more State banks, whereas in Uruguay this figure is 33%. As regards the nationalization of public transport in 48,09% agrees and in Uruguay, only 22%.

Finally, the relevant gaps are noticed for secondary and higher education. In Chile, only 9,16% agrees with private universities become managed by the State, a figure close to Uruguay's (10%); in relation to the State control of subsidized-private colleges, the figure is almost the same in Chile (9,92%), and slightly higher in Uruguay (16%).

In the assessment of D_{EMD} in Chile (Table 3), it is noticed that the main gaps correspond to education topics, where in addition to noticing gaps according to socioeconomic level: the wealthiest population sectors tend to agree more with the political elite, which rejects the State control of colleges and universities. This aligns with the recent contesting of the pillars of the Chilean model such as the Constitution, education, tax and pension systems (Cortés, 2015).²⁰

19 For Uruguay, only data from the survey to elite are available, for as previously stated, these questions were not in the national survey.

20 In this context, there is a debate on the possible collapse of the Chilean economic model (Mayol, 2012). However, such debate is rather local and has a rather conjunctural nature more than academic. For a theoretical reflection on varieties of neoliberalism and the Chilean model, see Maillat (2015a and 2015b).

Conclusions

The present article offers a diagnosis on the political elite's preferences and citizens in Chile and Uruguay. To do so, national survey polls were utilized to assess the three dimensions of congruence: a) ideological; b) thematic, support, satisfaction with democracy; and, c) preferences regarding the role of the State in economy. Mainly many-to-many measures and recent congruence indices are used for higher accuracy in the diagnosis of the existing breaches and alignments.

In the first dimension, higher congruence is noticed in Chile, through the difference between both countries tends to disappear if ideologically disaffected are considered in the calculation, which correspond to 38,08% in Chile. EMD Measurements enable noticing that in Chile, the center-right coalition tends to be more aligned with the citizens; while in Uruguay, it is noticed that *Frente Amplio* has relevant gaps with the population. Furthermore, when using RCC, it is noticed that the elite, as it is considered a homogeneous group, tends to ideologically align with higher socioeconomic level individuals in the case of Chile and with the most disadvantaged people in Uruguay.

In the second dimension, high elite-citizenry congruence is noticed in support to democracy in Uruguay, not so in satisfaction with it. This is because in Chile there is no perception that democracy works better, but because the Uruguayan elite is quite self-critical with its own democracy. As regards congruence regarding relevant public problems and compulsory vote, it is noticed there is more congruence between the elite and wealthier socioeconomic population sectors.

Finally, as regards congruence on the preferences of the role of the State in economy, there is a predisposition of Chilean citizens toward greater regulation and State intervention. Such tendencies are more conservative in Chilean and Uruguayan elites. The main gaps in this regard are noticed in education management in Chile: while citizens show tendencies toward the nationalization of universities and colleges, the political elite rejects it. This is consistent with recent social mobilizations and the positioning of education as a relevant problem in the public agenda in Chile.

Even if these results offer a diagnosis regarding the various gaps there exist between citizens and the elites in these two consolidated democracies in Latin America, it is important to bear in mind that such results have to consider possible recent changes in the ruling elites, and also, have to be contrasted with longitudinal data to outline a more robust diagnosis. In any

case, this work offers results with tendencies that are noticeable and need to be studied more, additionally, it presents a state of the art updated by means of a practical application on political congruence measurement and the link with the theory of elites.

References

- Achen, Christopher (1977), "Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient", en *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 21, núm. 4, Estados Unidos: Midwest Political Science Association. DOI: 10.2307/2110737. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110737> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Achen, Christopher (1978), "Measuring Representation", en *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, núm. 3, Estados Unidos: Midwest Political Science Association. DOI: 10.2307/2110458. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110458> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Alcántara, Manuel (2013), "De políticos y política: profesionalización y calidad en el ejercicio público", en *Perfiles Latinoamericanos*, vol. 21, núm. 41, México: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Disponible en: <http://ref.scielo.org/fj37bw> [19 de abril de 2017].
- Alcántara, Manuel y Luna, Juan Pablo (2004), "Ideología y competencia partidaria en dos post-transiciones: Chile y Uruguay en perspectiva comparada", en *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 24, núm. 1, Chile: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. DOI: 10.4067/S0718-090X2004000100006. Disponible en: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2004000100006> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Andeweg, Ruby (2011), "Approaching Perfect Policy Congruence. Measurement, Development, and Relevance for Political Representation", en Rosema, Martin *et al.* [comps.], *How Democracy Works. Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, Países Bajos: Amsterdam University Press.
- Andeweg, Rudy y Thomassen, Jacques (2005), "Modes of Political Representation: Toward a New Typology", en *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 30, núm. 4, Estados Unidos: American Political Science Association. DOI: 10.3162/036298005X201653. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.3162/036298005X201653> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Arana, Ignacio (2016), "¿Cómo evaluar a los integrantes de la élite política? Una propuesta basada en los presidentes americanos", en *Política, Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 54, núm. 1, Chile: Universidad de Chile. Disponible en: <http://revistapolitica.uchile.cl/index.php/RP/article/view/42714> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Barreda, Mikel y Ruiz, Leticia (2015), "Contrapuntos en torno al modo de representación: ciudadanos y diputados de América Latina", ponencia presentada en el *VIII Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política*, 22-24 julio, Lima, Perú (inédito).
- Bellinger, Paul y Arce, Moisés (2011), "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era", en *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 64, núm. 3, Estados Unidos: Western Political Science Association. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23056385> [21 de abril de 2018].

- Best, Heinrich (2011), "The Elite-Population Gap in the Formation of Political Identities. A Cross-Cultural Investigation", en *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 63, núm. 6, Escocia: Central and East European Studies. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.585751. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2011.585751> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Bobbio, Norberto (2003), "Élites, teoría delle", en Bobbio, Norberto *et al.* [comps.], *Dizionario di Politica*, Italia: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese.
- Buquet, Daniel y Selios, Lucía (2017), "Political Congruence in Uruguay, 2014", en Joignant, Alfredo *et al.* [comps.], *Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries*, Estados Unidos: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cantillana, Carlos *et al.* (2017), "Malestar con la representación democrática en América Latina", en *Política y Gobierno*, vol. XXIV, núm. 2, México: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. Disponible en: <http://ref.scielo.org/m2vz3z> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Codato, Adriano y Espinoza, Fran (2018), *Élites en las Américas: Diferentes Perspectivas*, Brasil: Editora Universidade Federal do Paraná.
- Cortés, Alexis (2015): "Chile en la encrucijada de un nuevo ciclo", en *Cadernos de Trabalho NETSAL*, vol. 3, núm. 7, Brasil: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Disponible en: http://www.academia.edu/31489911/Chile_en_la_encrucijada_de_un_nuevo_ciclo [07 de noviembre de 2018].
- Dalton, Russell *et al.* (2010), "The Individual-Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour", en *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 40, núm. 1, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/S000712340999038X. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340999038X> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Dalton, Russell *et al.* (2011), "The Dynamics of Political Representation", en Rosema, Martin *et al.* [comps.], *How Democracy Works. Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, Países Bajos: Amsterdam University Press.
- Dahl, Robert (1961), *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, Estados Unidos: Yale University Press.
- Dubrow, Joshua (2008), "Guest Editor's Introduction: Defining Political Inequality within a Cross-National Perspective", en *International Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, núm. 4, Estados Unidos: Taylor & Francis. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20628308> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Garretón, Manuel Antonio (1999), "Chile 1997-1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization", en *International Affairs*, vol. 75, núm. 2, Inglaterra: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Disponible en: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2623343> [07 de noviembre de 2018].
- Golder, Matt y Stramski, Jacek (2010), "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions", en *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 54, núm. 1, Estados Unidos: Midwest Political Science Association. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00420.x. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00420.x> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- González-Bustamante, Bastián (2016), "Élites políticas, económicas e intelectuales: una agenda de investigación creciente para la ciencia política", en *Política, Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 54, núm. 1, Chile: Universidad de Chile. Disponible en: <http://revistapolitica.uchile.cl/index.php/RP/article/view/42690> [28 de febrero de 2018].


- González-Bustamante, Bastián y Garrido-Vergara, Luis (2018), “Socialización, trayectorias y poscarrera de ministros en Chile, 1990-2010”, en *Política y Gobierno*, vol. XXV, núm. 1, México: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. Disponible en: <http://ref.scielo.org/bm9fmm> [20 de abril de 2018].
- González-Bustamante, Bastián y Olivares, Alejandro (2018), “La élite política gubernamental en Chile: supervivencia de ministros”, en Codato, Adriano y Espinoza, Fran [comps.], *Élites en las Américas: Diferentes Perspectivas*, Brasil: Editora Universidade Federal do Paraná.
- Gramacho, Wladimir y Llamazares, Iván (2007), “Ideología y preferencias de intervención económica estatal entre los diputados latinoamericanos”, en *Documentos CIDOB*, núm. 18, España: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Disponible en: http://americo.usal.es/OIR/OPAL/pdfs/Gramacho_Llamazares.pdf [22 de abril de 2018].
- Gulbrandsen, Trygve y Engelstad, Fredrik (2005), “Elite consensus on the Norwegian welfare state model”, en *West European Politics*, vol. 28, núm. 4, Inglaterra: Routledge. DOI: 10.1080/01402380500217029. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500217029> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Higley, John y Gunther, Richard (1992), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press.
- Huneus, Carlos (2014), *La democracia semisoberana. Chile después de Pinochet*, Chile: Taurus.
- Joignant, Alfredo (2011), “Tecnócratas, technopols y dirigentes de partido: tipos de agentes y especies de capital en las elites gubernamentales de la Concertación (1990-2010)”, en Joignant, Alfredo y Güell, Pedro [comps.], *Notables, tecnócratas y mandarines: Elementos de sociología de las elites en Chile (1990-2010)*, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales.
- Joignant, Alfredo *et al.* (2017), *Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries*, Estados Unidos: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (2000), “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities”, en *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 33, núm. 6-7, Estados Unidos: Sage. DOI: 10.1177/001041400003300607. Disponible en: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/001041400003300607> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Kitschelt, Herbert *et al.* (2010), *Latin American Party Systems*, Estados Unidos: Cambridge University Press.
- Levine, Daniel y Molina, José (2011), *The Quality of Democracy in Latin America*, Estados Unidos: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Lipset, Seymour (1960), *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Estados Unidos: Doubleday & Company.
- Luna, Juan Pablo y Zechmeister, Elizabeth (2005), “Political Representation in Latin America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries”, en *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 38, núm. 4, Estados Unidos: Sage. DOI: 10.1177/0010414004273205. Disponible en: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414004273205> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Luna, Juan Pablo y Zechmeister, Elizabeth (2010), “Political Representation in Latin America”, en Kitschelt, Herbert *et al.* [comps.], *Latin American Party Systems*, Estados Unidos: Cambridge University Press.

- Lupu, Noam *et al.* (2017), “A New Measure of Congruence: The Earth Mover’s Distance”, en *Political Analysis*, vol. 25, núm. 1, Estados Unidos: PolMeth. DOI: 10.1017/pan.2017.2. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.2> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Lupu, Noam y Warner, Zach (2017), “Mass-Elite Congruence and Representation in Argentina”, en Joignant, Alfredo *et al.* [comps.], *Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries*, Estados Unidos: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mainwaring, Scott (2006), “The Crisis of representation in the Andes”, en *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 17, núm. 3, Estados Unidos: National Endowment for Democracy. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2006.0048. Disponible en: <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/200110> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Marshall, Thomas H. (1950), *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press.
- Maillet, Antoine (2015a), “Más allá del ‘modelo’ chileno: una aproximación multi-sectorial a las relaciones Estado-mercado”, en *Revista de Sociología e Política*, vol. 23, núm. 55, Brasil: Universidade Federal do Paraná. DOI: 10.1590/1678-987315235504. Disponible en: <http://ref.scielo.org/xcpns9> [07 de noviembre de 2018].
- Maillet, Antoine (2015b), “Variedades de Neoliberalismo. Innovación conceptual para el análisis del rol del Estado en los mercados”, en *Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época)*, núm. 169, España: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. DOI: 10.18042/cepc/rep.169.04. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.169.04> [07 de noviembre de 2018].
- Mayol, Alberto (2012), *El derrumbe del modelo. La crisis de la economía de mercado en el Chile contemporáneo*, Chile: LOM.
- Miller, Warren y Stokes, Donald (1963), “Constituency Influence in Congress”, en *American Political Science Review*, vol. 57, núm. 1, Estados Unidos: American Political Science Association. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952717> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Mills, C. Wright (1956), *The Power Elite*, Estados Unidos: Oxford University Press.
- Morales, Mauricio (2014), “Congruencia programática entre partidos y votantes en Chile”, en *Perfiles Latinoamericanos*, vol. 22, núm. 44, México: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Disponible en: <http://ref.scielo.org/wh3g9m> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Otero-Felipe, Patricia (2014), “Party-voter linkages. A Comparative View of Ideology and European Integration”, en *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, núm. 146, España: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. DOI: 10.5477/cis/reis.146.141. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.146.141> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Pakulski, Jan (2012), “Introduction: John Higley’s Work on Elite Foundations of Social Theory and Politics”, en *Historical Social Research-Historische Sozialforschung*, vol. 37, núm. 1, Alemania: Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756447> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Parry, Geraint (2005), *Political Elites*, Inglaterra: European Consortium for Political Research Press.
- Pasquino, Gianfranco (2011), *Nuevo curso de ciencia política*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Pitkin, Hanna (1967), *The Concept of Representation*, Estados Unidos: University of California Press.

- Powell, G. Bingham (2004), "Political Representation in Comparative Politics", en *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 7, Estados Unidos: Annual Reviews. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815. Disponible en: <http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Powell, G. Bingham (2009), "The Ideological Congruence Controversy. The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules", en *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 42, núm. 12, Estados Unidos: Sage. DOI: 10.1177/0010414009332147. Disponible en: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414009332147> [22 de abril de 2018].
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) (2014), *Ciudadanía Política: Voz y Participación Ciudadana en América Latina*, Argentina: Siglo XXI.
- Przeworski, Adam *et al.* (1999), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press.
- Real-Dato, José (2017), "Party-voters Congruence Concerning the European Union: An Analysis of Its Evolution During the Eurozone Crisis Using Elite and Mass Surveys", en *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, vol. 8, núm. 3, Hungría: Corvinus University of Budapest. DOI: 10.14267/cjssp.2017.3S.05. Disponible en: <http://cjssp.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php/cjssp/article/view/268> [20 de abril de 2018].
- Rivas, Cristina *et al.* (2014), "¿Cómo medir la congruencia ideológica? Elite parlamentaria y opinión pública en América Latina", en *Seminario de Investigación Instituto de Iberoamérica*, núm. 9, España: Universidad de Salamanca. Disponible en: <http://americo.usal.es/iberoame/?q=node/2351> [06 de septiembre de 2015].
- Rubner, Yossi *et al.* (2000), "The Earth Mover's Distance as a Metric for Image Retrieval", en *International Journal of Computer Vision*, vol. 40, núm. 2, Estados Unidos: Springer. DOI: 10.1023/A:1026543900054. Disponible en: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1026543900054> [19 de abril de 2018].
- Sartori, Giovanni (1999), *Elementos de teoría política*, España: Alianza.
- Selios, Lucía (2015), "Receptividad democrática en América Latina: un análisis de congruencia ideológica en perspectiva diacrónica", ponencia presentada en el VIII Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, 22-24 julio, Lima, Perú (inédito).
- Serna, Miguel (2006), "Las vías hacia el poder político. Bases sociales y carreras parlamentarias", en Mazzei, Enrique [comp.], *El Uruguay desde la Sociología IV*, Uruguay: Universidad de la República.
- Siavelis, Peter (2017), "Elite-Mass Congruence in Chile", en Joignant, Alfredo *et al.* [comps.], *Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries*, Estados Unidos: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Solimano, Andrés (2014), *Economic Elites, Crises, and Democracy: Alternatives beyond Neoliberal Capitalism*, Estados Unidos: Oxford University Press.
- Torcal, Mariano (2006), "Political Disaffection and Democratization History in New Democracies", en Torcal, Mariano y Montero, José Ramón [comps.], *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*, Estados Unidos: Routledge.
- Urbanek, Simon y Rubner, Yossi (2015), "Earth Mover's Distance. Package providing calculation of Earth Mover's Distance (EMD)". Disponible en: <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/emdist/emdist.pdf> [19 de abril de 2018].

- Vommaro, Gabriel y Gené, Mariana (2018), *Las élites políticas en el Sur. Un estado de la cuestión de los estudios sobre la Argentina, Brasil y Chile*, Argentina: Ediciones Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento.
- Weissberg, Robert (1978), "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress", en *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72, núm. 2, Estados Unidos: American Political Science Association. DOI: 10.2307/1954109. Disponible en: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954109> [28 de febrero de 2018].
- Zechmeister, Elizabeth y Corral, Margarita (2010), "El variado significado de 'izquierda' y 'derecha' en América Latina", en *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas*, núm. 38, Estados Unidos: Vanderbilt University. Disponible en: <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0838es.pdf> [22 de abril de 2018].

Figure 1
Elite-citizen ideological self-identification



Source: Own elaboration with surveys IDRC-UDP 2013-2014.

Graphs of the density distributions of the left-right ideological self-positioning (on a scale from 0 to 10) calculated with the expansion factor of each sample. Citizens in dark grey; legislators in light grey. Plus, the superposition between both densities is shown.

Table 1

Ideological congruence per political bloc and socioeconomic level

	Chile			Uruguay		
	NSE-	NSE+	All	NSE-	NSE+	All
Nueva Mayoría	1,675 (0,363)	2,020 (0,320)	1,793 (0,355)	--	--	--
Alianza	1,732 (0,338)	1,416 (0,293)	1,608 (0,330)	--	--	--
Frente Amplio	--	--	--	3,461 (0,498)	4,140 (0,512)	3,932 (0,508)
Partido Nacional	--	--	--	2,157 (0,133)	1,990 (0,157)	1,998 (0,149)
Partido Colorado	--	--	--	2,513 (0,233)	2,436 (0,253)	2,444 (0,247)
All	0,388 (0,051)	0,539 (0,013)	0,419 (0,040)	2,575 (0,392)	3,203 (0,409)	2,995 (0,404)

Source: Own elaboration with surveys IDRC-UDP 2013-2014.

Values correspond to $\mathcal{D}_{\text{EMD}}$ and RCC in brackets.

Table 2


Thematic congruence, support and satisfaction with democracy by socioeconomic level

	Chile			Uruguay		
	NSE-	NSE+	All	NSE-	NSE+	All
Support for democracy	0,814	0,388	0,658	0,701	0,332	0,485
Satisfaction with democracy	0,836	0,403	0,637	1,229	1,485	1,410
Compulsory vote	0,409	0,324	0,379	0,463	0,322	0,348
More relevant public problem	1,503	0,953	1,302	1,800	0,926	1,243

Source: Own elaboration with surveys IDRC-UDP 2013-2014.

Values correspond to $\mathcal{D}_{\text{EMD}}$.

Figure 2
The most relevant public problems for the citizens



Source: Own elaboration with surveys IDRC-UDP 2013-2014.

Particular percentage calculations are graphed (up to 50%), with the expansion factor of each sample. Citizens in dark grey; legislators, light grey.

Table 3

Congruence in preferences on the role of the State in the economy

	Chile		
	NSE-	NSE+	All
Public transport should be managed by a State enterprise	0,221	0,199	0,226
There should be more State banks	0,362	0,347	0,359
Particular-subsidized colleges shall become part of the State	0,531	0,391	0,486
There should be a network of State drugstores	0,244	0,250	0,236
All the universities will have to become part of the State	0,618	0,458	0,553

Source: own elaboration with surveys IDRC-UDP 2013-2014.

Values correspond to $\mathcal{D}_{\text{EMD}}$.

Bastían González-Bustamante. Instructor Professor in Department of Management and Public Policies in College of Administration and Economy of Universidad de Santiago de Chile. Master in Political Sciences, public administrator and graduate in Political and Governmental Sciences from Universidad de Chile. Main research lines: composition and rotation of cabinets, political elites, civil service systems, political participation, digital media, electronic government and research methodology focusing on qualitative and mixed methods. Recent publications: González-Bustamante, Bastián and Garrido-Vergara, Luis (2018), “Socialización, trayectorias y poscarrera de ministros en Chile, 1990-2010”, in *Política y Gobierno*, vol. XXV, no. 1, Mexico: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas; González-Bustamante, Bastián (2018), “Civil Service Models in Latin America”, in Farazmand, Ali [comp.], *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, United States: Springer; González-Bustamante, Bastián (2018), “Internet, uso de redes sociales digitales y participación en el Cono Sur”, in Cottet, Pablo [comp.], *Opinión Pública Contemporánea: Otras Posibilidades de Comprensión e Investigación*, Chile: Social-Ediciones.